Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This updates the record layer to use the TLSv1.3 style nonce construciton.
It also updates TLSProxy and ossltest to be able to recognise the new
layout.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Commit b3618f44

 added a test for mac-then-encrypt. However the test fails
when running with "enable-tls1_3". The problem is that the test creates a
connection, which ends up being TLSv1.3. However it also restricts the
ciphers to a single mac-then-encrypt ciphersuite that is not TLSv1.3
compatible so the connection aborts and the test fails. Mac-then-encrypt
is not relevant to TLSv1.3, so the test should disable that protocol
version.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Calling SSL_set_accept_state() after DTLSv1_listen() clears the state, so
SSL_accept() no longer works. In 1.0.2 calling DTLSv1_listen() would set
the accept state automatically. We should still do that.

Fixes #1989

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Test suite used from boring, written by David Benjamin.
Test driver converted from C++ to C.
Added a Perl program to check the testsuite file.
Extensive review feedback incorporated (thanks folks).

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Verify that the encrypt-then-mac negotiation is handled
correctly. Additionally, when compiled with no-asm, this test ensures
coverage for the constant-time MAC copying code in
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac. The proxy-based CBC padding test covers that as
well but it's nevertheless better to have an explicit handshake test
for mac-then-encrypt.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This makes S/MIME and CMS signing in MIME format for SHA1 work again.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

GH issue #1916 affects only big-endian platforms. TLS is not affected,
because TLS fragment is never big enough.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

GH issue #1916 affects only big-endian platforms. TLS is not affected,
because TLS fragment is never big enough.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The bug was introduced in 80d27cdb

,
one too many instructions was removed. It went unnoticed, because
new subroutine introduced in previous commit is called in real-life
RSA/DSA/DH cases, while original code is called only in rare tests.
The bug was caught in test_fuzz.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

GH: #2003

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Don't use what is in supported_versions for the RSA pre-master

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

ossl_shim had some TLS1.3 defines that are now in ssl.h so need to be
removed.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The SSL_IS_TLS13() macro wasn't quite right. It would come back with true
in the case where we haven't yet negotiated TLSv1.3, but it could be
negotiated.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Add various different handshake types that are possible.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Current s_server can only get an OCSP Response from an OCSP responder. This
provides the capability to instead get the OCSP Response from a DER encoded
file.

This should make testing of OCSP easier.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

After the client processes the server's initial flight in TLS1.3 it may
respond with either an encrypted, or an unencrypted alert. We needed to
teach TLSProxy about this so that it didn't issue spurious warnings.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

In one case we weren't always sending an unexpected message alert if we
don't get what we expect.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

There is a set of miscellaneous processing for OCSP, CT etc at the end of
the ServerDone processing. In TLS1.3 we don't have a ServerDone, so this
needs to move elsewhere.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The previous commit had a dummy payload for the Finished data. This commit
fills it in with a real value.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This is a major overhaul of the TLSv1.3 state machine. Currently it still
looks like TLSv1.2. This commit changes things around so that it starts
to look a bit less like TLSv1.2 and bit more like TLSv1.3.

After this commit we have:

ClientHello
+ key_share          ---->
                           ServerHello
                           +key_share
                           {CertificateRequest*}
                           {Certificate*}
                           {CertificateStatus*}
                     <---- {Finished}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished}           ---->
[ApplicationData]    <---> [Application Data]

Key differences between this intermediate position and the final TLSv1.3
position are:
- No EncryptedExtensions message yet
- No server side CertificateVerify message yet
- CertificateStatus still exists as a separate message
- A number of the messages are still in the TLSv1.2 format
- Still running on the TLSv1.2 record layer

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

TLSv1.3 has a NewSessionTicket message, but it is *completely* different to
the TLSv1.2 one and may as well have been called something else. This commit
removes the old style NewSessionTicket from TLSv1.3. We will have to add the
new style one back in later.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Commit 94ed2c67

 dropped a ! operator by mistake, which causes extended
master secret connections to fail. This puts in back.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>