- Oct 12, 2016
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1702) (cherry picked from commit 7954dced)
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- Oct 11, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The original X509_NAME decode free code was buggy: this could result in double free or leaks if a malloc failure occurred. Simplify and fix the logic. Thanks to Guido Vranken for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1691) (cherry picked from commit 6dcba070)
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- Oct 02, 2016
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Oct 01, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit eb67172a)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Tidy up srp_Calc_k and SRP_Calc_u by making them a special case of srp_Calc_xy which performs SHA1(PAD(x) | PAD(y)). This addresses an OCAP Audit issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8f332ac9)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 198d8059)
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- Sep 29, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 83ae4661)
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David Woodhouse authored
This used to work in 1.0.2 but disappeared when the argument parsing was revamped. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1639) (cherry picked from commit a6972f34)
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Matt Caswell authored
If we have a handshake fragment waiting then dtls1_read_bytes() was not correctly setting the value of recvd_type, leading to an uninit read. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2f2d6e3e)
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Matt Caswell authored
The new large message test in sslapitest needs OPENSSL_NO_DTLS guards Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 55386bef)
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- Sep 28, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
Before loading a key from an engine, it may need to be initialized. When done loading the key, we must de-initialize the engine. (if the engine is already initialized somehow, only the reference counter will be incremented then decremented) Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 49e476a5)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit f9b1b664)
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Matt Caswell authored
Add the ability to test both server initiated and client initiated reneg. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit fe7dd553)
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Matt Caswell authored
Add update for testing renegotiation. Also change info on CTLOG_FILE environment variable - which always seems to be required. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1329b952)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e42c4544)
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- Sep 27, 2016
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David Benjamin authored
This would have caught 099e2968. This is a port of the test added in https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/7c040756178e14a4d181b6d93abb3827c93189c4 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1496) (cherry picked from commit 8ff70f33)
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- Sep 26, 2016
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David Benjamin authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 243ecf19)
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David Benjamin authored
The TLSProxy::Record->new call hard-codes a version, like 70-test_sslrecords.t. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit f3ea8d77)
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David Benjamin authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3058b742)
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David Benjamin authored
Avoid making the CI blow up. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 5cf6d7c5)
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David Benjamin authored
This is a regression test for https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1431 . It tests a maximally-padded record with each possible invalid offset. This required fixing a bug in Message.pm where the client sending a fatal alert followed by close_notify was still treated as success. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8523288e)
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Matt Caswell authored
A mem leak could occur on an error path. Also the mempacket BIO_METHOD needs to be cleaned up, because of the newly added DTLS test. Also fixed a double semi-colon in ssltestlib.c Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit fa454945)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Robert Swiecki authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 44f206aa)
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Matt Caswell authored
The buffer to receive messages is initialised to 16k. If a message is received that is larger than that then the buffer is "realloc'd". This can cause the location of the underlying buffer to change. Anything that is referring to the old location will be referring to free'd data. In the recent commit c1ef7c97 (master) and 4b390b6c (1.1.0) the point in the code where the message buffer is grown was changed. However s->init_msg was not updated to point at the new location. CVE-2016-6309 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 0d698f66)
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Matt Caswell authored
Ensure that we send a large message during the test suite. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 84d5549e)
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- Sep 22, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dmitry Belyavsky authored
Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards compatibility. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service attack. CVE-2016-6305 GitHub Issue #1563 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Test that the OCSP callbacks work as expected. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Add a function for testing whether a given OCSP_RESPID matches with a certificate. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
OCSP_RESPID was made opaque in 1.1.0, but no accessors were provided for setting the name/key value for the OCSP_RESPID. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar problem but I could not find any other issues. CVE-2016-6304 Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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