Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Test reading/writing to an SSL object after a fatal error has been
detected.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.

In order to exploit this issue an attacker would have to trick an
application into behaving incorrectly by issuing an SSL_read()/SSL_write()
after having already received a fatal error.

Thanks to David Benjamin (Google) for reporting this issue and suggesting
this fix.

CVE-2017-3737

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.

CVE-2017-3738

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This line will allow use private keys, which created by Crypto Pro, to
sign with OpenSSL.

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4836)

(cherry picked from commit b35bb37a)

Fixes #4775

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4815)

(cherry picked from commit a61c15eb)

Backport of #4677 / 1687aa76



Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4715)

Fixes #4734 #4649

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4735)

We had /WX (treat warnings as errors) in VC-WIN32 for long time. At
some point it was somehow omitted. It's argued that it allows to
keep better focus on new code, which motivates the comeback...

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4718)

It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4718)

 * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212–223
                                                                 ^
The EN DASH ('–') in this line is one UTF-8 character (hex: e2 80 93).
Under some code page setting (e.g. 936), Visual Studio may report C4819
warning: The file contains a character that cannot be represented in the
current code page.

Replace this character with the ASCII char '-' (Hex Code: 2D).

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4691)

(cherry picked from commit b4d0fa49)

cb_ticket2() does an exit, and should therefore not need to return anything.
Some compilers don't detect that, or don't care, and warn about a non-void
function without a return statement.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4713)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4714)

In earlier 5.1x Perl versions quoting globs works only if there is
white space. If there is none, it's looking for names starting with ".

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4696)

It's not clear if it's a feature or bug, but binutils-2.29[.1]
interprets 'adr' instruction with Thumb2 code reference differently,
in a way that affects calculation of addresses of constants' tables.

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4673)

Fixes: #4590

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4681)

The man pages say that BIGNUM arithmetic operations fail with a 0 return.
However some functions were returning -1 on error. In master and 1.1.0 they
already return 0, so this brings 1.0.2 in line.

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4682)

Cherry-picked by Matt Caswell from 69795831

.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4670)

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4600)

(cherry picked from commit a6f622bc)

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4600)

(cherry picked from commit 7760384b)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #4649

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.

CVE-2017-3736

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

information about the length of the scalar used in ECDSA operations
from a large number (2^32) of signatures.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Refer to #4576 for further details.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4623)

information about the length of a value used in DSA operations from
a large number of signatures.

This doesn't rate as a CVE because:

* For the non-constant time code, there are easier ways to extract
  more information.

* For the constant time code, it requires a significant number of signatures
  to leak a small amount of information.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Original commit by Paul Dale. Backported to 1.0.2 by Matt Caswell

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4642)

1ce95f19

 was incomplete and did not
handle the case when SSL_set_SSL_CTX was called from the cert_cb
callback rather than the SNI callback. The consequence is any server
using OpenSSL 1.0.2 and the cert_cb callback for SNI only ever signs a
weak digest, SHA-1, even when connecting to clients which use secure
ones.

Fix this and add regression tests for both this and the original issue.

Fixes #4554.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4577)

Fixes: #2539

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4594)

The functions strcasecmp() and strncasecmp() will use locale specific rules
when performing comparison. This could cause some problems in certain
locales. For example in the Turkish locale an 'I' character is not the
uppercase version of 'i'. However IA5 strings should not use locale specific
rules, i.e. for an IA5 string 'I' is uppercase 'i' even if using the
Turkish locale.

This fixes a bug in name constraints checking reported by Thomas Pornin
(NCCGroup).

This is not considered a security issue because it would require both a
Turkish locale (or other locale with similar issues) and malfeasance by
a trusted name-constrained CA for a certificate to pass name constraints
in error. The constraints also have to be for excluded sub-trees which are
extremely rare. Failure to match permitted subtrees is a bug, not a
vulnerability.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4570)

The lhash expand() function can fail if realloc fails. The previous
implementation made changes to the structure and then attempted to do a
realloc. If the realloc failed then it attempted to undo the changes it
had just made. Unfortunately changes to lh->p were not undone correctly,
ultimately causing subsequent expand() calls to increment num_nodes to a
value higher than num_alloc_nodes, which can cause out-of-bounds reads/
writes. This is not considered a security issue because an attacker cannot
cause realloc to fail.

This commit moves the realloc call to near the beginning of the function
before any other changes are made to the lhash structure. That way if a
failure occurs we can immediately fail without having to undo anything.

Thanks to Pavel Kopyl (Samsung) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4551)

The previous change with this intention didn't quite do it.  An
embedded item must not be freed itself, but might potentially contain
non-embedded elements, which must be freed.

So instead of calling ASN1_item_ex_free(), where we can't pass the
combine flag, we call asn1_item_embed_free() directly.

This changes asn1_item_embed_free() from being a static function to
being a private non-static function.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4578)

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4544)

(cherry picked from commit 04761b55)

An embedded item wasn't allocated separately on the heap, so don't
free it as if it was.

Issue discovered by Pavel Kopyl

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4571)

Add openssl-foo as a name for the openssl "foo" command.
Recommended by a usability study conducted by Martin Ukrop at CRoCS, FI MU
Fixes: #4548
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4557)

Thanks to Jo Hornsby for reporting this and helping with the fix.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4464)

RSA_setup_blinding() calls BN_BLINDING_create_param() which later calls
BN_mod_exp() as follows:

BN_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx)

ret->mod will have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set, but ret->e does not. In
BN_mod_exp() we only test the third param for the existence of this flag.
We should test all the inputs.

Thanks to Samuel Weiser (samuel.weiser@iaik.tugraz.at) for reporting this
issue.

This typically only happens once at key load, so this is unlikely to be
exploitable in any real scenario.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4477)

(cherry picked from commit e913d11f)