- 15 Sep, 2016 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Backport leak fix from master branch. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
This fixes the following error when building with no particular pointer size is specified (implied 32 bit): static void *(*realloc_func) (void *, size_t) = realloc; ................................................^ %CC-E-UNDECLARED, In the initializer for realloc_func, "_realloc32" is not declared. at line number 93 in file DEV:[OPENSSL102.crypto]mem.c;1 Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 14 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
The internal SRP function t_fromb64() converts from base64 to binary. It does not validate that the size of the destination is sufficiently large - that is up to the callers. In some places there was such a check, but not in others. Add an argument to t_fromb64() to provide the size of the destination buffer and validate that we don't write too much data. Also add some sanity checks to the callers where appropriate. With thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 73f0df83)
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- 13 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
A peer continually sending unrecognised warning alerts could mean that we make no progress on a connection. We should abort rather than continuing if we receive an unrecognised warning alert. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 12 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 11 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Backport leak fix from master branch. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 09 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 08 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Richard Levitte authored
VMS sets that errno when the device part of a file spec is malformed or a logical name that doesn't exist. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e82e2186)
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- 07 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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David Woodhouse authored
Some hardware devices don't provide the public EC_POINT data. The only way for X509_check_private_key() to validate that the key matches a given certificate is to actually perform a sign operation and then verify it using the public key in the certificate. Maybe that can come later, as discussed in issue 1532. But for now let's at least make it fail gracefully and not crash. GH: 1532 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1547) (cherry picked from commit 92ed7fa5)
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- 06 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Rich Salz authored
Never output -0; make "negative zero" an impossibility. Do better checking on BN_rand top/bottom requirements and #bits. Update doc. Ignoring trailing garbage in BN_asc2bn. Port this commit from boringSSL: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/899b9b19a4cd3fe526aaf5047ab9234cdca19f7d%5E!/ Ensure |BN_div| never gives negative zero in the no_branch code. Have |bn_correct_top| fix |bn->neg| if the input is zero so that we don't have negative zeros lying around. Thanks to Brian Smith for noticing. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 01c09f9f) (Some manual work required)
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- 31 Aug, 2016 1 commit
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Andy Polyakov authored
crypto/bn/*: x86[_64] division instruction doesn't handle constants, change constraint from 'g' to 'r'. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 68b4a6e9)
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- 30 Aug, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
The function tls_construct_cert_status() is called by both TLS and DTLS code. However it only ever constructed a TLS message header for the message which obviously failed in DTLS. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 26 Aug, 2016 11 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
OPENSSL_cleanse() does not validate its input parameter for NULL so SRP_create_verifier() should do so instead. Otherwise a segfault will result. Alternative solution to GitHub PR#1006 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
The definition of STITCHED_CALL relies on OPENSSL_NO_ASM. However, when a configuration simply lacks the assembler implementation for RC4 (which is where we have implemented the stitched call), OPENSSL_NO_ASM isn't implemented. Better, then, to rely on specific macros that indicated that RC4 (and MD5) are implemented in assembler. For this to work properly, we must also make sure Configure adds the definition of RC4_ASM among the C flags. (partly cherry picked from commit 216e8d91 ) Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Fix a possible leak on NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify failure. Backport of 0517538d Backport of f6c006ea Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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David Woodhouse authored
(Modified for 1.0.2 by adding selected PACKET_xx() functions and PRF, and subsequent cleanup from commit eb633d03 ) Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 40425899200a3dea9ec3684d3eb80bcf50c99baf)
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David Woodhouse authored
Baroque, almost uncommented code triggers behaviour which is undefined by the C standard. You might quite reasonably not care that the code was broken on ones-complement machines, but if we support a ubsan build then we need to at least pretend to care. It looks like the special-case code for 64-bit big-endian is going to behave differently (and wrongly) on wrap-around, because it treats the values as signed. That seems wrong, and allows replay and other attacks. Surely you need to renegotiate and start a new epoch rather than wrapping around to sequence number zero again? Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2e94723c)
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David Woodhouse authored
Commit d8e8590e ("Fix missing return value checks in SCTP") made the DTLS handshake fail, even for non-SCTP connections, if SSL_export_keying_material() fails. Which it does, for DTLS1_BAD_VER. Apply the trivial fix to make it succeed, since there's no real reason why it shouldn't even though we never need it. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c8a18468)
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Matt Caswell authored
This also fixes no-tls which is an alias for no-tls1 in 1.0.2 (it is not possible to do no-tls1_1 or no-tls1_2 in 1.0.2). Because it is not possible to disable TLS1.1 or TLS1.2 it no longer follows that disabling TLS1.0 should force the disabling of tlsext. Also a few missing ifdef guards. GitHub Iusse#935 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d3034d31)
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Andy Polyakov authored
RT#4625 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e3057a57)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b62b2454)
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Todd Short authored
Sessions are stored on the session_ctx, which doesn't change after SSL_set_SSL_CTX(). Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 24 Aug, 2016 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. CVE-2016-6303 Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 55d83bf7)
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Use a ciphersuite in dtlstest that is not affected by no-* options. Backport of commit fe34735c . Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 23 Aug, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on HMAC size. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. CVE-2016-6302 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 22 Aug, 2016 12 commits
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Richard Levitte authored
We don't really have a mechanism to include other object files into a given test program. For now, a simple hack in mk1mf.pl will do. RT#4653 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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David Benjamin authored
a03f81f4 added a malloc failure check to EVP_PKEY_keygen, but there already was one. Signed-off-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1473
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Kazuki Yamaguchi authored
Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f ("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()"). Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 099e2968)
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Rich Salz authored
Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err. Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte) Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 464d59a5)
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Richard Levitte authored
Most of the time, this isn't strictly needed. However, in the default extern model (called relaxed refdef), symbols are treated as weak common objects unless they are initialised. The librarian doesn't include weak symbols in the (static) libraries, which renders them invisible when linking a program with said those libraries, which is a problem at times. Using the strict refdef model is much more like standard C on all other platforms, and thereby avoid the issues that come with the relaxed refdef model. Note: this doesn't apply to VAX C. It's possible that this will make OpenSSL building with VAX C difficult some time in the future if it isn't already. However, VAX C is a very old compiler that we don't expect to see too often, as DEC C (a.k.a VMS C) should have replaced it a long time ago. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Some builds fail otherwise. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
The following would fail, or rather, freeze: openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048 openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating something new. This changes makes it fully flagged. RT#4655 Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages, touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to overstep the guard page. Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal instructions in some VM setups. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3ba1ef82)
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Richard Levitte authored
In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value. The compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it to be picky. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1c288878)
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Matt Caswell authored
Follow on from CVE-2016-2179 The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw. This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its own. The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e where the client receives the injected Finished message). The MITM requires the following capabilities: - The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages. - The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client - The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message, with the second fragment containing the final byte. During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message. OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and will buffer it for later use. After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM fragment and the final byte from the real client. The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g. the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in 256 of such injection attempts will succeed. It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be correct in all cases. In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection. Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL. The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate Finished message injection flaw. The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS). That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled. The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the point that we need to use it. However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented) message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get removed. Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number (starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future. However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything greater than that in the queue is just left there. So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At that point all the queues are flushed. An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion. I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be an issue. A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0 to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future. Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send that could get orphaned would typically be 15. The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of "orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k. Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be orphaned per connection. As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed. Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have to open many simultaneous connections. Issue reported by Quan Luo. CVE-2016-2179 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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