- 11 Jan, 2017 8 commits
-
-
Richard Levitte authored
It tests both the use of UI_METHOD (through the apps/apps.h API) and wrapping an older style PEM password callback in a UI_METHOD. Replace the earlier UI test with a run of this test program Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2204)
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
-
- 10 Jan, 2017 32 commits
-
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
The length passed to tls1_set_sigalgs() is a multiple of two and there are two char entries in the list for each sigalg. When we set client_sigalgslen or conf_sigalgslen this is the number of ints in the list where there is one entry per sigalg (i.e. half the length of the list passed to the function). Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
The SHA1 sigalgs were inadvertently missed off in the sigalgs refactor. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
The siglen value needs to be initialised prior to it being read in the call to EVP_DigestSignFinal later in this function. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Declare a variable as static to silence the warning Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Check that signatures actually work, and that an incorrect signature results in a handshake failure. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
This enables us to make changes to in-flight TLSv1.3 messages that appear after the ServerHello. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Previously SKE in TLSProxy only knew about one anonymous ciphersuite so there was never a signature. Extend that to include a ciphersuite that is not anonymous. This also fixes a bug where the existing SKE processing was checking against the wrong anon ciphersuite value. This has a knock on impact on the sslskewith0p test. The bug meant the test was working...but entirely by accident! Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
TLSv1.3 introduces PSS based sigalgs. Offering these in a TLSv1.3 client implies that the client is prepared to accept these sigalgs even in TLSv1.2. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
This also acts as a test for the bug fixed in the previous commit. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
TLSv1.3 freezes the record layer version and ensures that it is always set to TLSv1.0. Some implementations check this. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
In TLSv1.3 we must use PSS based sig algs for RSA signing. Ignore any shared sig algs which are PKCS1 based. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
A misreading of the TLS1.3 spec meant we were using the handshake hashes up to and including the Client Finished to calculate the client application traffic secret. We should be only use up until the Server Finished. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
We can't handle these messages yet, so ignore them for now. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
We need to use the length of the handshake hash for the length of the finished key. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
We were not incrementing the sequence number every time we sent/received a record. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
The sigalgs work has made some old lookup tables and functions redundant so remove them. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
We had an extra layer of indirection in looking up hashes and sigs based on sigalgs which is now no longer necessary. This removes it. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
The extensions refactor made this function redundant so we can remove it. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
In TLSv1.2 an individual sig alg is represented by 1 byte for the hash and 1 byte for the signature. In TLSv1.3 each sig alg is represented by two bytes, where the two bytes together represent a single hash and signature combination. This converts the internal representation of sigalgs to use a single int for the pair, rather than a pair of bytes. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Rich Salz authored
Fixes GitHub issue 2169. Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2207)
-
Kurt Roeckx authored
Found by tis-interpreter Reviewed-by:
-
