1. 07 Mar, 2019 4 commits
  2. 06 Mar, 2019 3 commits
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Update ChaCha20-Poly1305 documentation · f7a6d112
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Correctly describe the maximum IV length.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
      
      (cherry picked from commit 27d5631236325c3fd8a3bd06af282ac496aac64b)
      f7a6d112
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Test an overlong ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce · 9b10d1bf
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
      
      (cherry picked from commit a4f0b50eafb256bb802f2724fc7f7580fb0fbabc)
      9b10d1bf
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 · f426625b
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
      every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
      should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
      front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
      also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
      only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
      ignored.
      
      It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
      Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
      confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
      default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
      the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
      nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
      reused nonce.
      
      Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
      integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
      integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
      affected.
      
      Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
      because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
      applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
      length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
      
      CVE-2019-1543
      
      Fixes #8345
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
      
      (cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)
      f426625b
  3. 05 Mar, 2019 1 commit
  4. 04 Mar, 2019 1 commit
  5. 01 Mar, 2019 2 commits
  6. 28 Feb, 2019 5 commits
  7. 27 Feb, 2019 5 commits
  8. 26 Feb, 2019 12 commits
  9. 25 Feb, 2019 2 commits
    • Richard Levitte's avatar
      Rearrange the inclusion of curve448/curve448_lcl.h · f408e2a3
      Richard Levitte authored
      
      
      The real cause for this change is that test/ec_internal_test.c
      includes ec_lcl.h, and including curve448/curve448_lcl.h from there
      doesn't work so well with compilers who always do inclusions relative
      to the C file being compiled.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8334)
      f408e2a3
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Ensure bn_cmp_words can handle the case where n == 0 · df2cb82a
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Thanks to David Benjamin who reported this, performed the analysis and
      suggested the patch. I have incorporated some of his analysis in the
      comments below.
      
      This issue can cause an out-of-bounds read. It is believed that this was
      not reachable until the recent "fixed top" changes. Analysis has so far
      only identified one code path that can encounter this - although it is
      possible that others may be found. The one code path only impacts 1.0.2 in
      certain builds. The fuzzer found a path in RSA where iqmp is too large. If
      the input is all zeros, the RSA CRT logic will multiply a padded zero by
      iqmp. Two mitigating factors:
      
      - Private keys which trip this are invalid (iqmp is not reduced mod p).
      Only systems which take untrusted private keys care.
      - In OpenSSL 1.1.x, there is a check which rejects the oversize iqmp,
      so the bug is only reproducible in 1.0.2 so far.
      
      Fortunately, the bug appears to be relatively harmless. The consequences of
      bn_cmp_word's misbehavior are:
      
      - OpenSSL may crash if the buffers are page-aligned and the previous page is
      non-existent.
      - OpenSSL will incorrectly treat two BN_ULONG buffers as not equal when they
      are equal.
      - Side channel concerns.
      
      The first is indeed a concern and is a DoS bug. The second is fine in this
      context. bn_cmp_word and bn_cmp_part_words are used to compute abs(a0 - a1)
      in Karatsuba. If a0 = a1, it does not matter whether we use a0 - a1 or
      a1 - a0. The third would be worth thinking about, but it is overshadowed
      by the entire Karatsuba implementation not being constant time.
      
      Due to the difficulty of tripping this and the low impact no CVE is felt
      necessary for this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8326)
      
      (cherry picked from commit 576129cd72ae054d246221f111aabf42b9c6d76d)
      df2cb82a
  10. 22 Feb, 2019 4 commits
  11. 21 Feb, 2019 1 commit