- May 19, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
The return code from tls1_mac is supposed to be a boolean 0 for fail, 1 for success. In one place we returned -1 on error. This would cause code calling the mac function to erroneously see this as a success (because a non-zero value is being treated as success in all call sites). Fortunately, AFAICT, the place that returns -1 can only happen on an internal error so is not under attacker control. Additionally this code only appears in master. In 1.1.0 the return codes are treated differently. Therefore there are no security implications. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3495)
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3465)
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Diego Santa Cruz authored
With the -list option the srp app loops on the main while() endlessly, whether users were given on the command line or not. The loop should be stopped when in list mode and there are no more users. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #1526 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #1526 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
We are quite inconsistent about which alerts get sent. Specifically, these alerts should be used (normally) in the following circumstances: SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR = The peer sent a syntactically incorrect message SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER = The peer sent a message which was syntactically correct, but a parameter given is invalid for the context SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE = The peer's messages were syntactically and semantically correct, but the parameters provided were unacceptable to us (e.g. because we do not support the requested parameters) SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR = We messed up (e.g. malloc failure) The standards themselves aren't always consistent but I think the above represents the best interpretation. Reviewed-by:
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- May 18, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
add_key_share() is a helper function used during key_share extension construction. It is expected to be a simple boolean success/fail return. It shouldn't be using the new EXT_RETURN type but it was partially converted anyway. This changes it back. Reviewed-by:
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- May 17, 2017
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Paul Yang authored
recocognised -> recognised CLA: trivial Signed-off-by:
Paul Yang <paulyang.inf@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
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Todd Short authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Check that a missing sig algs extension succeeds if we are resuming. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The current TLSv1.3 spec says: 'If a server is authenticating via a certificate and the client has not sent a "signature_algorithms" extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake with a "missing_extension" alert (see Section 8.2).' If we are resuming then we are not "authenticating via a certificate" but we were still aborting with the missing_extension alert if sig algs was missing. This commit ensures that we only send the alert if we are not resuming. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
We already did this on an ad-hoc per extension basis (for some extensions). This centralises it and makes sure we do it for all extensions. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Notifications can be (and should be) configured on account basis on the CI web site. This avoids getting emails to openssl-commits for personal accounts that also build OpenSSL stuff. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3484)
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Matt Caswell authored
An alert message is 2 bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 - TLSv1.2 to fragment such alerts across multiple records (some of which could be empty). In practice it make no sense to send an empty alert record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3 prohibts this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not support this at all. Supporting it adds significant complexity to the record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause inter-operability issues. The DTLS code for this never worked anyway and it is not supported at a protocol level for DTLS. Similarly fragmented DTLS handshake records only work at a protocol level where at least the handshake message header exists within the record. DTLS code existed for trying to handle fragmented handshake records smaller than this size. This code didn't work either so has also been removed. Reviewed-by:
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- May 16, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Allow multiple file arguments. Split bntests.txt into separate files. Reviewed-by:
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- May 15, 2017
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Tomas Mraz authored
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Tomas Mraz authored
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Tomas Mraz authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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Pauli authored
[extended tests] Reviewed-by:
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Pauli authored
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- May 12, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Suppose OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE (via Nick Reilly) Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3454)
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Todd Short authored
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Rich Salz authored
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- May 11, 2017
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David Benjamin authored
The assembler already knows the actual path to the generated file and, in other perlasm architectures, is left to manage debug symbols itself. Notably, in OpenSSL 1.1.x's new build system, which allows a separate build directory, converting .pl to .s as the scripts currently do result in the wrong paths. This also avoids inconsistencies from some of the files using $0 and some passing in the filename. Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
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Rich Salz authored
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Todd Short authored
Issue 1: sh.bittable_size is a size_t but i is and int, which can result in freelist == -1 if sh.bittable_size exceeds an int. This seems to result in an OPENSSL_assert due to invalid allocation size, so maybe that is "ok." Worse, if sh.bittable_size is exactly 1<<31, then this becomes an infinite loop (because 1<<31 is a negative int, so it can be shifted right forever and sticks at -1). Issue 2: CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() sets secure_mem_initialized=1 even when sh_init() returns 0. If sh_init() fails, we end up with secure_mem_initialized=1 but sh.minsize=0. If you then call secure_malloc(), which then calls, sh_malloc(), this then enters an infite loop since 0 << anything will never be larger than size. Issue 3: That same sh_malloc loop will loop forever for a size greater than size_t/2 because i will proceed (assuming sh.minsize=16): i=16, 32, 64, ..., size_t/8, size_t/4, size_t/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, .... This sequence will never be larger than "size". Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
BIO_socket_ioctl is only implemented on VMS for VMS version 7.0 and up, but since we only support version 7.1 and up, there's no need to check the VMS version. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Not exactly everywhere, but in those source files where stdint.h is included conditionally, or where it will be eventually Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
In some cases, testutil outputs subtests like this: 1..6 # Subtest: progname The standard set by Test::More (because there really is no actual standard yet) gives this display: # Subtest: progname 1..6 Until the standard is actually agreed upon, let's do it like Test::More. Reviewed-by: -
Richard Levitte authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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Bernd Edlinger authored
- Mostly missing fall thru comments - And uninitialized value used in sslapitest.c Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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