- Sep 12, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes: #7161 (hopefully) Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7175) (cherry picked from commit 6839a7a7)
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Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter authored
Fixes a minor typo that would cause the linker to complain about not finding -lFuzzer CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7197) (cherry picked from commit 8e8fe187)
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Viktor Szakats authored
- fix to use secure URL in generated Windows resources - fix a potentially uninitialized variable - fix an unused variable warning CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #7186 Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7193) (cherry picked from commit 88ea3685)
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- Sep 11, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Richard Levitte authored
Since the SSL code started using RSA_NO_PADDING, the CAPI engine became unusable. This change fixes that. Fixes #7131 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 10, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Found by Coverity Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes a Coverity complaint. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
If sizeof(int) != sizeof(size_t) this may not work correctly. Fixes a Coverity issue. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Hopefully this will resolve spurious travis failures. [extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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Paul Yang authored
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
It's actually not a real issue but caused by the absence of the default case which does not occur in reality but which makes coverity see a code path where pkey remains unassigned. Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1423323) [extended tests] Reviewed-by:
Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1439138) [extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1439136) [extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 09, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
The deprecated ASN.1 type LONG / ZLONG (incorrectly) produced zero length INTEGER encoding for zeroes. For the sake of backward compatibility, we allow those to be read without fault when using the replacement types INT32 / UINT32 / INT64 / UINT64. Fixes #7134 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Confirms #7134 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 08, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
This was originally part of SipHash_Init. However, there are cases where there isn't any key material to initialize from when setting the hash size, and we do allow doing so with a EVP_PKEY control. The solution is to provide a separate hash_size setter and to use it in the corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD. Fixes #7143 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Confirms #7143 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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- Sep 07, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
PR #3783 introduce coded to reset the server side SNI state in SSL_do_handshake() to ensure any erroneous config time SNI changes are cleared. Unfortunately SSL_do_handshake() can be called mid-handshake multiple times so this is the wrong place to do this and can mean that any SNI data is cleared later on in the handshake too. Therefore move the code to a more appropriate place. Fixes #7014 Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Ben Kaduk authored
Ideally, SSL_get_servername() would do exactly as it is documented and return exactly what the client sent (i.e., what we currently are stashing in the SSL's ext.hostname), without needing to refer to an SSL_SESSION object. For historical reasons, including the parsed SNI value from the ClientHello originally being stored in the SSL_SESSION's ext.hostname field, we have had references to the SSL_SESSION in this function. We cannot fully excise them due to the interaction between user-supplied callbacks and TLS 1.2 resumption flows, where we call all callbacks but the client did not supply an SNI value. Existing callbacks expect to receive a valid SNI value in this case, so we must fake one up from the resumed session in order to avoid breakage. Otherwise, greatly simplify the implementation and just return the value in the SSL, as sent by the client. Reviewed-by:
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Ben Kaduk authored
Commit 1c4aa31d modified the state machine to clean up stale ext.hostname values from SSL objects in the case when SNI was not negotiated for the current handshake. This is natural from the TLS perspective, since this information is an extension that the client offered but we ignored, and since we ignored it we do not need to keep it around for anything else. However, as documented in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/7014 , there appear to be some deployed code that relies on retrieving such an ignored SNI value from the client, after the handshake has completed. Because the 1.1.1 release is on a stable branch and should preserve the published ABI, restore the historical behavior by retaining the ext.hostname value sent by the client, in the SSL structure, for subsequent retrieval. [extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The is_tls13_capable() function should not return 0 if no certificates are configured directly because a certificate callback is present. Fixes #7140 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
That function was removed in favour of SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(). Update the docs accordingly. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Even though we already sent close_notify the server may not have recieved it yet and could issue a CertificateRequest to us. Since we've already sent close_notify we can't send any reasonable response so we just ignore it. Reviewed-by:
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Kurt Roeckx authored
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Matt Caswell authored
If we've sent a close_notify then we are restricted about what we can do in response to handshake messages that we receive. However we can sensibly process NewSessionTicket messages. We can also process a KeyUpdate message as long as we also ignore any request for us to update our sending keys. Reviewed-by:
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Paul Yang authored
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Paul Yang authored
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Paul Yang authored
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Paul Yang authored
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Jack Lloyd authored
This test case is originally submitted in #6757, by Jack Lloyd. The test case has been modified to use the a different method to set the ID when computing the Z hash of SM2 signature. Reviewed-by:
Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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Paul Yang authored
zero-length ID is allowed, but it's not allowed to skip the ID. Fixes: #6534 Reviewed-by:
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Paul Yang authored
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Paul Yang authored
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