- Sep 04, 2019
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David Woodhouse authored
In commit 6aca8d1a ("Honour mandatory digest on private key in has_usable_cert()") I added two checks for the capabilities of the EVP_PKEY being used. One of them was wrong, as it should only be checking the signature of the X.509 cert (by its issuer) against the sigalgs given in a TLS v1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension. Remove it. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9705)
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- Aug 30, 2019
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9738)
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- Aug 29, 2019
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Pauli authored
It lacks exposure of the `shm*` functions and should prefer the GETRANDOM source. Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9735) (cherry picked from commit 280cc0180862ae6664b88d5ea12cb5f599000d36)
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9734) (cherry picked from commit 46a9cc9451213039fd53f62733b2ccd04e853bb2)
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- Aug 27, 2019
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Cesar Pereida Garcia authored
This commit addresses a side-channel vulnerability present when PVK and MSBLOB key formats are loaded into OpenSSL. The public key was not computed using a constant-time exponentiation function. This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9587) (cherry picked from commit 724339ff44235149c4e8ddae614e1dda6863e23e)
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- Aug 24, 2019
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Pauli authored
There is a problem in the rand_unix.c code when the random seed fd is greater than or equal to FD_SETSIZE and the FDSET overruns its limit and walks the stack. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9686) (cherry picked from commit e1f8584d47a499301fba781086af6885fcf21fec)
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- Aug 23, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
Parsing functions are at liberty to return: 1: when parsing on processing of the parsed value succeeded 0: when the parsed keyword is unknown -1: when the parsed value processing failed Some parsing functions didn't do this quite right, they returned 0 when they should have returned -1, causing a message like this: Line 123: unknown keyword PeerKey When this message (which is displayed when the parsing function returns -1) would have been more appropriate: Line 123: error processing keyword PeerKey = ffdhe2048-2-pub Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9682) (cherry picked from commit f42c225d7f9a0bce0bf46103343402d3f0ad742f)
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- Aug 22, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
The input reading loop in 'openssl dgst' and 'openssl enc' doesn't check for end of input, and because of the way BIO works, it thereby won't detect that the end is reached before the read is an error. With the FILE BIO, an error occurs when trying to read past EOF, which is fairly much ok, except when the command is used interactively, at least on Unix. The result in that case is that the user has to press Ctrl-D twice for the command to terminate. The issue is further complicated because both these commands use filter BIOs on top of the FILE BIO, so a naïve attempt to check BIO_eof() doesn't quite solve it, since that only checks the state of the source/sink BIO, and the filter BIO may have some buffered data that still needs to be read. Fortunately, there's BIO_pending() that checks exactly that, if any filter BIO has pending data that needs to be processed. We end up having to check both BIO_pending() and BIO_eof(). Thanks to Zsigmond Lőrinczy for the initial effort and inspiration. Fixes #9355 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9668) (cherry picked from commit 8ed7bbb411d2a9e0edef928958ad955e0be3d6dd)
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- Aug 20, 2019
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Johannes authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9643) (cherry picked from commit 797a5b7af9d9bbfbcbff4607c10ad5c5595ac785)
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Pauli authored
Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed. Once one such call has succeeded, a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded. This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source. An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy conditions. However, this is no worse than the current situation. An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack. This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the duration of the process's existence. Thus, an attacker would not only need to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in any process. Even one long running process will prevent this attack. The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as Linux kernel 2.0. Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed). Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595) [manual merge]
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- Aug 19, 2019
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9639) (cherry picked from commit 038b381ecf2a988eee4c7bb21074ed0603303bd1)
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Rich Salz authored
Backport of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9602 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9632)
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Mykola Baibuz authored
Fixes #9622 CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9627) (cherry picked from commit faee6b21048623a422d537cdbad24f50c5c21937)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9619) (cherry picked from commit 24d932ec842bc5fdbd5e9b519cecf15a56bc74e6)
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- Aug 18, 2019
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Patrick Steuer authored
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9433) (cherry picked from commit 3ce46435e6ebed69bec0fa3454cc195ced426d42)
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Patrick Steuer authored
Requesting zero bytes from shake previously led to out-of-bounds write on some platforms. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9433) (cherry picked from commit a890ef833d114da3430c2f2efd95e01714704d34)
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9620) (cherry picked from commit 5be78a88aa922a6c43a83a18dbe252c6a358b8e9)
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- Aug 17, 2019
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9614) (cherry picked from commit cae665dfa6ccec743a7f39cf80676d7d2d787e56)
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- Aug 15, 2019
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9599) (cherry picked from commit bf9d6bb83d009923ceb65753c6dd9fa880e8ba92)
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Omid Najafi authored
The error was from the alignment syntax of the code. More details: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/57316823/arm-assembly-syntax-in-vst-vld-commands?noredirect=1#comment101133590_57316823 CLA: trivial Fixes: #9518 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9518) (cherry picked from commit 2a17758940657cc3a97b032104a92f0aa304f863)
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Richard Levitte authored
When OpenSSL is configured with 'no-stdio', TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT shouldn't be defined, as that test uses stdio. Fixes #9597 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9598) (cherry picked from commit 9f643f54236d6cf0d0d24327acd3b858883f0686)
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- Aug 14, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
Actually supply a chain and then test: 1) A successful check of both the ee and chain certs 2) A failure to check the ee cert 3) A failure to check a chain cert Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9443)
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Matt Caswell authored
The function SSL_check_chain() can be used by applications to check that a cert and chain is compatible with the negotiated parameters. This could be useful (for example) from the certificate callback. Unfortunately this function was applying TLSv1.2 sig algs rules and did not work correctly if TLSv1.3 was negotiated. We refactor tls_choose_sigalg to split it up and create a new function find_sig_alg which can (optionally) take a certificate and key as parameters and find an appropriate sig alg if one exists. If the cert and key are not supplied then we try to find a cert and key from the ones we have available that matches the shared sig algs. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9443)
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opensslonzos-github authored
Fix a few places where calling ossl_isdigit does the wrong thing on EBCDIC based systems. Replaced with ascii_isdigit. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9556) (cherry picked from commit 48102247ff513d4c57b40b19c1d432f37b9e4b02)
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Paul Yang authored
Add memory management description in X509_STORE_add_cert, otherwise users will not be aware that they are leaking memory... Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9484) (cherry picked from commit 86333b6e0c5c488130ab237e95b8520891b81bf6)
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- Aug 13, 2019
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Tomas Mraz authored
We should not retry on EAI_MEMORY as that error is most probably fatal and not depending on AI_ADDRCONFIG hint. Also report the error from the first call if the second call fails as that one would be most probably the more interesting one. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9535) (cherry picked from commit 91cb81d40a8102c3d8667629661be8d6937db82b)
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Tomas Mraz authored
Do not try to discern the error return value on getaddrinfo() failure but when retrying set the AI_NUMERICHOST to avoid DNS lookups. Fixes: #9053 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9535) (cherry picked from commit 7f616a00e9232392927099dca1eca70d0d058665)
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- Aug 12, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
A local 'make clean' did some sweeping removals of files execpt for the .git directory. This is a little too sweeping, as other dotted files might be cleaned away if they happen to match the pattern that's searched for. An example is a symlink .dir-locals.el that would keep disappearing if you build in the source tree and do a make clean... So we change this to leave all dotted files alone. Our builds do not produce such files anyway, so this is a harmless (or rather, less harmful) change. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9573) (cherry picked from commit 853094dbe15a49b334f3488fc99a557abf021c09)
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #9244 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9572)
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Denis Ovsienko authored
Fixup INSTALL and a couple man pages to get rid of "the the" and "in the in the". CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9563) (cherry picked from commit 3c74e77bd89e3d5400ab4d640149e27863756579)
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- Aug 09, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9553) (cherry picked from commit 20946b94658416d2fed0b9d9c7adfbe4b7d70515)
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Matt Caswell authored
Create a PSS certificate with parameter restrictions Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9553) (cherry picked from commit 39d9ea5e502114a204750f641ca76ff5b4912401)
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Matt Caswell authored
A default digest of SHA256 was being returned for RSA PSS even if the PSS parameters indicated a different digest must be used. We change this so that the correct default digest is returned and additionally mark this as mandatory for PSS. This bug had an impact on sig alg selection in libssl. Due to this issue an incorrect sig alg might be selected in the event that a server is configured with an RSA-PSS cert with parameter restrictions. Fixes #9545 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9553) (cherry picked from commit 9bcc9f973b2a216461dd6f140e47ef647eb733b4)
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Vladimir Kotal authored
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9415) (cherry picked from commit 8c47e55ee69500e31e80458682c6e022294cd0be)
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Vladimir Kotal authored
fixes #8936 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9132) (cherry picked from commit 861335001b99cfd665030c50ad37a663536a5c0f)
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- Aug 08, 2019
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Martin Ukrop authored
The meaning of the X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY and X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT error codes were still reversed in the X509_STORE_CTX_get_error function documentation. This used to be the problem also in the verify application documentation, but was fixed on 2010-02-23 in 7d3d1788 . Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9529) (cherry picked from commit 6d5aa88d74b67b1bc108e121dea687a4ca67e329)
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Matt Caswell authored
Ensure users understand that they need to have appropriate permissions to write to the install location. Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9268) (cherry picked from commit 7c03bb9fff02b7f08d4654f51f8667584a92cf72)
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Shane Lontis authored
Note a flag needed to be added since some ssl tests fail if they output any error (even if the error is ignored). Only ciphers that handle the GET_IV_LEN control set this flag. Fixes #8330 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9499)
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- Aug 06, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
They incorrectly said that i2d_ECDSA_SIG returns 0 on error. In fact it returns a negative value on error. We fix this by moving the i2d_ECDSA_SIG/d2i_ECDSA_SIG docs onto the same page as all the other d2i/i2d docs. Fixes #9517 Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9533) (cherry picked from commit bbda79976b5c5095c5e6557311c86c623ba335f1)
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Matt Caswell authored
The macro TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST is supposed to hold the ascii string "extended master secret". On EBCDIC machines it actually contained the value "extecded master secret" Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9430) (cherry picked from commit c1a3f16f735057b45df1803d58f40e4e17b233e5)
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