- 24 Mar, 2015 5 commits
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Mike Frysinger authored
Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define. Reported-by:
Conrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de> URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828 RT#3758 Signed-off-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Thanks to a -I.., the path does work, at least on unix. However, this doesn't work so well on VMS. Correcting the path to not rely on given -I does work on both. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 23 Mar, 2015 19 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Remove old ASN.1 COMPAT type. This was meant as a temporary measure so older ASN.1 code (from OpenSSL 0.9.6) still worked. It's a hack which breaks constification and hopefully nothing uses it now, if it ever did. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
It was saying that it was an illegal parameter / unsupported cipher Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case. ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Also removes for it being NULL Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Remove x_exten.c and x_exten.o from crypto/asn1/Makefile: they've moved now. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Fix missing return value check in dtls1_listen when calling SSL_clear(). Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Change ssl_set_handshake_header from return void to returning int, and handle error return code appropriately. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Ensure that all libssl functions called from within the apps have their return values checked where appropriate. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Ensure that all functions have their return values checked where appropriate. This covers all functions defined and called from within libssl. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Mark most functions returning a result defined in any libssl header file with __owur to warn if they are used without checking the return value. Use -DUNUSED_RETURN compiler flag with gcc to activate these warnings. Some functions returning a result are skipped if it is common and valid to use these functions without checking the return value. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
In order to receive warnings on unused function return values the flag -DDEBUG_UNUSED must be passed to the compiler. This change adds that for the --strict-warnings Configure option. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Follow up on the earlier "Do not keep TABLE in version control". Actually removing TABLE from version control was forgotten. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Don't check that the curve appears in the list of acceptable curves for the peer, if they didn't send us such a list (RFC 4492 does not require that the extension be sent). Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Remove {i2d,d2i}_ASN1_BOOLEAN. Rewrite single occurrence of d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN in asn1_parse2 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Remove old M_ASN1_ macros and replace any occurences with the corresponding function. Remove d2i_ASN1_bytes, d2i_ASN1_SET, i2d_ASN1_SET: no longer used internally. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
In cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro) and Sami Tolvanen (Google). Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 21 Mar, 2015 1 commit
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Richard Levitte authored
Using $t is an artifact from the earlier changes in Configure and was unfortunately forgotten as is. Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- 20 Mar, 2015 7 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
This tests the unwrap algorithm with an invalid key. The result should be rejected without returning any plaintext. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Richard Godbee authored
crypto/modes/wrap128.c was heavily refactored to support AES Key Wrap with Padding, and four bugs were introduced into CRYPTO_128_unwrap() at that time: - crypto_128_unwrap_raw()'s return value ('ret') is checked incorrectly, and the function immediately returns 'ret' in (almost) all cases. This makes the IV checking code later in the function unreachable, but callers think the IV check succeeded since CRYPTO_128_unwrap()'s return value is non-zero. FIX: Return 0 (error) if crypto_128_unwrap_raw() returned 0 (error). - crypto_128_unwrap_raw() writes the IV to the 'got_iv' buffer, not to the first 8 bytes of the output buffer ('out') as the IV checking code expects. This makes the IV check fail. FIX: Compare 'iv' to 'got_iv', not 'out'. - The data written to the output buffer ('out') is "cleansed" if the IV check fails, but the code passes OPENSSL_cleanse() the input buffer length ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes that crypto_128_unwrap_raw() wrote to the output buffer ('ret'). This means that OPENSSL_cleanse() could potentially write past the end of 'out'. FIX: Change 'inlen' to 'ret' in the OPENSSL_cleanse() call. - CRYPTO_128_unwrap() is returning the length of the input buffer ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes written to the output buffer ('ret'). This could cause the caller to read past the end of 'out'. FIX: Return 'ret' instead of 'inlen' at the end of the function. PR#3749 Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Richard Godbee authored
Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Updated test/testssl script to include the new DTLS capability in ssltest. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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David Woodhouse authored
Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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David Woodhouse authored
Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- 19 Mar, 2015 8 commits
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reported by the LibreSSL project as a follow on to CVE-2015-0209 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Resync NEWS with the latest version from 1.0.2 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Resync CHANGES with the latest version from 1.0.2. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
In PKCS#7, the ASN.1 content component is optional. This typically applies to inner content (detached signatures), however we must also handle unexpected missing outer content correctly. This patch only addresses functions reachable from parsing, decryption and verification, and functions otherwise associated with reading potentially untrusted data. Correcting all low-level API calls requires further work. CVE-2015-0289 Thanks to Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server enabling client authentication. CVE-2015-0286 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE cipher being used and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack. CVE-2015-1787 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
If a client renegotiates using an invalid signature algorithms extension it will crash a server with a NULL pointer dereference. Thanks to David Ramos of Stanford University for reporting this bug. CVE-2015-0291 Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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