Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

MR: #3176
(cherry picked from commit a73be798)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2a9afa40)

RT4386: Add sanity checks for BN_new()
RT4384: Missing Sanity Checks for RSA_new_method()
RT4384: Missing Sanity Check plus potential NULL pointer deref
RT4382: Missing Sanity Check(s) for BUF_strdup()
RT4380: Missing Sanity Checks for EVP_PKEY_new()
RT4377: Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference
RT4375: Missing sanity checks for OPENSSL_malloc()
RT4374: Potential for NULL pointer dereferences
RT4371: Missing Sanity Check for malloc()
RT4370: Potential for NULL pointer dereferences

Also expand tabs, make update, typo fix (rsalz)
Minor tweak by Paul Dale.
Some minor internal review feedback.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

A function error code needed updating due to merge issues.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks
in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6.

A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with
the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we
have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand
edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked
against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then
we also reject the new record.

If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off
the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record.
If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark
the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge
of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge
is in line with the newly received sequence number.

Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being
sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we
have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or
validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an
unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately,
even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if
currently in a handshake/renegotiation.

This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next
epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very
large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is
moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are
dropped causing a denial of service.

A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this
case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a
message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code
will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number
(as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about
so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be
handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent
legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a
security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the
initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g.
injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and
the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying
to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet.
Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That
issue isn't addressed here though.

This addressed an OCAP Audit issue.

CVE-2016-2181

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Injects a record from epoch 1 during epoch 0 handshake, with a record
sequence number in the future, to test that the record replay protection
feature works as expected. This is described more fully in the next commit.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch
arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or
verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive
the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them.

Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data
that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new
epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the
buffered records if we've not got any data left.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Add a test to inject a record from the next epoch during the handshake and
make sure it doesn't get processed immediately.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Enables the testing of DTLS code in 1.0.2

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

- make the VMS version of RAND_poll() faster and more secure
- avoid pointer size warnings with setvbuf()

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Apply a limit to the maximum blob length which can be read in do_d2i_bio()
to avoid excessive allocation.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 66bcba14)

If an oversize BIGNUM is presented to BN_bn2dec() it can cause
BN_div_word() to fail and not reduce the value of 't' resulting
in OOB writes to the bn_data buffer and eventually crashing.

Fix by checking return value of BN_div_word() and checking writes
don't overflow buffer.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

CVE-2016-2182

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07bed46f)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/bn_print.c

Check for error return in BN_div_word().

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b9afbc0)

RT#4530

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7123aa81)

Thanks to Hanno Böck for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 39a43280)

Conflicts:
	crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c

Fix error path leaks in a2i_ASN1_STRING(), a2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and
a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED().

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting these issues.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #1322
(cherry picked from commit 5e3553c2

)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20fc103f)

Conflicts:
	include/openssl/ts.h

Because proxy certificates typically come without any CRL information,
trying to check revocation on them will fail.  Better not to try
checking such information for them at all.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 790555d6)

Use correct length in old ASN.1 indefinite length sequence decoder
(only used by SSL_SESSION).

This bug was discovered by Hanno Böck using libfuzzer.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e9f17097)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56f9953c)

Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e032117d)

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 976ef6ad)

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/bio_enc.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ee6ce5cc)

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/bio_enc.c

If two CRLs are equivalent then use the one with a later lastUpdate field:
this will result in the newest CRL available being used.

RT#4615

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 626aa248)

RT#4511

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.

CVE-2016-2180

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ed26acc)

RT#4603

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>