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  1. Mar 19, 2015
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Multiblock corrupted pointer fix · 77c77f0a
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
      feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
      NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
      OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
      using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
      socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
      However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
      fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
      
      CVE-2015-0290
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
      77c77f0a
  2. Mar 18, 2015
  3. Mar 17, 2015
  4. Mar 15, 2015
  5. Mar 14, 2015
  6. Mar 12, 2015
  7. Mar 11, 2015
  8. Mar 10, 2015
    • Emilia Kasper's avatar
      Harmonize return values in dtls1_buffer_record · 0c14565c
      Emilia Kasper authored
      
      
      Ensure all malloc failures return -1.
      
      Reported by Adam Langley (Google).
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 06c6a2b4)
      0c14565c
    • Richard Godbee's avatar
      BIO_debug_callback: Fix output on 64-bit machines · 5a9e9669
      Richard Godbee authored
      
      
      BIO_debug_callback() no longer assumes the hexadecimal representation of
      a pointer fits in 8 characters.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 460e920d)
      5a9e9669
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Prevent handshake with unseeded PRNG · 2b31fcc0
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
      handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
      - Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
      user has not seeded manually
      - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
      SSL_client_methodv23)
      - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
      from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
      (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)
      
      If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
      have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
      the output may be predictable.
      
      For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
      succeed on an unpatched platform:
      
      openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
      
      CVE-2015-0285
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit e1b568dd)
      2b31fcc0
  9. Mar 09, 2015
  10. Mar 08, 2015
  11. Mar 07, 2015
  12. Mar 06, 2015
  13. Mar 05, 2015
  14. Mar 02, 2015