- Aug 11, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from the 1.0.2 documentation): For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the data just written. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL output buffer was provided. Fixes #6914 Reviewed-by:Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918) (cherry picked from commit 61140415)
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- Aug 10, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889) (cherry picked from commit 582ad5d4) Resolved conflicts: crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
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Andy Polyakov authored
It was false positive, but one can as well view it as readability issue. Switch even to unsigned indices because % BN_BYTES takes 4-6 instructions with signed dividend vs. 1 (one) with unsigned. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
"Computationally constant-time" means that it might still leak information about input's length, but only in cases when input is missing complete BN_ULONG limbs. But even then leak is possible only if attacker can observe memory access pattern with limb granularity. Reviewed-by:
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- Aug 07, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6881)
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- Aug 01, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
(back-ported from commit 37132c97 ) Reviewed-by:
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Billy Brumley authored
Those even order that do not play nicely with Montgomery arithmetic (back-ported from commit 3a6a4a93 ) Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
New implementation failed to correctly reset r->neg flag. Spotted by OSSFuzz. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
Originally suggested solution for "Return Of the Hidden Number Problem" is arguably too expensive. While it has marginal impact on slower curves, none to ~6%, optimized implementations suffer real penalties. Most notably sign with P-256 went more than 2 times[!] slower. Instead, just implement constant-time BN_mod_add_quick. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
Note that exported functions maintain original behaviour, so that external callers won't observe difference. While internally we can now perform Montogomery multiplication on fixed-length vectors, fixed at modulus size. The new functions, bn_to_mont_fixed_top and bn_mul_mont_fixed_top, are declared in bn_int.h, because one can use them even outside bn, e.g. in RSA, DSA, ECDSA... Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
The new flag marks vectors that were not treated with bn_correct_top, in other words such vectors are permitted to be zero padded. For now it's BN_DEBUG-only flag, as initial use case for zero-padded vectors would be controlled Montgomery multiplication/exponentiation, not general purpose. For general purpose use another type might be more appropriate. Advantage of this suggestion is that it's possible to back-port it... bn/bn_div.c: fix memory sanitizer problem. bn/bn_sqr.c: harmonize with BN_mul. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
Trouble is that addition is postponing expansion till carry is calculated, and if addition carries, top word can be zero, which triggers assertion in bn_check_top. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 26, 2018
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Kurt Roeckx authored
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Kurt Roeckx authored
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> GH: #6075 Fixes: #6012 (cherry picked from commit feac7a1c)
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Kurt Roeckx authored
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit. We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 25, 2018
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Jiecheng Wu, Zuxing Gu for the report. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 23, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine is called when application attempts to use custom generator, i.e. rarely. Even though it was wrong, it didn't affect point operations, they were just not as fast as expected. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 22, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
As per RFC 7292. Fixes #6665 Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6708) (cherry picked from commit b709babb)
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- Jul 13, 2018
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Alexandre Perrin authored
Change the description for BN_hex2bn() so that it uses the same BIGNUM argument name as its prototype. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 03, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
We should validate that the various fields we put into the CertificateRequest are not too long. Otherwise we will construct an invalid message. Fixes #6609 Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 28, 2018
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Rich Salz authored
Fixes uninitialized memory read reported by Nick Mathewson Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 25, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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- Jun 24, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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- Jun 21, 2018
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Nick Mathewson authored
Also, modernize the code, so that it isn't trying to store a size_t into an int, and then check the int's sign. :/ Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
In previous versions of OpenSSL, the documentation for PEM_read_* said: The callback B<must> return the number of characters in the passphrase or 0 if an error occurred. But since c82c3462 , 0 is now treated as a non-error return value. Applications that want to indicate an error need to return -1 instead. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too. This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA. Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates: s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature operations. As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to the operation so that: s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned. This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is only removed at the last possible step. Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 19, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #5322 Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 18, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6465)
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- Jun 13, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates: s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature operations. As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to the operation so that: s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned. Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 12, 2018
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Guido Vranken authored
CVE-2018-0732 Signed-off-by:
Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit 91f7361f ) Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 09, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
This module is used only with odd input lengths, i.e. not used in normal PKI cases, on contemporary processors. The problem was "illuminated" by fuzzing tests. Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 02, 2018
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Ken Goldman authored
ECDSA_SIG_new() returns NULL on error. Reviewed-by:
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- May 31, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Just because an engine implements algorithm methods, that doesn't mean it also implements the ASN1 method. Therefore, be careful when looking for an ASN1 method among all engines, don't try to use one that doesn't exist. Fixes #6381 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
XN_FLAG_COMPAT has a unique property, its zero for value. This means it needs special treatment; if it has been set (which can only be determined indirectly) and set alone (*), no other flags should be set. (*) if any other nameopt flag has been set by the user, compatibility mode is blown away. Reviewed-by:
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- May 29, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Thanks to Guido Vranken and OSSFuzz for finding this issue. Reviewed-by:
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