- Aug 28, 2018
-
-
Andy Polyakov authored
(cherry picked from commit 324b9560 ) Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
-
Andy Polyakov authored
(cherry picked from commit e02c519c ) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_blind.c Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
-
Andy Polyakov authored
In [most common] case of p and q being of same width, it's possible to replace CRT modulo operations with Montgomery reductions. And those are even fixed-length Montgomery reductions... (cherry picked from commit 41bfd5e7 ) Resolved conflicts: crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
-
Andy Polyakov authored
Add bn_mul_fixed_top, bn_from_mont_fixed_top, bn_mod_sub_fixed_top. Switch to bn_{mul|sqr}_fixed_top in bn_mul_mont_fixed_top and remove memset in bn_from_montgomery_word. (cherry picked from commit fcc4ee09 ) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_mod.c crypto/bn_int.h Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
-
- Aug 27, 2018
-
-
Hubert Kario authored
the option is provided in the -help message of the s_server utility but it is not documented in the man page, this fixes it Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7046)
-
- Aug 17, 2018
-
-
Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6916) (cherry picked from commit 0da7358b) Resolved conflicts: crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
-
- Aug 14, 2018
-
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6957)
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6955)
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6951)
-
Richard Levitte authored
Just as was done recently for i2d_ASN1_OBJECT, we also make i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN comply with the documentation. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6943)
-
- Aug 11, 2018
-
-
Richard Levitte authored
Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from the 1.0.2 documentation): For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the data just written. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL output buffer was provided. Fixes #6914 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918) (cherry picked from commit 61140415)
-
- Aug 10, 2018
-
-
Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889) (cherry picked from commit 582ad5d4) Resolved conflicts: crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
-
Andy Polyakov authored
It was false positive, but one can as well view it as readability issue. Switch even to unsigned indices because % BN_BYTES takes 4-6 instructions with signed dividend vs. 1 (one) with unsigned. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889) (cherry picked from commit 83e03437)
-
Andy Polyakov authored
"Computationally constant-time" means that it might still leak information about input's length, but only in cases when input is missing complete BN_ULONG limbs. But even then leak is possible only if attacker can observe memory access pattern with limb granularity. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889) (cherry picked from commit 89d8aade) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
-
- Aug 07, 2018
-
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6881)
-
- Aug 01, 2018
-
-
Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
-
Andy Polyakov authored
(back-ported from commit 37132c97 ) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
-
Billy Brumley authored
Those even order that do not play nicely with Montgomery arithmetic (back-ported from commit 3a6a4a93 ) Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
-
Andy Polyakov authored
New implementation failed to correctly reset r->neg flag. Spotted by OSSFuzz. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810) (cherry picked from commit 70a579ae)
-
Andy Polyakov authored
Originally suggested solution for "Return Of the Hidden Number Problem" is arguably too expensive. While it has marginal impact on slower curves, none to ~6%, optimized implementations suffer real penalties. Most notably sign with P-256 went more than 2 times[!] slower. Instead, just implement constant-time BN_mod_add_quick. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810) (cherry picked from commit 3fc7a9b9) Resolved onflicts: crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
-
Andy Polyakov authored
Note that exported functions maintain original behaviour, so that external callers won't observe difference. While internally we can now perform Montogomery multiplication on fixed-length vectors, fixed at modulus size. The new functions, bn_to_mont_fixed_top and bn_mul_mont_fixed_top, are declared in bn_int.h, because one can use them even outside bn, e.g. in RSA, DSA, ECDSA... Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810) (cherry picked from commit 71883868) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_exp.c crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h crypto/bn/bn_mont.c crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
-
Andy Polyakov authored
The new flag marks vectors that were not treated with bn_correct_top, in other words such vectors are permitted to be zero padded. For now it's BN_DEBUG-only flag, as initial use case for zero-padded vectors would be controlled Montgomery multiplication/exponentiation, not general purpose. For general purpose use another type might be more appropriate. Advantage of this suggestion is that it's possible to back-port it... bn/bn_div.c: fix memory sanitizer problem. bn/bn_sqr.c: harmonize with BN_mul. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810) (cherry picked from commit 305b68f1) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
-
Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810) (cherry picked from commit 6c90182a)
-
Andy Polyakov authored
Trouble is that addition is postponing expansion till carry is calculated, and if addition carries, top word can be zero, which triggers assertion in bn_check_top. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810) (cherry picked from commit e42395e6) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
-
- Jul 26, 2018
-
-
Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> GH: #6794 (cherry picked from commit b9e54e98)
-
Kurt Roeckx authored
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> GH: #6075 Fixes: #6012 (cherry picked from commit feac7a1c)
-
Kurt Roeckx authored
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit. We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> GH: #6075 (cherry picked from commit 74ee3796)
-
- Jul 25, 2018
-
-
Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Jiecheng Wu, Zuxing Gu for the report. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6791) (cherry picked from commit 037241bf) (Only the EC part)
-
- Jul 23, 2018
-
-
Andy Polyakov authored
ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine is called when application attempts to use custom generator, i.e. rarely. Even though it was wrong, it didn't affect point operations, they were just not as fast as expected. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6761)
-
- Jul 22, 2018
-
-
Richard Levitte authored
As per RFC 7292. Fixes #6665 Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6708) (cherry picked from commit b709babb)
-
- Jul 13, 2018
-
-
Alexandre Perrin authored
Change the description for BN_hex2bn() so that it uses the same BIGNUM argument name as its prototype. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6712)
-
- Jul 03, 2018
-
-
Matt Caswell authored
We should validate that the various fields we put into the CertificateRequest are not too long. Otherwise we will construct an invalid message. Fixes #6609 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6629)
-
- Jun 28, 2018
-
-
Rich Salz authored
Fixes uninitialized memory read reported by Nick Mathewson Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6603) (cherry picked from commit 10c3c1c1)
-
- Jun 25, 2018
-
-
Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6586)
-
- Jun 24, 2018
-
-
Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6581) (cherry picked from commit dc6c374b)
-
- Jun 21, 2018
-
-
Nick Mathewson authored
Also, modernize the code, so that it isn't trying to store a size_t into an int, and then check the int's sign. :/ Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6271) (cherry picked from commit c8c25033) (cherry picked from commit 50d06d1c)
-
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6552)
-