- Oct 29, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
We made the build of foo.obj depend on foo.d, meaning the latter gets built first. Unfortunately, the way the compiler works, we are forced to redirect all output to foo.d, meaning that if the source contains an error, the build fails without showing those errors. We therefore remove the dependency and force the build of foo.d to always happen after build of foo.obj. Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7469) (cherry picked from commit ecc347f5)
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Richard Levitte authored
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Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7194) (cherry picked from commit 60690b5b)
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Richard Levitte authored
Needed to clear a clash between ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings and ERR_load_crypto_strings Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Believe it or not, the VMS C compiler is remarking on this Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 28, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7510) (cherry picked from commit 040a0347)
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Pauli authored
Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation that can potentially provide a side channel. Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486) (cherry picked from commit 99540ec7)
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Pauli authored
Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack. Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this. Reviewed-by:
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Pauli authored
There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm. This change takes advantage of the primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse without leaking information. Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Found by Coverity Scan Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
This also gave enough reason to collect the stuff that's common for all iOS config targets into the template "ios-common". Fixes #7318 Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7403) (cherry picked from commit 04e3f9a1)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
The new Configure summary box (41349b5e6db) now hides the warning about the missing seed source (2805ee1e ) too much. To make it more visible again, add warning markers. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 27, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes #7394 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Commit 5b4cb385c18a (#7382) introduced a bug which had the effect that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() failed for buffer sizes less than 32 bytes. The reason was that now the added random data was used exlusively as entropy source for reseeding. When the random input was too short or contained not enough entropy, the DRBG failed without querying the available entropy sources. This commit makes drbg_add() act smarter: it checks the entropy requirements explicitely. If the random input fails this check, it won't be added as entropy input, but only as additional data. More precisely, the behaviour depends on whether an os entropy source was configured (which is the default on most os): - If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer content as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular reseeding. - If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail inevitably. So drbg_add() uses a trick to mix the buffer contents into the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: it generates a dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data. Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 26, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
In commit 8bf366519661 some renamings andd typo fixes were made while adding back the DRBG-HMAC and DRBG-HASH implementation. Since the commit could not be backported, a lot of unnecessary differences between master and 1.1.1 were introduced. These differences result in tiresome merge conflicts when cherry-picking. To minimize these merge-conflicts, this patch ports all 'non-feature' changes of commit 8bf366519661 (e.g., renamings of private variables, fixes of typographical errors, comment changes) manually back to 1.1.1. The commits a83dc59afa2e (#7399) and 8817215d5c52 (#7456) failed to cherry-pick previously to 1.1.1, with this patch they both cherry-pick without conflicts. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Since 1fb9fdc3 we may attempt to buffer a record from the next epoch that has already been buffered. Prior to that this never occurred. We simply ignore a failure to buffer a duplicated record. Fixes #6902 Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by:
Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
In commit 820e414d (pr #5247) the summary output of the Configure command was optimized towards instructing people how to create issue reports. It turned out that the wording of this message can confuse new OpenSSL users and make them think that they are seeing an error message. This commit makes the summary output start with a success to prevent a misunderstanding. Also it gives more hints to new OpenSSL users. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Increase the load buffer size such that it exceeds the chunk size by a comfortable amount. This is done to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk (unless it's the only one). Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
The failure of RAND_load_file was only noticed because of the heap corruption which was reported in #7499 and fixed in commit 5b4cb385c18a. To prevent this in the future, RAND_load_file() now explicitly checks RAND_status() and reports an error if it fails. Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 25, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
When building shared libraries on Windows, we had a clash between 'libcrypto.lib' the static routine library and 'libcrypto.lib' the import library. We now change it so the static versions of our libraries get '_static' appended to their names. These will never get installed, but can still be used for our internal purposes, such as internal tests. When building non-shared, the renaming mechanism doesn't come into play. In that case, the static libraries 'libcrypto.lib' and 'libssl.lib' are installed, just as always. Fixes #7492 Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 23, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
This value is used to set DRBG_MAX_LENGTH Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 22, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
This bug was introduced by #7382 which enhanced RAND_add() to accept large buffer sizes. As a consequence, RAND_add() now fails for buffer sizes less than 32 bytes (i.e. less than 256 bits). In addition, rand_drbg_get_entropy() forgets to reset the attached drbg->pool in the case of an error, which leads to the heap corruption. The problem occurred with RAND_load_file(), which reads the file in chunks of 1024 bytes each. If the size of the final chunk is less than 32 bytes, then RAND_add() fails, whence RAND_load_file() fails silently for buffer sizes n = k * 1024 + r with r = 1,...,31. This commit fixes the heap corruption only. The other issues will be addressed in a separate pull request. Thanks to Gisle Vanem for reporting this issue. Fixes #7449 Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 21, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
We only had targets for the "simple" shared library names (libfoo.so and not libfoo.so.x.y on Unix, import library libfoo.lib but not libfoo.dll on Windows). This has created some confusion why it wasn't possible to rebuild the less "simple" name directly (just as an example, someone who mistook the import library on Windows for a static library, removed the DLL and then found it was difficult to rebuild directly), so we change the target to include all possible names. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 19, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
An unknown PSK identity could be because its actually a session resumption attempt. Sessions resumptions and external PSKs are indistinguishable so the callbacks need to fail gracefully if they don't recognise the identity. Fixes #7433 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Previously when a ClientHello arrives with a valid cookie using DTLSv1_listen() we only "peeked" at the message and left it on the underlying fd. This works fine for single threaded applications but for multi-threaded apps this does not work since the fd is typically reused for the server thread, while a new fd is created and connected for the client. By "peeking" we leave the message on the server fd, and consequently we think we've received another valid ClientHello and so we create yet another fd for the client, and so on until we run out of fds. In this new approach we remove the ClientHello and buffer it in the SSL object. Fixes #6934 Reviewed-by:
Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7375) (cherry picked from commit 079ef6bd)
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Matt Caswell authored
Rather than using init_buf we use the record layer read and write buffers in DTLSv1_listen(). These seem more appropriate anyway and will help with the next commit. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #7428 Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
{make|swap|get|set}context are removed in POSIX.1-2008, but glibc apparently keeps providing it. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 18, 2018
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armfazh authored
The formula used for this is now kVarianceBlocks = ((255 + 1 + md_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size) + 1 Notice that md_block_size=64 for SHA256, which results on the magic constant kVarianceBlocks = 6. However, md_block_size=128 for SHA384 leading to kVarianceBlocks = 4. CLA:trivial Reviewed-by:
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Also, some readers of the code find starting the count at 1 for EE cert confusing (since RFC5280 counts only non-self-issued intermediate CAs, but we also counted the leaf). Therefore, never count the EE cert, and adjust the path length comparison accordinly. This may be more clear to the reader. Reviewed-by:
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
At the bottom of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-12 and top of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-13 (last paragraph of above https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-3.3), we see: This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA certificates and end entity certificates. CA certificates may be further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued certificates, and self-signed certificates. Cross-certificates are CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different entities. Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between the two CAs. Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are the same entity. Self-issued certificates are generated to support changes in policy or operations. Self- signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital signature may be verified by the public key bound into the certificate. Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public key for use to begin certification paths. End entity certificates are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates. that the term "self-issued" is only applicable to CAs, not end-entity certificates. In https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.9 the description of path length constraints says: The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the keyCertSign bit (Section 4.2.1.3). In this case, it gives the maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may follow this certificate in a valid certification path. (Note: The last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate certificate, and is not included in this limit. Usually, the last certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA certificate.) This makes it clear that exclusion of self-issued certificates from the path length count applies only to some *intermediate* CA certificates. A leaf certificate whether it has identical issuer and subject or whether it is a CA or not is never part of the intermediate certificate count. The handling of all leaf certificates must be the same, in the case of our code to post-increment the path count by 1, so that we ultimately reach a non-self-issued intermediate it will be the first one (not zeroth) in the chain of intermediates. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 17, 2018
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Antoine Salon authored
Replace ECDH_KDF_X9_62() with internal ecdh_KDF_X9_63() Signed-off-by:
Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345) (cherry picked from commit ffd89124)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Commit ffb46830 introduced the 'rand_serial' option. When it is used, the 'serialfile' does not get initialized, i.e. it remains a NULL pointer. This causes a crash when the NULL pointer is passed to the rotate_serial() call. This commit fixes the crash and unifies the pointer checking before calling the rotate_serial() and save_serial() commands. Fixes #7412 Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
When looking at configured macro definitions, we must look at both what comes from the config target AND what comes from user configuration. Fixes #7396 Reviewed-by:
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Mansour Ahmadi authored
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cclauss authored
CLA: trivial Discovered via #7410 @ https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/jobs/442003489#L440 Reviewed-by:
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