- 03 Jun, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
Fix typos and clarify a few things in the CONTRIBUTING file. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 01 Jun, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
A common idiom in the codebase is: if (p + len > limit) { return; /* Too long */ } Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and limit == p + SIZE "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS message). The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually undefined behaviour. For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2177 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 26 May, 2016 2 commits
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot continue due to malloc failure. Similarly for issuer lookup failures and caller errors (bad parameters or invalid state). Also, when X509_verify_cert() returns <= 0 make sure that the verification status does not remain X509_V_OK, as a last resort set it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, just in case some code path returns an error without setting an appropriate value of ctx->error. Add new and some missing error codes to X509 error -> SSL alert switch. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 23 May, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
The functions SRP_Calc_client_key() and SRP_Calc_server_key() were incorrectly returning a valid pointer in the event of error. Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 308ff286)
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- 19 May, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
In the X509 app check that the obtained public key is valid before we attempt to use it. Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang. Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 11 May, 2016 2 commits
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c393a5de)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 09 May, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
RT#3826 Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2b4825d0)
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- 06 May, 2016 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
PR#4449 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b1f8ba4d)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
PR#4466 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 06227924)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 708cf5de)
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- 05 May, 2016 2 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The default ASN.1 handling can be used for SEED. This also makes CMS work with SEED. PR#4504 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c0aa8c27)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Try to set the ASN.1 parameters for CMS encryption even if the IV length is zero as the underlying cipher should still set the type. This will correctly result in errors if an attempt is made to use an unsupported cipher type. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3fd60dc4) Conflicts: crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
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- 04 May, 2016 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will cause large CRLs to be rejected. Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length. RT#4531 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4e0d184a)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
RT#4527 Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3340e8bb)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b1b3e14f)
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- 03 May, 2016 12 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Only treat an ASN1_ANY type as an integer if it has the V_ASN1_INTEGER tag: V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER is an internal only value which is never used for on the wire encoding. Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug. This was found using libFuzzer. RT#4364 (part)CVE-2016-2108. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> CVE-2016-2107 MR: #2572
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Matt Caswell authored
A few functions in the recently added EVP_EncodeInit docs don't apply to the 1.0.x branches. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error condition. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most likely result in a crash. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2105 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2176 Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is like this: EVP_EncryptInit() EVP_EncryptUpdate() i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls this function directly. CVE-2016-2106 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3f358213)
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- 02 May, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reported by David Benjamin Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 05aef4bb)
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- 29 Apr, 2016 4 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 64eaf6c9)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject excessively large X509_NAME structures. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 9b08619c) Conflicts: crypto/x509/x509.h crypto/x509/x509_err.c
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne(). Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b33d1141)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to restrictions on certificate size. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 295f3a24)
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- 27 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers (e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption anyway. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d78df5df)
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- 26 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore we should make sure we check it. Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 446ba8de)
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- 25 Apr, 2016 2 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
This causes a compilation failure when using --strict-warnings in 1.0.2 and 1.0.1 Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 0ca67644)
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by:
Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 79356a83)
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- 23 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Backport of commits: 79c7f74d bdcd660e from master. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 22 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents small files allocating excessive amounts of data. CVE-2016-2109 Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c6298139)
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