- Jun 21, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too. This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA. Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates: s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature operations. As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to the operation so that: s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned. This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is only removed at the last possible step. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6522)
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Matt Caswell authored
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #6544 Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6546)
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Pauli authored
Also fix some clumsy wording. [skip_ci] Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6545)
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- Jun 20, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Hopefully, this will make it more clear that it isn't only ELF specific, even though there is a part that is (or even more restrictively GNU ld.so specific). Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6520)
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Paul Kehrer authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6528)
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #6525 Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
[extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 19, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Commit 4aa5a566 accidentally missed off the catch all case of ignoring all warning alerts that are otherwise unhandled. This breaks the SSLv3 tests which send a "no certificate" warning alert. Fixes #6496 [extended tests] Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6509)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
- Print positive feedback in the case when 'make doc-nits' finds no errors. - Other than before, keep the 'doc-nits' output file only in case of errors and remove it if it is empty. - Declare 'doc-nits' as a phony make target to facilitate rerunning 'make doc-nits' without having to remove the output file first. Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by:
Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6514)
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Sohaib ul Hassan authored
This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method, EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method. This commit is derived from the patch https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley. Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way, it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an algorithm state) unpredictable. For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the aforementioned curves. For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves. Co-authored-by:
Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Co-authored-by:
Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
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Jack Lloyd authored
Use EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type to access Reviewed-by:
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Jack Lloyd authored
Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
... to the check OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L, to correspond with how it's declared. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
(that is, until 1.2.0 comes along) Since we allow future deprecation (and that shouldn't be affected by 'no-deprecated'), we need to distinguish what to have deprecated on the value of OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, not the existence of OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED. Note that the macro OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED still exists, in case someone still uses it. Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 18, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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David von Oheimb authored
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David von Oheimb authored
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David von Oheimb authored
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- Jun 15, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Calling the functions rand_pool_add_{additional,nonce}_data() in crypto/rand/rand_lib.c with no implementation for djgpp/MSDOS causees unresolved symbols when linking with djgpp. Reported and fixed by Gisle Vanem Reviewed-by: -
Eric S. Raymond authored
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- Jun 14, 2018
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David Cooper authored
This commit replaces the certificates in demos/bio with new certificates that don't expire until 2118. The same certificates appear in both demos/smime and demos/cms. This commit copies the new certificates and keys from demos/smime to demos/cms. This PR Fixes #6412 by updating cacert.pem and signer.pem in the openssl/demos/smime/ directory. It also updates all of the keys with longer key lengths. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
848113a3 added mitigation for a side-channel attack. This commit extends approach to all code paths for consistency. [It also removes redundant white spaces introduced in last commit.] Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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- Jun 13, 2018
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Eric S. Raymond authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates: s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature operations. As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to the operation so that: s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned. Reviewed-by: -
Andy Polyakov authored
[omit even -b:SRE, as it's implied by -G flag.] Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
Add aix-common template that covers even aix-shared from shared-info.pl, add -bsymbolic to shared_ldflags. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
This allows to specify flags specific to shared build, e.g. 'bin_lflags => shared("-Wl,-bsvr4")'. Reviewed-by: -
Andy Polyakov authored
The flag was apparently omitted in switch from Makefile.shared to shared-info.pl. Do put it back! And in the process move all solaris-shared flags from shared-info.pl to solaris-common. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
The man name didn't match the file name, and some places had 'password' instead of 'pass phrase'. Fixes #6474 Reviewed-by:
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