1. 21 Jun, 2018 4 commits
  2. 18 Jun, 2018 5 commits
  3. 15 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  4. 13 Jun, 2018 1 commit
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Add blinding to an ECDSA signature · 0c27d793
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
      ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
      
      s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
      
      The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
      flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
      operations.
      
      As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
      the operation so that:
      
      s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
      
      Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      0c27d793
  5. 12 Jun, 2018 2 commits
  6. 11 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  7. 09 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  8. 08 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  9. 07 Jun, 2018 1 commit
    • Marcus Huewe's avatar
      Do not free a session before calling the remove_session_cb · 6849421c
      Marcus Huewe authored
      If the remove_session_cb accesses the session's data (for instance,
      via SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version), a potential use after free
      can occur. For this, consider the following scenario when adding
      a new session via SSL_CTX_add_session:
      
      - The session cache is full
        (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
      - Only the session cache has a reference to ctx->session_cache_tail
        (that is, ctx->session_cache_tail->references == 1)
      
      Since the cache is full, remove_session_lock is called to remove
      ctx->session_cache_tail from the cache. That is, it
      SSL_SESSION_free()s the session, which free()s the data. Afterwards,
      the free()d session is passed to the remove_session_cb. If the callback
      accesses the session's data, we have a use after free.
      
      The free before calling the callback behavior was introduced in
      commit e4612d02
      
       ("Remove sessions
      from external cache, even if internal cache not used.").
      
      CLA: trivial
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6222)
      
      (cherry picked from commit c0a58e03)
      6849421c
  10. 05 Jun, 2018 2 commits
  11. 02 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  12. 31 May, 2018 2 commits
  13. 30 May, 2018 1 commit
  14. 29 May, 2018 1 commit
  15. 26 May, 2018 1 commit
  16. 24 May, 2018 2 commits
  17. 23 May, 2018 2 commits
    • Viktor Dukhovni's avatar
      Skip CN DNS name constraint checks when not needed · 6d3cfd13
      Viktor Dukhovni authored
      
      
      Only check the CN against DNS name contraints if the
      `X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT` flag is not set, and either the
      certificate has no DNS subject alternative names or the
      `X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT` flag is set.
      
      Add pertinent documentation, and touch up some stale text about
      name checks and DANE.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
      6d3cfd13
    • Viktor Dukhovni's avatar
      Limit scope of CN name constraints · c2c2c7b3
      Viktor Dukhovni authored
      
      
      Don't apply DNS name constraints to the subject CN when there's a
      least one DNS-ID subjectAlternativeName.
      
      Don't apply DNS name constraints to subject CN's that are sufficiently
      unlike DNS names.  Checked name must have at least two labels, with
      all labels non-empty, no trailing '.' and all hyphens must be
      internal in each label.  In addition to the usual LDH characters,
      we also allow "_", since some sites use these for hostnames despite
      all the standards.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
      c2c2c7b3
  18. 21 May, 2018 2 commits
  19. 20 May, 2018 3 commits
  20. 19 May, 2018 1 commit
  21. 18 May, 2018 1 commit
  22. 17 May, 2018 2 commits
  23. 16 May, 2018 1 commit
  24. 15 May, 2018 1 commit