- Mar 29, 2019
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Pauli authored
If the structures have empty padding bytes, ensure they are zeroed. These structures are added to seed pools as complete blocks including any padding and alignment bytes. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8610)
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Soujyu Tanaka authored
Revert win32_pathbyaddr() which is used in DSO_dsobyaddr(). Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)
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Soujyu Tanaka authored
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Soujyu Tanaka authored
Replace it with InitializeCriticalSection() Reviewed-by:
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Soujyu Tanaka authored
This implementation is referenced to https://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1_69_0/boost/detail/interlocked.hpp Reviewed-by:
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Pauli authored
Refer to FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests for details. The check is fairly simplistic, being for the entropy sources to not feed the DRBG the same block of seed material twice in a row. Only the first DRBG in a chain is subject to this check, latter DRBGs are assumed to be safely seeded via the earlier DRBGs. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Shane Lontis authored
Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 28, 2019
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Pauli authored
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Paul Monson authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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Shane Lontis authored
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Dmitry Belyavskiy authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #8589 Reviewed-by:
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Pauli authored
/usr/include/bits/waitstatus.h includes endian.h under some libc's. This clashes with the new test header file, so rename the latter. Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 27, 2019
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Pauli authored
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Jake Massimo authored
DH_check is used to test the validity of Diffie-Hellman parameter sets (p, q, g). Among the tests performed are primality tests on p and q, for this BN_is_prime_ex is called with the rounds of Miller-Rabin set as default. This will therefore use the average case error estimates derived from the function BN_prime_checks_for_size based on the bit size of the number tested. However, these bounds are only accurate on testing random input. Within this testing scenario, where we are checking the validity of a DH parameter set, we can not assert that these parameters are randomly generated. Thus we must treat them as if they are adversarial in nature and increase the rounds of Miller-Rabin performed. Generally, each round of Miller-Rabin can declare a composite number prime with probability at most (1/4), thus 64 rounds is sufficient in thwarting known generation techniques (even in safe prime settings - see https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/032 for full analysis). The choice of 64 rounds is also consistent with SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64 as used in srp_Verify_N_and_g in openssl/apps/s_client.c. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
See discussion in github issue #8563 Fixes #8563 Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8584)
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Matt Caswell authored
EVP_MAC_ctrl is documented to return 0 or -1 on failure. Numerous places were not getting this check correct. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #8567 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
We treat that as automatic success. Other EVP_*Update functions already do this (e.g. EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_DecryptUpdate etc). EVP_EncodeUpdate is a bit of an anomoly. That treats 0 byte input length as an error. Fixes #8576 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reported by Mak Kolybabi Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 26, 2019
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Shane Lontis authored
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- Mar 25, 2019
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Hubert Kario authored
not specifying the digest both on command line and in the config file will lead to response generation aborting with 140617514493760:error:2F098088:time stamp routines:ts_CONF_lookup_fail: \ cannot find config variable:crypto/ts/ts_conf.c:106:tsr_test::signer_digest Reviewed-by: -
Shane Lontis authored
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- Mar 22, 2019
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Bernd Edlinger authored
constant time with a memory access pattern that does not depend on secret information. [extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
[extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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Pauli authored
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- Mar 21, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Shane Lontis authored
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- Mar 20, 2019
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Lorinczy Zsigmond authored
So far, it only handled hash-and-algorithm pairs from TLS1.2, now it also handles 'schemes' defined in TLS1.3 like 0x0807=ed25519 or 0x0809=rsa_pss_pss_sha256 Now it prints information in one of these formats: ... Algorithm scheme=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, security bits=128 ... TLS1.3 ... Algorithm digest=SHA384, algorithm=DSA, security bits=192 ... TLS1.2 ... Algorithm scheme=unknown(0x0e01), security bits=128 ... unhandled case To implement this added three new lookup-tables: signature_tls13_scheme_list, signature_tls12_alg_list, signature_tls12_hash_list. Also minor changes in 'security_callback_debug', eg adding variable 'show_nm' to indicate if we should show 'nm'. Also coding-styles fixes from matcaswell Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Great effort has been made to make initialization more configurable. However, the behavior of OPENSSL_config() was lost in the process, having it suddenly generate errors it didn't previously, which is not how it's documented to behave. A simple setting of default flags fixes this problem. Fixes #8528 Reviewed-by:
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Shane Lontis authored
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David von Oheimb authored
Reviewed-by:
Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8527)
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