- Apr 01, 2018
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Daniel Bevenius authored
It looks like the usage of these functions were removed in in commit 0a4edb93 ("Unified - adapt the generation of cpuid, uplink and buildinf to use GENERATE"). This commit removes the import/use of File::Spec::Functions module as it is no longer needed by crypto/build.info. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5832) (cherry picked from commit 0e34f37f)
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Richard Levitte authored
Because many of our test programs use internal headers, we need to make sure they know how, exactly, to mangle the symbols. So far, we've done so by specifying it in the affected test programs, but as things change, that will develop into a goose chase. Better then to declare once and for all how symbols belonging in our libraries are meant to be treated, internally as well as publically. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3259) (cherry picked from commit f46f69f4)
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- Mar 31, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
test/cipherlist_test.c is an internal consistency check, and therefore requires that the shared library it runs against matches what it was built for. test/recipes/test_cipherlist.t is made to refuse running unless library version and build version match. This adds a helper program test/versions.c, that simply displays the library and the build version. Partially fixes #5751 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5753)
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- Mar 29, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5788)
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Richard Levitte authored
Instead of invoking the fuzz test programs once for every corpora file, we invoke them once for each directory of corpora files. This dramatically reduces the number of program invokations, as well as the time 90-test_fuzz.t takes to complete. fuzz/test-corpus.c was enhanced to handle directories as well as regular files. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5788)
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Richard Levitte authored
This wasn't a good solution, too many things depend on the quotes being there consistently. This reverts commit 49cd47ea . Fixes #5772 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5773) (cherry picked from commit 00701e5e)
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- Mar 28, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
If a server has been configured to use an ECDSA certificate, we should allow it regardless of whether the server's own supported groups list includes the certificate's group. Fixes #2033 Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5607)
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- Mar 27, 2018
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Philippe Antoine authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5686)
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Miroslav Suk authored
ts/ts_rsp_sign.c: change to OPENSSL_gmtime. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5720) (cherry picked from commit 98c03302)
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Rich Salz authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3292) (cherry picked from commit b3c42fc2)
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Matt Caswell authored
If we don't have OID data for an object then we should fail if we are asked to encode the ASN.1 for that OID. Fixes #5723 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5725) (cherry picked from commit 53c9818e)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Comparison was effectively reduced to least significant bits. CVE-2018-0733 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth. CVE-2018-0739 Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5759)
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- Mar 26, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
openssl x509 -in server.pem -signkey privkey.pem -out server.pem Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5747)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5744) (cherry picked from commit 52814352)
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- Mar 25, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5741) (cherry picked from commit 4bdc25b0)
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- Mar 22, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5726)
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- Mar 21, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #5711 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5712) (cherry picked from commit ab0a3914)
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Samuel Weiser authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5170)
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Samuel Weiser authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5170)
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Samuel Weiser authored
Replaced variable-time GCD with consttime inversion to avoid side-channel attacks on RSA key generation Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5170)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Various code-cleanups. Use SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) insead of handling SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ everywhere. Turn off the linger option on connected sockets to avoid failure. Add BIO_set_conn_mode(conn, BIO_SOCK_NODELAY) to improve thruput. Continue test even without -cipher option as in 1.0.2. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5698)
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Matt Caswell authored
For DTLS/SCTP we were waiting for a dry event during the call to tls_finish_handshake(). This function just tidies up various internal things, and after it completes the handshake is over. I can find no good reason for waiting for a dry event here, and nothing in RFC6083 suggests to me that we should need to. More importantly though it seems to be wrong. It is perfectly possible for a peer to send app data/alerts/new handshake while we are still cleaning up our handshake. If this happens then we will never get the dry event and so we cannot continue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5085)
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Matt Caswell authored
At a couple of points in a DTLS/SCTP handshake we need to wait for a dry event before continuing. However if an alert has been sent by the peer then we will never receive that dry event and an infinite loop results. This commit changes things so that we attempt to read a message if we are waiting for a dry event but haven't got one yet. This should never succeed, but any alerts will be processed. Fixes #4763 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5085)
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
The sid_ctx is something of a "certificate request context" or a "session ID context" -- something from the application that gives extra indication of what sort of thing this session is/was for/from. Without a sid_ctx, we only know that there is a session that we issued, but it could have come from a number of things, especially with an external (shared) session cache. Accordingly, when resuming, we will hard-error the handshake when presented with a session with zero-length sid_ctx and SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set -- we simply have no information about the peer to verify, so the verification must fail. In order to prevent these future handshake failures, proactively decline to add the problematic sessions to the session cache. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5175) (cherry picked from commit d316cdcf)
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- Mar 20, 2018
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Pauli authored
Refer #5682 This is the same but for 1.1.0 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5683)
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Johannes Bauer authored
Give meaningful error messages when the user incorrectly uses pkeyutl; backport to OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable, cherrypicked from f6add6ac . Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5699)
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- Mar 19, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
We did the SSL_CONF_cmd() pass last of all things that could affect the SSL ctx. However, the results of this, for example: -max_protocol TLSv1.3 -tls1_2 ... would mean that the protocol min got set to TLSv1.2 and the protocol max to TLSv1.3, when they should clearly both be TLSv1.2. However, if we see the SSL_CONF_cmd() switches as generic and those internal to s_client and s_server as specialisations, we get something that makes a little more sense. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5679) (cherry picked from commit 8f8be103)
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Richard Levitte authored
Have all test programs using that function specify those versions. Additionally, have the remaining test programs that use SSL_CTX_new directly specify at least the maximum protocol version. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5662)
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Richard Levitte authored
Partially fixes #5661 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5662)
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Richard Levitte authored
If for nothing else, they are needed when doing a regression test Partially fixes #5661 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5662)
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Richard Levitte authored
When doing a regression test, it's obvious that the version test/shlibloadtest is built for will not be the same as the library version. So we change the test to check for assumed compatibility. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5620)
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Richard Levitte authored
This is only useful when building shared libraries. This allows us to run our tests against newer libraries when the time comes. Simply do this: OPENSSL_REGRESSION=/other/OpenSSL/build/tree make test ($OPENSSL_REGRESSION *must* be an absolute path) Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5620)
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- Mar 17, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5651)
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