- Nov 15, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1922) (cherry picked from commit 8aa9cf7e)
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Richard Levitte authored
Under certain circumstances, the libcrypto init code would loop, causing a deadlock. This would typically happen if something in ossl_init_base() caused an OpenSSL error, and the error stack routines would recurse into the init code before the flag that ossl_init_base() had been run was checked. This change makes sure ossl_init_base isn't run once more of the base is initiated. Thanks to Dmitry Kostjuchenko for the idea. Fixes Github issue #1899 Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 14, 2016
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit fe9e5b9c)
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Sebastian Andrzej Siewior authored
prio openssl 1.1.0 seed_len < q was accepted and the seed argument was then ignored. Now DSA_generate_parameters_ex() returns an error in such a case but no error string. Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
This reverts commit edc18749 . The proposed fix is incorrect. It marks the "run_once" code as having finished before it has. The intended semantics of run_once is that no threads should proceed until the code has run exactly once. With this change the "second" thread will think the run_once code has already been run and will continue, even though it is still in progress. This could result in a crash or other incorrect behaviour. Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Nov 13, 2016
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DK authored
Fixed deadlock in CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() if call to init() is causing a recursive call to CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() again that is causing a hot deadloop inside do { } while (result == ONCE_ININIT); section. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Matthias Kraft authored
Avoid a memory alignment issue. Signed-off-by:
Matthias Kraft <Matthias.Kraft@softwareag.com> CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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EasySec authored
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EasySec authored
Replace the 'SSL' broken link with SSL_CTX_set_security_level which seems not being referenced from elsewhere Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 12, 2016
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enkore authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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Kurt Roeckx authored
llvm's ubsan reported: runtime error: negation of -9223372036854775808 cannot be represented in type 'int64_t' (aka 'long'); cast to an unsigned type to negate this value to itself Found using libfuzzer Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 11, 2016
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Andy Polyakov authored
In order to minimize dependency on assembler version a number of post-SSE2 instructions are encoded manually. But in order to simplify the procedure only register operands are considered. Non-register operands are passed down to assembler. Module in question uses pshufb with memory operands, and old [GNU] assembler can't handle it. Fortunately in this case it's possible skip just the problematic segment without skipping SSSE3 support altogether. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Richard Levitte authored
When configured no-dso, there are no DSO_{whatever} macros defined. Therefore, before checking those, you have to check if OPENSSL_NO_DSO is defined. Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 10, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
Apparently, pod2html doesn't add ".html" at the end of links, making them useless, so we need to fix that With thanks for the report to Michel <michel.sales@free.fr> Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
This is done by taking one vector, "corrupting" last bit of the tag value and verifying that decrypt fails. Reviewed-by:Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Don't set choice selector on parse failure: this can pass unexpected values to the choice callback. Instead free up partial structure directly. CVE-2016-7053 Thanks to Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: -
Richard Levitte authored
The offset to the memory to clear was incorrect, causing a heap buffer overflow. CVE-2016-7054 Thanks to Robert Święcki for reporting this Reviewed-by: -
Andy Polyakov authored
Some of stone-age assembler can't cope with r0 in address. It's actually sensible thing to do, because r0 is shunted to 0 in address arithmetic and by refusing r0 assembler effectively makes you understand that. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Richard Levitte authored
Skip the test if the value after ":" is a disabled algorithm, rather than failing it Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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- Nov 09, 2016
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EasySec authored
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Richard Levitte authored
For consistency, it's better to use the perl that was specified to Configure last time it was called. Use case: perl v5.8.8 was first along $PATH, perl v5.22.2 was available and specified as: PERL=/opt/local/bin/perl ./config. When make wanted to reconfigure and called './Configure reconf', configuration broke down, complaining about a perl that's too old. Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 08, 2016
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FdaSilvaYY authored
BN_RECP_CTX_new direclty use bn_init to avoid twice memset calls Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Falko Strenzke for bringing this to our attention. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
libssl, not libddl. Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 07, 2016
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FdaSilvaYY authored
and fix documentation. Reviewed-by:
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Andrea Grandi authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
MD5/SHA1 and MDC-2 have special-case logic beyond the generic DigestInfo wrapping. Test that each of these works, including hash and length mismatches (both input and signature). Also add VerifyRecover tests. It appears 5824cc29 added support for VerifyRecover, but forgot to add the test data. Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
PKCS #1 v2.0 is the name of a document which specifies an algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, often referred to as "PKCS #1 v1.5" after an earlier document which specified it. This gets further confusing because the document PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two signature algorithms, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS. RSA_sign implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. Refer to the document using the RFC number which is easier to find anyway, and refer to the algorithm by its name. Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by:
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