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  1. Jul 25, 2017
    • Andy Polyakov's avatar
      x86_64 assembly pack: "optimize" for Knights Landing. · 738a9dd5
      Andy Polyakov authored
      "Optimize" is in quotes because it's rather a "salvage operation"
      for now. Idea is to identify processor capability flags that
      drive Knights Landing to suboptimial code paths and mask them.
      Two flags were identified, XSAVE and ADCX/ADOX. Former affects
      choice of AES-NI code path specific for Silvermont (Knights Landing
      is of Silvermont "ancestry"). And 64-bit ADCX/ADOX instructions are
      effectively mishandled at decode time. In both cases we are looking
      at ~2x improvement.
      
      Hardware used for benchmarking courtesy of Atos, experiments run by
      Romain Dolbeau <romain.dolbeau@atos.net>. Kudos!
      
      This is minimalistic backpoint of 64d92d74
      
      
      
      Thanks to David Benjamin for spotting typo in Knights Landing detection!
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4006)
      738a9dd5
  2. Jul 24, 2017
  3. Jul 23, 2017
  4. Jul 19, 2017
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Remove some dead code · 42aebbd5
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      The intention of the removed code was to check if the previous operation
      carried. However this does not work. The "mask" value always ends up being
      a constant and is all ones - thus it has no effect. This check is no longer
      required because of the previous commit.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3832)
      
      (cherry picked from commit d5475e31)
      42aebbd5
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Fix undefined behaviour in e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c and e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c · 6db7d015
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      In TLS mode of operation the padding value "pad" is obtained along with the
      maximum possible padding value "maxpad". If pad > maxpad then the data is
      invalid. However we must continue anyway because this is constant time code.
      
      We calculate the payload length like this:
      
          inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
      
      However if pad is invalid then inp_len ends up -ve (actually large +ve
      because it is a size_t).
      
      Later we do this:
      
          /* verify HMAC */
          out += inp_len;
          len -= inp_len;
      
      This ends up with "out" pointing before the buffer which is undefined
      behaviour. Next we calculate "p" like this:
      
          unsigned char *p =
              out + len - 1 - maxpad - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
      
      Because of the "out + len" term the -ve inp_len value is cancelled out
      so "p" points to valid memory (although technically the pointer arithmetic
      is undefined behaviour again).
      
      We only ever then dereference "p" and never "out" directly so there is
      never an invalid read based on the bad pointer - so there is no security
      issue.
      
      This commit fixes the undefined behaviour by ensuring we use maxpad in
      place of pad, if the supplied pad is invalid.
      
      With thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3832)
      
      (cherry picked from commit 335d0a46)
      6db7d015
  5. Jul 18, 2017
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