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  1. Jan 09, 2018
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Tolerate DTLS alerts with an incorrect version number · da9ed725
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      In the case of a protocol version alert being sent by a peer the record
      version number may not be what we are expecting. In DTLS records with an
      unexpected version number are silently discarded. This probably isn't
      appropriate for alerts, so we tolerate a mismatch in the minor version
      number.
      
      This resolves an issue reported on openssl-users where an OpenSSL server
      chose DTLS1.0 but the client was DTLS1.2 only and sent a protocol_version
      alert with a 1.2 record number. This was silently ignored by the server.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5019)
      da9ed725
  2. Jan 07, 2018
  3. Jan 06, 2018
  4. Jan 05, 2018
  5. Dec 27, 2017
  6. Dec 23, 2017
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  11. Dec 08, 2017
  12. Dec 07, 2017
  13. Dec 06, 2017
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Add a test for CVE-2017-3737 · c7383fb5
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Test reading/writing to an SSL object after a fatal error has been
      detected.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      c7383fb5
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Don't allow read/write after fatal error · 898fb884
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
      mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
      then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
      you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
      explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
      SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
      SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
      handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
      call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
      for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
      being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.
      
      In order to exploit this issue an attacker would have to trick an
      application into behaving incorrectly by issuing an SSL_read()/SSL_write()
      after having already received a fatal error.
      
      Thanks to David Benjamin (Google) for reporting this issue and suggesting
      this fix.
      
      CVE-2017-3737
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      898fb884
    • Andy Polyakov's avatar
      bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl: fix digit correction bug in rsaz_1024_mul_avx2. · ca51bafc
      Andy Polyakov authored
      
      
      Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.
      
      CVE-2017-3738
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      ca51bafc
  14. Dec 04, 2017
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