- May 02, 2018
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Pavel Kopyl authored
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Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4700)
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- May 01, 2018
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
Commit d316cdcf introduced some extra checks into the session-cache update procedure, intended to prevent the caching of sessions whose resumption would lead to a handshake failure, since if the server is authenticating the client, there needs to be an application-set "session id context" to match up to the authentication context. While that change is effective for its stated purpose, there was also some collatoral damage introduced along with the fix -- clients that set SSL_VERIFY_PEER are not expected to set an sid_ctx, and so their usage of session caching was erroneously denied. Fix the scope of the original commit by limiting it to only acting when the SSL is a server SSL. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5967)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #5061 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Specifically this is not supported with an even modulus and BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. Fixes #5082 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #5063 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Apr 30, 2018
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Fixes: #6046 Reviewed-by:
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- Apr 29, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
Rationale for enforcing no-engine is because of disconnect between compile-time config and run-time, which is a per-application sandbox directory which one can't predict in advance. Besides, none of the bundled engines actually give an edge on iOS... Reviewed-by:
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- Apr 28, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes: #6120 Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6123)
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- Apr 27, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes: #6081 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Make it clear that you should not attempt to get the version before the first handshake is complete. Fixes #2893 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #6098 Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6104)
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Billy Brumley authored
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- Apr 26, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
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Richard Levitte authored
To my surprise, it turns out that on OpenVMS, opening './' (which is translated to '[]') for writing actually creates a file, '[].'. On OpenVMS, this is a perfectly valid file with no name or extension, just the delimiter between the two. Because of the mess the exception would generate in the test recipe, it gets refactored again, to clearly separate each test inside it, and use skips to avoid some of them (that makes it clear that they are skipped and why, when running the recipe). Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6100)
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Rich Salz authored
Add a script to find them in the future Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6103)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes: #5950 Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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FdaSilvaYY authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Note that calling the *use_certificate* functions will replace any existing certificate of the same type. The same thing applies for private keys. Fixes #2147 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
SSL_kANY, and SSL_aANY were placed in the wrong fields. It makes no functional difference since these macros evaluate to 0 anyway, which is the correct value for these fields. Fixes #6048 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
get_last_sys_error() already exists, so there's no need for yet another macro that fulfills the same purpose. Fixes #4120 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Add a bit more commentary to explain what's going on. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
That error is already caught by EVP_read_pw_string_min, and causes this function to return -1, so the code detecting too short passwords in this function is practically dead. Fixes #5465 Reviewed-by:
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- Apr 25, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #6083 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #5656 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
This option shows the certificates as sent by the server. It is not the full verified chain. Fixes #4933 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
open() will take care of the checks anyway Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
[extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
This reverts commit 555c94a0 . Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
This reverts commit 215a6730 . Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
This reverts commit f6d76598 . Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Test writing to the null device. This should be successful. Also, refactor so the planned number of tests is calculated. Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
The actual functionality of generating signatures through the `EVP_PKEY` API is completely untested. Current tests under the `EVP_PKEY` API (`test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt`) only cover `Verify` and `Decrypt`, while encryption and signature generation are tested with ad-hoc clients (`test/sm2crypttest.c`, `test/sm2signtest.c`) that do not call the `EVP_PKEY` interface at all but soon-to-be private functions that bypass it (cf. PR#5895 ). It is my opinion that an ideal solution for the future would consist on enhancing the `test/evp_pkey` facility and syntax to allow tests to take control of the PRNG to inject known nonces and validate the results of `EVP_PKEY` implementations against deterministic known answer tests, but it is probably too late to work on this feature in time for next release. Given that commit b5a85f70d8 highlights some critical bugs in the hook between the `EVP_PKEY` interface and SM2 signature generation and that these defects escaped testing and code review, I think that at least for now it is beneficial to at least add the kind of "bogus" testing provided by this patch: this is a "fake" test as it does only verify that the SM2 `EVP_PKEY` interface is capable of creating a signature without failing, but it does not say anything about the generated signature being valid, nor does it test the functional correctness of the cryptosystem. Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Currently, critical bugs prevent using SM2 signatures through the `EVP_PKEY` interface: any application that managed to satisfy the requirement of forcing SM3 as the message digest – even if this is currently not possible transparently through the `EVP_PKEY` interface and requires manually forcing the MD selection – would crash with a segmentation fault upon calling the `SM2_sign()` function. This is easily verified using the OpenSSL CLI to execute this critical code path under the right conditions: `openssl dgst -sm3 -hex -sign sm2.eckey /path/to/file/to/sign` The issue is caused by a double free at the end of `SM2_sign()` in `crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c` in case of successful signature generation. In addition, even if the double free was not causing segfaults, the function returns the wrong return value in case of success (it would return 0 rather than 1). This patch fixes both problems. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
The MAX_CURVELIST macro defines the total number of in-built SSL/TLS curves that we support. However it has not been updated as new curves are added. Fixes #5232 Reviewed-by:
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