- 26 Jan, 2017 1 commit
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Andy Polyakov authored
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory (or bogus MAC value is produced if x86 MD5 assembly module is involved). Since hash operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS condition. Thanks to Robert Święcki for report. CVE-2017-3731 Reviewed-by:Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 25 Jan, 2017 17 commits
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Cory Benfield authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2288)
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Richard Levitte authored
In test/ssl_test, parsing ExpectedClientSignHash ended up in the expected_server_sign_hash field. Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2289)
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Matt Caswell authored
Clashing function code values in evp.h Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
This function is used to validate application supplied parameters. An assert should be used to check for an error that is internal to OpenSSL. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Don't use the temp variable donelen in the non-aad fragmented code path. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
When doing in place encryption the overlapping buffer check can fail incorrectly where we have done a partial block "Update" operation. This fixes things to take account of any pending partial blocks. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The previous commit fixed a bug where a partial block had been passed to an "Update" function and it wasn't properly handled. We should catch this type of error in evp_test. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
If we have previously been passed a partial block in an "Update" call then make sure we properly increment the output buffer when we use it. Fixes #2273 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Lots of references to 16 replaced by AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Also a few other style tweaks in that function Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
After collecting extensions we must free them again. Reviewed-by:
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1618)
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FdaSilvaYY authored
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FdaSilvaYY authored
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FdaSilvaYY authored
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FdaSilvaYY authored
simplify some code. Reviewed-by:
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FdaSilvaYY authored
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FdaSilvaYY authored
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- 24 Jan, 2017 11 commits
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Richard Levitte authored
Instead of looking for "200" and "established" (and failing all other 2xx responses or "Established"), let's look for a line that's not a header (i.e. doesn't contain a ':') and where the first space is followed by a '2'. Reviewed-by:
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Todd Short authored
Remove duplicate defines from EVP source files. Most of them were in evp.h, which is always included. Add new ones evp_int.h EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK is now always defined in evp.h, so remove conditionals on it Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
Well, not as much, at least. Commit 07afdf3c changed things so that for SSLv2 format ClientHellos we store the cipher list in the TLS format, i.e., with two bytes per cipher, to be consistent with historical behavior. However, the space allocated for the array still performed the computation with three bytes per cipher, a needless over-allocation (though a relatively small one, all things considered). Reviewed-by:
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Todd Short authored
Add Poly1305 as a "signed" digest. Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist() was a little too "raw" in the case of an SSLv2 compat ClientHello. In 1.0.2 and below, during version negotiation, if we received an SSLv2 compat ClientHello but actually wanted to do SSLv3+ then we would construct a "fake" SSLv3+ ClientHello. This "fake" ClientHello would have its ciphersuite list converted to the SSLv3+ format. It was this "fake" raw list that got saved away to later be returned by a call to SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(). In 1.1.0+ version negotiation works differently and we process an SSLv2 compat ClientHello directly without the need for an intermediary "fake" ClientHello. This meant that the raw ciphersuite list being saved was in the SSLv2 format. Any caller of this function would not expect that and potentially overread the returned buffer by one byte. Fixes #2189 Reviewed-by:
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Kazuki Yamaguchi authored
ChaCha20 code uses its own custom cipher_data. Add EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV and EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT so that the key and the iv can be set by different calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
- s == NULL can mean c is a new session *or* lh_insert was unable to create a hash entry. - use lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve to check for this error condition. - If it happens simply remove the extra reference again. Reviewed-by:
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ganesh authored
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ganesh authored
According to the documentation, the return code should be -1 when RAND_status does not return 1. Reviewed-by:
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ganesh authored
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- 23 Jan, 2017 11 commits
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Andy Polyakov authored
This comes from a comment in GH issue #1027. Andy wrote the code, Rich made the PR. Reviewed-by:
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Cory Benfield authored
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Cory Benfield authored
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Cory Benfield authored
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Richard Levitte authored
It seems that the ssl test 20-cert-select.conf dislikes the lack of TLSv1.2 Reviewed-by:
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FdaSilvaYY authored
it was getting the SerialNumber of a previous cert. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
In a non client-auth renegotiation where the original handshake *was* client auth, then the server will expect the client to send a Certificate message anyway resulting in a connection failure. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
In a non client-auth renegotiation where the original handshake *was* client auth, then the client will send a Certificate message anyway resulting in a connection failure. Fixes #1920 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The flag SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is documented as follows: B<Server mode:> only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL handshake. Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a renegotiation. This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. B<Client mode:> ignored But the implementation actually did nothing. After the server sends its ServerKeyExchange message, the code was checking s->session->peer to see if it is NULL. If it was set then it did not ask for another client certificate. However s->session->peer will only be set in the event of a resumption, but a ServerKeyExchange message is only sent in the event of a full handshake (i.e. no resumption). The documentation suggests that the original intention was for this to have an effect on renegotiation, and resumption doesn't come into it. The fix is to properly check for renegotiation, not whether there is already a client certificate in the session. As far as I can tell this has been broken for a *long* time. Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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