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  11. Jun 07, 2016
  12. Jun 06, 2016
    • Cesar Pereida's avatar
      Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME · 621eaf49
      Cesar Pereida authored
      
      
      Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
      order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
      implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
      certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
      attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
      
      CVE-2016-2178
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      621eaf49
  13. Jun 03, 2016
  14. Jun 01, 2016
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic · a004e72b
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      A common idiom in the codebase is:
      
      if (p + len > limit)
      {
          return; /* Too long */
      }
      
      Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
      limit == p + SIZE
      
      "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
      message).
      
      The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
      defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
      undefined behaviour.
      
      For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
      provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
      values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
      
      Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
      
      CVE-2016-2177
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      a004e72b
  15. May 31, 2016