- Jan 03, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7974)
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- Dec 15, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #7903 Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7910)
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- Dec 12, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Fixes #7883 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7884) (cherry picked from commit 00eb879f)
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Tobias Stoeckmann authored
There was a trailing :w at a line, which didn't make sense in context of the sentence/styling. Removed it, because I think it's a leftover vi command. CLA: trivial Signed-off-by:
Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by:
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- Dec 07, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the method is getting registered. Fixes #7758 Reviewed-by:
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- Dec 06, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
And make RSAErr call unconditional. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
And make RSAErr call unconditional. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then wipe it if there was no actual error. Reviewed-by:
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- Dec 03, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
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- Nov 24, 2018
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David Woodhouse authored
If the private key says it can only support one specific digest, then don't ask it to perform a different one. Fixes: #7348 (cherry picked from commit 2d263a4a and reworked for 1.0.2) Reviewed-by:
Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7610)
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David Woodhouse authored
ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID is documented to return 2 for a mandatory digest algorithm, when the key can't support any others. That isn't true here, so return 1 instead. Partially fixes #7348 (cherry picked from commit eb7eb137 ) Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 23, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Blinding is performed more efficiently and securely if MONT_CTX for public modulus is available by the time blinding parameter are instantiated. So make sure it's the case. Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 22, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
A lacking DCL variable to indicate where it's located was missing. Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 20, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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- Nov 14, 2018
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Vitezslav Cizek authored
dsa_builtin_paramgen2 expects the L parameter to be greater than N, otherwise the generation will get stuck in an infinite loop. Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 12, 2018
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Billy Brumley authored
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- Nov 09, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Fixes #3302 Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 02, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Since 3884b47b we may attempt to buffer a record from the next epoch that has already been buffered. Prior to that this never occurred. We simply ignore a failure to buffer a duplicated record. Fixes #6902 Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 01, 2018
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Pauli authored
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- Oct 29, 2018
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Pauli authored
There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm. This change takes advantage of the primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse without leaking information. Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 28, 2018
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Pauli authored
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- Oct 18, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Previously, the RNG sets `initialized=1` after the first call to RAND_poll(), although its criterion for being initialized actually is whether condition `entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED` is true. This commit now assigns `initialized=(entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED)`, which has the effect that on the next call, RAND_poll() will be called again, if it previously failed to obtain enough entropy. Reviewed-by:
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Also, some readers of the code find starting the count at 1 for EE cert confusing (since RFC5280 counts only non-self-issued intermediate CAs, but we also counted the leaf). Therefore, never count the EE cert, and adjust the path length comparison accordinly. This may be more clear to the reader. Reviewed-by:
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
At the bottom of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-12 and top of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-13 (last paragraph of above https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-3.3), we see: This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA certificates and end entity certificates. CA certificates may be further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued certificates, and self-signed certificates. Cross-certificates are CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different entities. Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between the two CAs. Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are the same entity. Self-issued certificates are generated to support changes in policy or operations. Self- signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital signature may be verified by the public key bound into the certificate. Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public key for use to begin certification paths. End entity certificates are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates. that the term "self-issued" is only applicable to CAs, not end-entity certificates. In https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.9 the description of path length constraints says: The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the keyCertSign bit (Section 4.2.1.3). In this case, it gives the maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may follow this certificate in a valid certification path. (Note: The last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate certificate, and is not included in this limit. Usually, the last certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA certificate.) This makes it clear that exclusion of self-issued certificates from the path length count applies only to some *intermediate* CA certificates. A leaf certificate whether it has identical issuer and subject or whether it is a CA or not is never part of the intermediate certificate count. The handling of all leaf certificates must be the same, in the case of our code to post-increment the path count by 1, so that we ultimately reach a non-self-issued intermediate it will be the first one (not zeroth) in the chain of intermediates. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 12, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
While reviewing last modification in GH#6261 Richard actually spotted the inconsistency, but withdrew the remark, correct one in aftermath... Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 02, 2018
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Nicola Tuveri authored
It appears that, in FIPS mode, `ec_precompute_mont_data()` always failed but the error was ignored until commit e3ab8cc4 from #6810. The actual problem lies in the fact that access to the `mont_data` field of an `EC_GROUP` struct should always be guarded by an `EC_GROUP_VERSION(group)` check to avoid OOB accesses, because `group` might come from the FIPS module, which does not define the `mont_data` field inside the EC_GROUP structure. This commit adds the required check before any access to `group->mont_data` in `EC_GROUP_set_generator()`. Fixes #7127 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 26, 2018
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Pauli authored
Manual merge of #7047 to 1.0.2-stable. Reviewed-by:
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Manikantan Subramanian authored
Fixes #7228 The function BIO_get_host_ip uses gethostbyname, which is not thread safe and hence we grab a lock. In multi-threaded applications, this lock sometimes causes performance bottlenecks. This patch uses the function gethostbyname_r (thread safe version), when available. Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 24, 2018
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Daniel Bevenius authored
This commit documents the OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT which is currently missing in the man page. Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 21, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
This module includes bn.h via other headers, so it picks up the definition from there and doesn't need to define them locally (any more?). Worst case scenario, the redefinition may be different and cause all sorts of compile errors. Fixes #7227 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 20, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Fixes #7240 In FIPS mode, the default FIPS DRBG uses the drbg_get_entropy() callback to reseed itself, which is provided by the wrapping libcrypto library. This callback in turn uses ssleay_rand_bytes() to generate random bytes. Now ssleay_rand_bytes() calls RAND_poll() once on first call to seed itself, but RAND_poll() is never called again (unless the application calls RAND_poll() explicitely). This implies that whenever the DRBG reseeds itself (which happens every 2^14 generate requests) this happens without obtaining fresh random data from the operating system's entropy sources. This patch forces a reseed from system entropy sources on every call to drbg_get_entropy(). In contrary to the automatic reseeding of the DRBG in master, this reseeding does not break applications running in a chroot() environment (see c7504aeb ), because the SSLEAY PRNG does not maintain an error state. (It does not even check the return value of RAND_poll() on its instantiation.) In the worst case, if no random device is available for reseeding, no fresh entropy will be added to the SSLEAY PRNG but it will happily continue to generate random bytes as 'entropy' input for the DRBG's reseeding, which is just as good (or bad) as before this patch. To prevent ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system() (and hence RAND_poll()) from being called twice during instantiation, a separate drbg_get_nonce() callback has been introduced, which is identical with the previous implementation of drbg_get_entropy(). Reviewed-by:
Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7259)
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Richard Levitte authored
These both indicate that the file descriptor we're trying to use as a terminal isn't, in fact, a terminal. Fixes #7271 Reviewed-by:
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