There were some memory leaks in the creation of an SRP verifier (both on
successful completion and also on some error paths).

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

The -srpvfile option was broken in the srp command line app. Using it would
always result in "-dbfile and -configfile cannot be specified together."
The error message is also wrong because the option is "-srpvfile" not
"-dbfile", so that has been fixed too.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

PR#3817

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

There actually is a "srp" feature to check the availability on

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

There actually is a "jpake" feature to check the availability on

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

These tests were checking for specific sha variants, when they should
just check if "sha" is disabled.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

It depended on 'openssl no-wp', which always exited with code 0, so
this test would never be performed, and this, I never discovered that
the program it's supposed to run was misspellt.  Furthermore, the
feature to check is 'whirlpool', not 'wp'.

All corrected.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

I have no clue why MD_GHOST94 was checked on, there is no
OPENSSL_NO_MD_GHOST94 in sight anywhere

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Have a look at the directories in crypto/, I found reason to add
checks on CMAC and HMAC.  This might be completely irrelevant, but I
prefered covering too much than not enough.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

A grep of OPENSSL_NO_ in the rest of the source tree revealed a few
more features to check.

NOTE: there are some of those macros that I ignore because a check of
them doesn't seem useful to external apps.  This might change later on.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

After a grep of OPENSSL_NO_ in apps/*.c, a few more features that may
be interesting to check the availability of came up.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

I've tried to make this list as complete as possible, based on
information found in apps/progs.pl.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Add Utils.pm for test utilities. This currently just contains one function:
disabled which checks if a feature is disabled based on the output of
openssl list -disabled

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

OPENSSL_NO_ECA changed to OPENSSL_NO_EC

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Obvious typo, and it took configuring with 'zlib' to discover it,
otherwise there was a previous skip that bypassed this section
entirely.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

TLSProxy was failing if we are Configured with compression because it
doesn't support it. This fix simply switches compression off for the
purposes of the test.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

New option "openssl list -disabled" this lists a set of disabled features
in a form which can be conveniently parsed by the test framework so it
knows which tests to skip.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

When an OID is decoded see if it exists in the registered OID table
and if so return the shared OID instead of dynamically allocating
an ASN1_OBJECT.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

If test/recipes/40-test_rehash.t is executed as root, the last test
will fail, since the created directory will remain writable no matter
what.  Make sure it complains loudly about being run as root.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

It's unused, and the same functionality can be achieved with saving a
copy of the struct.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

In master we have the function OPENSSL_clear_free(x,y), which immediately
returns if x == NULL. In <=1.0.2 this function does not exist so we have to
do:
OPENSSL_cleanse(x, y);
OPENSSL_free(x);

However, previously, OPENSSL_cleanse did not check that if x == NULL, so
the real equivalent check would have to be:
if (x != NULL)
    OPENSSL_cleanse(x, y);
OPENSSL_free(x);

It would be easy to get this wrong during cherry-picking to other branches
and therefore, for safety, it is best to just ensure OPENSSL_cleanse also
checks for NULL.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Previously, the conversion would silently coerce to ASCII. Now, we error
out.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate.

In particular: reject extra trailing padding, and padding in the middle
of the content. Don't limit line length. Add tests.

Previously, the behaviour was ill-defined, and depended on the position
of the padding within the input.

In addition, this appears to fix a possible two-byte oob read.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

The bookmark API results in a lot of boilerplate error checking that can
be much more easily achieved with a simple struct copy. It also lays the
path for removing the third PACKET field.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Real fix for RT 4033

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Make sure it's valid very early.

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Simplify encrypted premaster secret reading by using new methods in the
PACKET API.

Don't overwrite the packet buffer. RSA decrypt accepts truncated
ciphertext with leading zeroes omitted, so it's even possible that by
crafting a valid ciphertext with several leading zeroes, this could
cause a few bytes out-of-bounds write. The write is harmless because of
the size of the underlying message buffer, but nevertheless we shouldn't
write into the packet.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>