- 03 May, 2016 6 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
A few functions in the recently added EVP_EncodeInit docs don't apply to the 1.0.x branches. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error condition. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most likely result in a crash. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2105 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2176 Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is like this: EVP_EncryptInit() EVP_EncryptUpdate() i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls this function directly. CVE-2016-2106 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3f358213)
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- 02 May, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reported by David Benjamin Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 05aef4bb)
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- 29 Apr, 2016 4 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 64eaf6c9)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject excessively large X509_NAME structures. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 9b08619c) Conflicts: crypto/x509/x509.h crypto/x509/x509_err.c
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne(). Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b33d1141)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to restrictions on certificate size. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 295f3a24)
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- 27 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers (e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption anyway. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d78df5df)
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- 26 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore we should make sure we check it. Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 446ba8de)
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- 25 Apr, 2016 2 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
This causes a compilation failure when using --strict-warnings in 1.0.2 and 1.0.1 Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 0ca67644)
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 79356a83)
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- 23 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Backport of commits: 79c7f74d bdcd660e from master. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 22 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents small files allocating excessive amounts of data. CVE-2016-2109 Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c6298139)
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- 07 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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David Benjamin authored
Free up parsed X509_NAME structure if the CertificateRequest message contains excess data. The security impact is considered insignificant. This is a client side only leak and a large number of connections to malicious servers would be needed to have a significant impact. This was found by libFuzzer. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ec66c8c9)
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- 26 Mar, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 21211ade)
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- 18 Mar, 2016 4 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
no-comp on Windows was not actually suppressing compilation of the code, although it was suppressing its use. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a6406c95)
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Matt Caswell authored
Ensure we check for a NULL return from OPENSSL_malloc Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur. Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it anyway. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ffe9150b)
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- 14 Mar, 2016 1 commit
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> MR: #2341 (cherry picked from commit 42569575)
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- 09 Mar, 2016 1 commit
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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- 08 Mar, 2016 1 commit
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
This improves ABI compatibility when symbol resolution is not lazy. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 07 Mar, 2016 3 commits
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Andy Polyakov authored
Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one... Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit adc4f1fc ) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 29cce508)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 01c32b5e)
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- 04 Mar, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
PVK files with abnormally large length or salt fields can cause an integer overflow which can result in an OOB read and heap corruption. However this is an rarely used format and private key files do not normally come from untrusted sources the security implications not significant. Fix by limiting PVK length field to 100K and salt to 10K: these should be more than enough to cover any files encountered in practice. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 5f57abe2)
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- 01 Mar, 2016 10 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Update mk1mf.pl to properly handle no-weak-ssl-ciphers Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 902b30df)
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Andy Polyakov authored
[Backport from master] CVE-2016-0702 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to reach almost 10%. CVE-2016-0702 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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