Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Fixes a travis failure

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Nothing is using this yet, it just adds the underlying functions necesary
for generating the TLS1.3 secrets.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Normally WPACKETs will use a BUF_MEM which can grow as required. Sometimes
though that may be overkill for what is needed - a static buffer may be
sufficient. This adds that capability.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

At the moment you can only do an HKDF Extract and Expand in one go. For
TLS1.3 we need to be able to do an Extract first, and the subsequently do
a number of Expand steps on the same PRK.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Split x509_verify_param_zero code to the right place

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

There were a few places where they could be declared const so this commit
does that.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The name and type of the argument to ssl_check_for_safari() has changed.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The size if fixed by the protocol and won't change even if
sizeof(clienthello.random) does.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Don't use a sub-packet, just load it.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

For consistency with the TLSv1.3 spec.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Add a blank line, take one away - due to feedback received during review.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Based on review feedback received.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

We should be freeing up the raw extension data after we've finished with it.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

In the case of an SSLv2 compat ClientHello we weren't setting up the
compression methods correctly, which could lead to uninit reads or crashes.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Having that code in one central object file turned out to cause
trouble when building test/modes_internal_test.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1883)

For consistency, it's better to use the perl that was specified to
Configure last time it was called.

Use case:

perl v5.8.8 was first along $PATH, perl v5.22.2 was available and
specified as: PERL=/opt/local/bin/perl ./config.  When make wanted to
reconfigure and called './Configure reconf', configuration broke down,
complaining about a perl that's too old.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1884)

BN_RECP_CTX_new direclty use bn_init to avoid twice memset calls

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1879)

Thanks to Falko Strenzke for bringing this to our attention.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1882)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

libssl, not libddl.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1871)

and fix documentation.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1634)

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #1834

MD5/SHA1 and MDC-2 have special-case logic beyond the generic DigestInfo
wrapping. Test that each of these works, including hash and length
mismatches (both input and signature). Also add VerifyRecover tests. It
appears 5824cc29

 added support for
VerifyRecover, but forgot to add the test data.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #1474

PKCS #1 v2.0 is the name of a document which specifies an algorithm
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, often referred to as "PKCS #1 v1.5" after an earlier
document which specified it. This gets further confusing because the
document PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two signature algorithms,
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS. RSA_sign implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.

Refer to the document using the RFC number which is easier to find
anyway, and refer to the algorithm by its name.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #1474

RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode
the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key
operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal.

OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding
round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient
laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html

Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme,
this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This
avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy
ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations
which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature
producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and
accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a
responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical.

In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and
security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not
here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so
this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL
releases.

See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00



As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this
version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces
digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath
wasn't quite doing this right.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #1474

This partially reverts commit c636c1c4

. It also tweaks the documentation
and comments in this area. On the client side the documented interface for
SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() is that setting the flag
SSL_VERIFY_PEER causes verfication of the server certificate to take place.
Previously what was implemented was that if *any* flag was set then
verification would take place. The above commit improved the semantics to
be as per the documented interface.

However, we have had a report of at least one application where an
application was incorrectly using the interface and used *only*
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT on the client side. In OpenSSL prior to
the above commit this still caused verification of the server certificate
to take place. After this commit the application silently failed to verify
the server certificate.

Ideally SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() could be modified to indicate
if invalid flags were being used. However these are void functions!

The simplest short term solution is to revert to the previous behaviour
which at least means we "fail closed" rather than "fail open".

Thanks to Cory Benfield for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

1) Remove some unnecessary fixtures
2) Add EXECUTE_TEST_NO_TEARDOWN shorthand when a fixture exists but has
no teardown.
3) Fix return values in ct_test.c (introduced by an earlier refactoring,
oops)

Note that for parameterized tests, the index (test vector) usually holds all the
customization, and there should be no need for a separate test
fixture. The CTS test is an exception: it demonstrates how to combine
customization with parameterization.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Prior to TLS1.3 we check that the received record version number is correct.
In TLS1.3 we need to ignore the record version number. This adds a test to
make sure we do it correctly.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The record layer version field must be ignored in TLSv1.3, so we remove the
check when using that version.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

We may get failures if we run it in TLS1.3, and it makes no sense anyway
so force TLS1.2

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>