- Feb 06, 2020
- Sep 10, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Bernd Edlinger authored
An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is used and the recipient will not notice the attack. As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777) (cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Due to the dynamic allocation that was added to rand_pool_add_begin this function could now return a null pointer where it was previously guaranteed to succeed. But the return value of this function does not need to be checked by design. Move rand_pool_grow from rand_pool_add_begin to rand_pool_bytes_needed. Make an allocation error persistent to avoid falling back to less secure or blocking entropy sources. Fixes: a6a66e4511ee ("Make rand_pool buffers more dynamic in their sizing.") Reviewed-by:Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
There was a warning about unused variables in this config: ./config --strict-warnings --with-rand-seed=rdcpu Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 09, 2019
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Since commit 7c226dfc a chained DRBG does not add additional data anymore when reseeding from its parent. The reason is that the size of the additional data exceeded the allowed size when no derivation function was used. This commit provides an alternative fix: instead of adding the entire DRBG's complete state, we just add the DRBG's address in memory, thereby providing some distinction between the different DRBG instances. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Provides a little extra fork-safety on UNIX systems, adding to the fact that all DRBGs reseed automatically when the fork_id changes. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1, it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe, which the old CSPRNG hadn't been. The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdb , so the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise. This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach. It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed after a fork is necessary. To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that the child reseeds after fork. CVE-2019-1549 Reviewed-by:
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Billy Brumley authored
Reviewed-by:
Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9821) (cherry picked from commit 1d3cd983f56e0a580ee4216692ee3c9c7bf14de9)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
crypto/rand/rand_win.c(70) : error C2065: 'BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG' : undeclared identifier Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
so results were undefined. Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
For for G=2 and 5 DH_generate_parameters will continue to generate the order 2q subgroup for compatibility with previous versions. For G=3 DH_generate_parameters generates an order q subgroup, but it will not pass the check in DH_check with previous OpenSSL versions. Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
(cherry picked from commit 65936a56461fe09e8c81bca45122af5adcfabb00) Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9813)
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Description ----------- Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new `EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters `EC_GROUP`. This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`: - direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` - direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit parameters argument - ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`) A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the `OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`. Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the documentation. After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`. Motivation ---------- This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits: - the specialized methods have better security hardening than the generic implementations - optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure code-paths for single point scalar multiplication - in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth analysis of the issues related to this commit. It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes. On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given that the field is optional). These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities and their security will benefit from this commit. Related commits --------------- While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves (CVE-2019-1547). The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit: - d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too - 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation. - b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it - 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 branches. This commit includes a partial backport of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555 (commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38) for which the main author is Shane Lontis. Responsible Disclosure ---------------------- This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND. The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull Requests. _______________________________________________________________________________ Co-authored-by:
Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808 ) Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 08, 2019
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
While gcc ignores unknown options of the type '-Wno-xxx', clang by default issues a warning [-Wunknown-warning-option] (see [3]), which together with '-Werror' causes the build to fail. This turned out to be a problem on the 1.0.2 stable branch in the case of the '-Wextended-offsetof' option, which was removed in version 6.0.0, but needs to be kept here in order to support older clang versions, too (see #9446). Incidentally, master and 1.1.1 branch already contained the -Wno-unknown-warning-option option. Due to its special role and its importance, this commit adds an explaining commit message and moves the option to the front. [extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 07, 2019
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Nicola Tuveri authored
This amends the entry added in a6186f39 with the relevant CVE. Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
This leaves VPAES and AESNI support. The VPAES performance is comparable but BSAES is not completely constant time. There are table lookups using secret key data in AES_set_encrypt/decrypt_key and in ctr mode short data uses the non-constant time AES_encrypt function instead of bit-slicing. Furthermore the AES_ASM is by far outperformed by recent GCC versions. Since BSAES calls back to AES_ASM for short data blocks the performance on those is also worse than the pure software implementaion. Fixes: #9640 Reviewed-by:
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Billy Brumley authored
Reviewed-by:
Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by:
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Billy Brumley authored
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Billy Brumley authored
The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present. This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more SCA-robust code. This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form, where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent. It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed programatically with explicit parameters, then calling EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero). The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock timing attacks. CVE-2019-1547 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 06, 2019
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Nicola Tuveri authored
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Replace flip_endian() by using the little endian specific BN_bn2lebinpad() and BN_lebin2bn(). Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
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Nicola Tuveri authored
This issue was partially addressed by commit 972c87df , which hardened its callee BN_num_bits_word() to avoid leaking the most-significant word of its argument via branching and memory access pattern. The commit message also reported: > There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where > the bit length is also secret. This does *not* fully resolve those > cases as we still only look at the top word. BN_num_bits() is called directly or indirectly (e.g., through BN_num_bytes() or BN_bn2binpad() ) in various parts of the `crypto/ec` code, notably in all the currently supported implementations of scalar multiplication (in the generic path through ec_scalar_mul_ladder() as well as in dedicated methods like ecp_nistp{224,256,521}.c and ecp_nistz256.c). Under the right conditions, a motivated SCA attacker could retrieve the secret bitlength of a secret nonce through this vulnerability, potentially leading, ultimately, to recover a long-term secret key. With this commit, exclusively for BIGNUMs that are flagged with BN_FLG_CONSTTIME, instead of accessing only bn->top, all the limbs of the BIGNUM are accessed up to bn->dmax and bitwise masking is used to avoid branching. Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an out-of-bound read. As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation while manipulating it: this should be already done at the top level alongside setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue through responsible disclosure. Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
BN_bn2bin() is not constant-time and leaks the number of bits in the processed BIGNUM. The specialized methods in ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c and ecp_nistp521.c internally used BN_bn2bin() to convert scalars into the internal fixed length representation. This can leak during ECDSA/ECDH key generation or handling the nonce while generating an ECDSA signature, when using these implementations. The amount and risk of leaked information useful for a SCA attack varies for each of the three curves, as it depends mainly on the ratio between the bitlength of the curve subgroup order (governing the size of the secret nonce/key) and the limb size for the internal BIGNUM representation (which depends on the compilation target architecture). To fix this, we replace BN_bn2bin() with BN_bn2binpad(), bounding the output length to the width of the internal representation buffer: this length is public. Internally the final implementation of both BN_bn2binpad() and BN_bn2bin() already has masking in place to avoid leaking bn->top through memory access patterns. Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an out-of-bound read. As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation while manipulating it: this is already done at the top level alongside setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. Finally, the internal implementation of BN_bn2binpad() indirectly calls BN_num_bits() via BN_num_bytes(): the current implementation of BN_num_bits() can leak information to a SCA attacker, and is addressed in the next commit. Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue through responsible disclosure. Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Cesar Pereida Garcia authored
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Cesar Pereida Garcia authored
This commit addresses multiple side-channel vulnerabilities present during RSA key validation. Private key parameters are re-computed using variable-time functions. This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
We also use this in test_tls13messages to check that the extensions we expect to see in a CertificateRequest are there. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
If a TLSv1.3 server configured to respond to the status_request extension also attempted to send a CertificateRequest then it was incorrectly inserting a non zero length status_request extension into that message. The TLSv1.3 RFC does allow that extension in that message but it must always be zero length. In fact we should not be sending the extension at all in that message because we don't support it. Fixes #9767 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 05, 2019
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes #9757 Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
This will never be the case for 1.1.1 so removed. Fixes: comment 1 of #9757 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 04, 2019
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Billy Brawner authored
Fixes #9080 Signed-off-by:
Billy Brawner <billy@wbrawner.com> Reviewed-by:
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raja-ashok authored
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