Fix some of the variables to be (s)size_t, so that more than 1GB of
secure memory can be allocated. The arena has to be a power of 2, and
2GB fails because it ends up being a negative 32-bit signed number.

The |too_late| flag is not strictly necessary; it is easy to figure
out if something is secure memory by looking at the arena. As before,
secure memory allocations will not fail, but now they can be freed
correctly. Once initialized, secure memory can still be used, even if
allocations occured before initialization.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This macro was defined by no-longer-supported __MWERKS__ compiler.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Usage of $ymm variable is a bit misleading here, it doesn't refer
to %ymm register bank, but rather to VEX instruction encoding,
which AMD XOP code path depends on.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Some X509_STORE macros do not work since the type was made opaque.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne().

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

EC_GROUP_check() was obtaining a temporary BIGNUM from the BN_CTX, but
then not using it.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The srp application created an uninitialised DB_ATTR object and then
passed it to the load_index function which attempted to read it. A
DB_ATTR object only contains a single field called "unique_subject".
AFAICT this attribute is unused in the SRP case, and therefore it would be
better to pass a NULL DB_ATTR to load_index (which handles that case
gracefully).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

We should only copy parameters and keys if the group is set. Otherwise
they don't really make any sense. Previously we copied the private key
regardless of whether the group was set...but if it wasn't a NULL ptr
deref could occur. It's unclear whether we could ever get into that
situation, but since we were already checking it for the public key we
should be consistent.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

BIO_ADDR_new() calls OPENSSL_zalloc() which can fail - but the return
value is not checked.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

i2d_name_canon can return a negative number on error. We should check it
before continuing.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1012)

The length is a long, so returning the difference does not quite work.

Thanks to Torbjörn Granlund for noticing.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The non-ascii version of this set of macros ensures that the "a" variable
is inside the expected range. This logic wasn't quite right for the
EBCDIC version.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Most of the tests already pass with EBCIDC but a few were trying to
write into read only memory.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

This adds the define CHARSET_EBCDIC_TEST which enables testing of EBCDIC
code on an ASCII system.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Building with -DCHARSET_EBCDIC and using --strict-warnings resulted in
lots of miscellaneous errors. This fixes it.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

When compiling all other C files, rely on the compiler to
automatically pick up the name translation information from the header
files __DECC_INCLUDE_{PRO,EPI}LOGUE.H.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

With DEC C on VMS, you can use __DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H and
__DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H to include some DEC C specific features or
pragmas without having to touch the other header files.

It seems, however, that the current version of the compiler requires
the file names to be upcased, or it doesn't handle them quite right.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Currently we can get all block ciphers with
	EVP_get_cipherbyname("<alg_name>-<block-mode-name>")
for example, by names "aes-128-ecb" or "des-ede-cbc".
I found a problem with des-ede-ecb and des-ede3-ecb ciphers as
they can be accessed only with names:
	EVP_get_cipherbyname("des-ede")
	EVP_get_cipherbyname("des-ede3")
It breaks the general concept.

In this patch I add aliases which allow to use names:
	EVP_get_cipherbyname("des-ede-ecb")
	EVP_get_cipherbyname("des-ede3-ecb")
in addition to the currently used names.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Script obj_dat.pl depends on file obj_mac.h generated by script objects.pl

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT#4508

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Commit e1d9f1ab

 left some dead code behind. This removes it.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>