The buffer to receive messages is initialised to 16k. If a message is
received that is larger than that then the buffer is "realloc'd". This can
cause the location of the underlying buffer to change. Anything that is
referring to the old location will be referring to free'd data. In the
recent commit c1ef7c97 (master) and 4b390b6c

 (1.1.0) the point in the code
where the message buffer is grown was changed. However s->init_msg was not
updated to point at the new location.

CVE-2016-6309

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0d698f66)

Ensure that we send a large message during the test suite.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 84d5549e)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an
infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and
never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in
a Denial Of Service attack.

CVE-2016-6305

GitHub Issue #1563

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a
mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested
NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore
the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious
server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As
this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not
occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Test that the OCSP callbacks work as expected.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Add a function for testing whether a given OCSP_RESPID matches with a
certificate.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

OCSP_RESPID was made opaque in 1.1.0, but no accessors were provided for
setting the name/key value for the OCSP_RESPID.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.

CVE-2016-6304

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a449b47c)

There are cases when argc is more trustable than proper argv termination.
Since we trust argc in all other test programs, we might as well treat it
the same way in this program.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 780bbb96)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This issue is very similar to CVE-2016-6307 described in the previous
commit. The underlying defect is different but the security analysis and
impacts are the same except that it impacts DTLS.

A DTLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the
message.
This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length
are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending
reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed
to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that
memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive
message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could
mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a
connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory
exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place,
and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the
application calls SSL_free() on the failed conneciton in a timely manner
then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again.
Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature.
This then means that there is only a security impact if:

1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the
event that the connection fails
or
2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there
is very little free memory
or
3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there
are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for
the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is
insufficient memory to service the multiple requests.

Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to
be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is
subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an
increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack
of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service.

This issue does not affect TLS users.

Issue was reported by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.).

CVE-2016-6308

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 48c054fe)

A TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message.
This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length
are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending
reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed
to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that
memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive
message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could
mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a
connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory
exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place,
and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the
application calls SSL_free() on the failed conneciton in a timely manner
then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again.
Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature.
This then means that there is only a security impact if:

1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the
event that the connection fails
or
2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there
is very little free memory
or
3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there
are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for
the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is
insufficient memory to service the multiple requests.

Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to
be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is
subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an
increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack
of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service.

This issue does not affect DTLS users.

Issue was reported by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.).

CVE-2016-6307

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c1ef7c97)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 047d97af)

If OPENSSL_sk_insert() calls OPENSSL_realloc() and it fails, it was leaking
the originally allocated memory.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41bff723)

Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that
no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts.
Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit af58be76)

Suggested in GH#1589.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7dc0ad4d)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ba8fa4e5)

Reported in GH#1589, but solution is different from suggested.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 799c1293)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 776e15f9)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6fcace45)

Makes the logic a little bit clearer.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1571)
(cherry picked from commit 4f8a5f4d)

We should check the last BN_CTX_get() call to ensure that it isn't NULL
before we try and use any of the allocated BIGNUMs.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ff7425d)

This is a program for VMS that corresponds to util/shlib_wrap.sh.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f3ff481f)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 47852e6a)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f6be8315)

Check arg count and print an error message.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 13a46183)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a19228b7)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e836806)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c88c88b)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f4566dff)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ccf11f7e)

Call SSL_CTX_new() before doing any configuration.
(or call OPENSSL_ssl_init())

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 54d72ef0)

'ECDHParameters = Automatic' isn't accepted.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3656ea1c)

Note: server-cmod doesn't seem to do things right...  from loading
cmod.cnf, it tries to load libssl_conf.so.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 16c6deed)

CMS_NOOLDMIMETYPE and PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE  are unused in pkcs7/cms code.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1585)
(cherry picked from commit 28aef3d9)