- Feb 27, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
We don't want recipes for the same files generated more than once Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Ben Laurie authored
Linux target that does that. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> MR: #2083
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reformat EC_POINT_new.pod and add parentheses to function names. Clarify the octet form. Add documentation for EC_POINT_oct2buf(). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Feb 26, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
The ubsec engine is now considered obsolete and therefore has been removed. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rob Percival authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rob Percival authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rob Percival authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rob Percival authored
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
This reverts commit acae59bb . Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
They're too slow. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Since the configs were remade into hash tables, this isn't needed any more. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dmitry-Me authored
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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J Mohan Rao Arisankala authored
In EC_KEY_priv2buf(), check for pbuf sanity. If invoked with NULL, gracefully returns the key length. Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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J Mohan Rao Arisankala authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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J Mohan Rao Arisankala authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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J Mohan Rao Arisankala authored
- In error paths, EVP_MD_CTX allocated by the callee is not released. - Checking method before accessing Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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David Woodhouse authored
We are using strcmp() as the cmp_func, where in the EDK2 environment strcmp actually ends up being the external AsciiStrCmp() function — an EFI library function defined with the Microsoft ABI. This means that we can't just assign function pointers to it, since in GCC-hosted builds the ABI of any function *not* explicitly marked EFIAPI is the native SysV ABI. Arguably this stupidity ought to be resolved on the UEFI side, but in the general case that would mean that we need to provide ABI-compatible wrappers for *all* the "standard" functions, just in case they're used like this. And in fact we already have a workaround here for DEC C. So instead of playing games with casting function pointers, it's nicer just to use a simple function to wrap the strcmp() call. That cleans up the DEC C workaround, *and* it works around the UEFI bogosity at the same time. Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
mkdef.pl was issuing the following error: Use of uninitialized value within %tag in numeric eq (==) at util/mkdef.pl line 560, <IN> line 92 This was because it was treating a __cplusplus "#ifdef" check as a "tag" but then skipping over the corresponding "#endif". Therefore after processing a file it still had "left over" tags from processing the previous file. It was also getting confused by "#if" checks that didn't match is pre-defined styles. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
build.info needed a slight update, one more include directory. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Alessandro Ghedini authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
They now default to " " as separator, but that can be overridden by having a hash with parameters as last argument. The only currently recognised parameter is `separator'. The special separator `undef' will force the result to become a list rather than a concatenated string. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Feb 25, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur. These issues will only occur on certain platforms where sizeof(size_t) > sizeof(int). E.g. many 64 bit systems. The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour. These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl. CVE-2016-0799 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Simplifies calling code. Also fixed up any !ptr tests that were nearby, turning them into NULL tests. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Rob Percival authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Adam Eijdenberg authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Fixes github issue 463. Building the app without OPENSSL_NO_SOCK isn't supported, so only do OPENSSL_NO_OCSP. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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