- Jan 24, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2132) (cherry picked from commit 7928ee4d)
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
Well, not as much, at least. Commit 07afdf3c changed things so that for SSLv2 format ClientHellos we store the cipher list in the TLS format, i.e., with two bytes per cipher, to be consistent with historical behavior. However, the space allocated for the array still performed the computation with three bytes per cipher, a needless over-allocation (though a relatively small one, all things considered). Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2281) (cherry picked from commit f1429b85)
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Matt Caswell authored
SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist() was a little too "raw" in the case of an SSLv2 compat ClientHello. In 1.0.2 and below, during version negotiation, if we received an SSLv2 compat ClientHello but actually wanted to do SSLv3+ then we would construct a "fake" SSLv3+ ClientHello. This "fake" ClientHello would have its ciphersuite list converted to the SSLv3+ format. It was this "fake" raw list that got saved away to later be returned by a call to SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(). In 1.1.0+ version negotiation works differently and we process an SSLv2 compat ClientHello directly without the need for an intermediary "fake" ClientHello. This meant that the raw ciphersuite list being saved was in the SSLv2 format. Any caller of this function would not expect that and potentially overread the returned buffer by one byte. Fixes #2189 Reviewed-by:
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Kazuki Yamaguchi authored
ChaCha20 code uses its own custom cipher_data. Add EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV and EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT so that the key and the iv can be set by different calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
- s == NULL can mean c is a new session *or* lh_insert was unable to create a hash entry. - use lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve to check for this error condition. - If it happens simply remove the extra reference again. Reviewed-by:
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ganesh authored
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ganesh authored
According to the documentation, the return code should be -1 when RAND_status does not return 1. Reviewed-by:
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ganesh authored
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- Jan 23, 2017
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FdaSilvaYY authored
it was getting the SerialNumber of a previous cert. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
In a non client-auth renegotiation where the original handshake *was* client auth, then the server will expect the client to send a Certificate message anyway resulting in a connection failure. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
In a non client-auth renegotiation where the original handshake *was* client auth, then the client will send a Certificate message anyway resulting in a connection failure. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The flag SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is documented as follows: B<Server mode:> only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL handshake. Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a renegotiation. This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. B<Client mode:> ignored But the implementation actually did nothing. After the server sends its ServerKeyExchange message, the code was checking s->session->peer to see if it is NULL. If it was set then it did not ask for another client certificate. However s->session->peer will only be set in the event of a resumption, but a ServerKeyExchange message is only sent in the event of a full handshake (i.e. no resumption). The documentation suggests that the original intention was for this to have an effect on renegotiation, and resumption doesn't come into it. The fix is to properly check for renegotiation, not whether there is already a client certificate in the session. As far as I can tell this has been broken for a *long* time. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Repeat for various handshake types Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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- Jan 20, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
When setting the digest parameter for DSA parameter generation, the signature MD was set instead of the parameter generation one. Fortunately, that's also the one that was used for parameter generation, but it ultimately meant the parameter generator MD and the signature MD would always be the same. Fixes github issue #2016 Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 19, 2017
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Markus Triska authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 18, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
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Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1597) (cherry picked from commit 4f326dd8)
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Rich Salz authored
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FdaSilvaYY authored
... mostly related to some old discarded modules . Reviewed-by:
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FdaSilvaYY authored
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Markus Triska authored
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- Jan 17, 2017
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EasySec authored
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- Jan 16, 2017
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xemdetia authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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Kurt Roeckx authored
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- Jan 15, 2017
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Found by oss-fuzz Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> GH: #2231 (cherry picked from commit c2ce477f)
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Kurt Roeckx authored
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Found by afl Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 13, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
RUN_ONCE really just returns 0 on failure or whatever the init function returned. By convention, however, the init function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success. This needed to be clarified. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
The use of EXFLAG_SET requires the inclusion of openssl/x509v3.h. openssl/ocsp.h does that, except when OCSP is disabled. Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 12, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Also, if want SHA1 then use the pre-computed value if there. Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
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- Jan 10, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Fixes GitHub issue 2169. Reviewed-by:
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Found by tis-interpreter Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Otherwise the client will try to process it again. The second time around it will try and move the record data into handshake fragment storage and realise that there is no data left. At that point it marks it as read anyway. However, it is a bug that we go around the loop a second time, so we prevent that. Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 09, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Signed-off-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
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