- Mar 27, 2018
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Rich Salz authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3292) (cherry picked from commit b3c42fc2)
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Matt Caswell authored
If we don't have OID data for an object then we should fail if we are asked to encode the ASN.1 for that OID. Fixes #5723 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5725) (cherry picked from commit 53c9818e)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Comparison was effectively reduced to least significant bits. CVE-2018-0733 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth. CVE-2018-0739 Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5759)
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- Mar 26, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
openssl x509 -in server.pem -signkey privkey.pem -out server.pem Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5747)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5744) (cherry picked from commit 52814352)
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- Mar 25, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5741) (cherry picked from commit 4bdc25b0)
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- Mar 22, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5726)
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- Mar 21, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #5711 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5712) (cherry picked from commit ab0a3914)
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Samuel Weiser authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5170)
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Samuel Weiser authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5170)
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Samuel Weiser authored
Replaced variable-time GCD with consttime inversion to avoid side-channel attacks on RSA key generation Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5170)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Various code-cleanups. Use SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) insead of handling SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ everywhere. Turn off the linger option on connected sockets to avoid failure. Add BIO_set_conn_mode(conn, BIO_SOCK_NODELAY) to improve thruput. Continue test even without -cipher option as in 1.0.2. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5698)
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Matt Caswell authored
For DTLS/SCTP we were waiting for a dry event during the call to tls_finish_handshake(). This function just tidies up various internal things, and after it completes the handshake is over. I can find no good reason for waiting for a dry event here, and nothing in RFC6083 suggests to me that we should need to. More importantly though it seems to be wrong. It is perfectly possible for a peer to send app data/alerts/new handshake while we are still cleaning up our handshake. If this happens then we will never get the dry event and so we cannot continue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5085)
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Matt Caswell authored
At a couple of points in a DTLS/SCTP handshake we need to wait for a dry event before continuing. However if an alert has been sent by the peer then we will never receive that dry event and an infinite loop results. This commit changes things so that we attempt to read a message if we are waiting for a dry event but haven't got one yet. This should never succeed, but any alerts will be processed. Fixes #4763 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5085)
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
The sid_ctx is something of a "certificate request context" or a "session ID context" -- something from the application that gives extra indication of what sort of thing this session is/was for/from. Without a sid_ctx, we only know that there is a session that we issued, but it could have come from a number of things, especially with an external (shared) session cache. Accordingly, when resuming, we will hard-error the handshake when presented with a session with zero-length sid_ctx and SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set -- we simply have no information about the peer to verify, so the verification must fail. In order to prevent these future handshake failures, proactively decline to add the problematic sessions to the session cache. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5175) (cherry picked from commit d316cdcf)
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- Mar 20, 2018
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Pauli authored
Refer #5682 This is the same but for 1.1.0 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5683)
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Johannes Bauer authored
Give meaningful error messages when the user incorrectly uses pkeyutl; backport to OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable, cherrypicked from f6add6ac . Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5699)
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- Mar 19, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
We did the SSL_CONF_cmd() pass last of all things that could affect the SSL ctx. However, the results of this, for example: -max_protocol TLSv1.3 -tls1_2 ... would mean that the protocol min got set to TLSv1.2 and the protocol max to TLSv1.3, when they should clearly both be TLSv1.2. However, if we see the SSL_CONF_cmd() switches as generic and those internal to s_client and s_server as specialisations, we get something that makes a little more sense. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5679) (cherry picked from commit 8f8be103)
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Richard Levitte authored
Have all test programs using that function specify those versions. Additionally, have the remaining test programs that use SSL_CTX_new directly specify at least the maximum protocol version. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5662)
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Richard Levitte authored
Partially fixes #5661 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5662)
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Richard Levitte authored
If for nothing else, they are needed when doing a regression test Partially fixes #5661 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5662)
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Richard Levitte authored
When doing a regression test, it's obvious that the version test/shlibloadtest is built for will not be the same as the library version. So we change the test to check for assumed compatibility. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5620)
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Richard Levitte authored
This is only useful when building shared libraries. This allows us to run our tests against newer libraries when the time comes. Simply do this: OPENSSL_REGRESSION=/other/OpenSSL/build/tree make test ($OPENSSL_REGRESSION *must* be an absolute path) Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5620)
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- Mar 17, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5651)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5649)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes: #5567 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5624) (cherry picked from commit d288d7fc)
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- Mar 15, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5635) (cherry picked from commit ad3350a9)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5627)
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Matt Caswell authored
It is quite likely for there to be multiple certificates with empty subjects, which are still distinct because of subjectAltName. Therefore we allow multiple certificates with an empty Subject even if unique_subject is set to yes. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5627)
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Matt Caswell authored
Commit 87e8feca (16 years ago!) introduced a bug where if we are attempting to insert a cert with a duplicate subject name, and duplicate subject names are not allowed (which is the default), then we get an unhelpful error message back (error number 2). Prior to that commit we got a helpful error message which displayed details of the conflicting entry in the database. That commit was itself attempting to fix a bug with the noemailDN option where we were setting the subject field in the database too early (before extensions had made any amendments to it). This PR moves the check for a conflicting Subject name until after all changes to the Subject have been made by extensions etc. This also, co-incidentally fixes the ca crashing bug described in issue 5109. Fixes #5109 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5627)
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Matt Caswell authored
This reverts commit f2982ad7 . Empty Subjects should be permissible. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5627)
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Matt Caswell authored
This reverts commit 462163e9 . Empty subjects should be permissible. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5627)
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- Mar 12, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
We should be using ASN1_OBJECT_free() not OPENSSL_free(). Fixes #5568 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5598)
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