If SSL_check_chain is called with a NULL X509 object or a NULL EVP_PKEY
or the type of the public key is unrecognised then the local variable
|cpk| in tls1_check_chain does not get initialised. Subsequently an
attempt is made to deref it (after the "end" label), and a seg fault will
result.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d813f9eb)

Fixed assorted missing return value checks in c3_cpols.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c5f2b533)

The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0c7ca403)

The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6aa8dab2)

The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34a7ed0c)

ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e488fd6)

Calling EVP_DigestInit_ex which has already had the digest set up for it
should be possible. You are supposed to be able to pass NULL for the type.
However currently this seg faults.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0108702)

In the event of an error |rr| could be NULL. Therefore don't assume you can
use |rr| in the error handling code.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c5a7b33)

- SIGSEGV/ILL in CCM (RT#3688);

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac5a1106)

Cleanse various intermediate buffers used by the PRF (backported version
from master).

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Ensure all malloc failures return -1.

Reported by Adam Langley (Google).

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06c6a2b4)

BIO_debug_callback() no longer assumes the hexadecimal representation of
a pointer fits in 8 characters.

Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 460e920d)

Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)

If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.

For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:

openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA

CVE-2015-0285

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e1b568dd)

Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0b142f02)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Since commit 741c9959

 ("DTLS revision."), we put the wrong protocol
version into our ClientHello for DTLS1_BAD_VER. The old DTLS
code which used ssl->version was replaced by the more generic SSL3 code
which uses ssl->client_version. The Cisco ASA no longer likes our
ClientHello.

RT#3711

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f7683aaf)

Commit 9cf0f187 in HEAD, and 68039af3

 in 1.0.2, removed a version check
from dtls1_buffer_message() which was needed to distinguish between DTLS
1.x and Cisco's pre-standard version of DTLS (DTLS1_BAD_VER).

Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3703

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5178a16c)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

New function ASN1_STRING_clear_free which cleanses an ASN1_STRING
structure before freeing it.

Call ASN1_STRING_clear_free on PKCS#8 private key components.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a8ae0891)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e3013932)

They are moved to the COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT instead.
This also fixes SSLv2 to be part of COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Make the output from mkerr.pl consistent with the newly reformatted code.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This patch uses warning/fatal constants instead of numbers with comments for
warning/alerts in d1_pkt.c and s3_pkt.c

RT#3725

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fd865cad)

Miscellaneous unchecked malloc fixes. Also fixed some mem leaks on error
paths as I spotted them along the way.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 918bb865)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c

CVE-2015-0288
PR#3708

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 28a00bcd)

The format script didn't correctly recognise some ASN.1 macros and
didn't reformat some files as a result. Fix script and reformat
affected files.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 437b14b5)

Some Cisco appliances use a pre-standard version number for DTLS. We support
this as DTLS1_BAD_VER within the code.

This change fixes d2i_SSL_SESSION for that DTLS version.

Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

RT#3704

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_asn1.c

Added various missing return value checks in tls1_change_cipher_state.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Fixed various missing return value checks in ssl3_send_newsession_ticket.
Also a mem leak on error.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c

When OpenSSL is configured with no-ec, then the new evp_extra_test fails to
pass. This change adds appropriate OPENSSL_NO_EC guards around the code.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a9880362)

Updates to include SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512. In particular note
the restriction on setting md to NULL with regards to thread safety.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f7812493)

the extract-names.pl script.

RT#3718

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Inspired by BoringSSL commit 517073cd4b by Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>

CVE-2015-0209

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

called evp_test.c, so I have called this one evp_extra_test.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/Makefile
	test/Makefile

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 384dee51)