Commit 7b415b0e authored by Richard Levitte's avatar Richard Levitte
Browse files

VSI submission: RAND fixups 



- make the VMS version of RAND_poll() faster and more secure
- avoid pointer size warnings with setvbuf()

Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
parent 23ffde2e

crypto/rand/rand_vms.c

100644 → 100755
+72 −51
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@ 
 * Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project

 * 2000.

 */

/*

 * Modified by VMS Software, Inc (2016)

 *    Eliminate looping through all processes (performance)

 *    Add additional randomizations using rand() function

 */

/* ====================================================================

 * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.

 *
@@ -61,11 +66,11 @@ 
#include "rand_lcl.h"



#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)



# include <descrip.h>

# include <jpidef.h>

# include <ssdef.h>

# include <starlet.h>

# include <efndef>

# ifdef __DECC

#  pragma message disable DOLLARID

# endif
@@ -83,77 +88,93 @@ 
# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */



static struct items_data_st {

    short length, code;         /* length is amount of bytes */

    short length, code;         /* length is number of bytes */

} items_data[] = {

    {

        4, JPI$_BUFIO

    },

    {

        4, JPI$_CPUTIM

    },

    {

        4, JPI$_DIRIO

    },

    {

        8, JPI$_LOGINTIM

    },

    {

        4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS

    },

    {

        4, JPI$_PID

    },

    {

        4, JPI$_WSSIZE

    },

    {

        0, 0

    }

    {4, JPI$_BUFIO},

    {4, JPI$_CPUTIM},

    {4, JPI$_DIRIO},

    {4, JPI$_IMAGECOUNT},

    {8, JPI$_LAST_LOGIN_I},

    {8, JPI$_LOGINTIM},

    {4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS},

    {4, JPI$_PID},

    {4, JPI$_PPGCNT},

    {4, JPI$_WSPEAK},

    {4, JPI$_FINALEXC},

    {0, 0}                      /* zero terminated */

};



int RAND_poll(void)

{

    long pid, iosb[2];

    int status = 0;



    /* determine the number of items in the JPI array */



    struct items_data_st item_entry;

    int item_entry_count = sizeof(items_data)/sizeof(item_entry);



    /* Create the JPI itemlist array to hold item_data content */



    struct {

        short length, code;

        long *buffer;

        int *buffer;

        int *retlen;

    } item[32], *pitem;

    unsigned char data_buffer[256];

    short total_length = 0;

    struct items_data_st *pitems_data;

    } item[item_entry_count], *pitem; /* number of entries in items_data */



    struct items_data_st *pitems_data;

    pitems_data = items_data;

    pitem = item;

    int data_buffer[(item_entry_count*2)+4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */

    int iosb[2];

    int sys_time[2];

    int *ptr;

    int i, j ;

    int tmp_length   = 0;

    int total_length = 0;



    /* Setup itemlist for GETJPI */



    /* Setup */

    while (pitems_data->length && (total_length + pitems_data->length <= 256)) {

    while (pitems_data->length) {

        pitem->length = pitems_data->length;

        pitem->code   = pitems_data->code;

        pitem->buffer = (long *)&data_buffer[total_length];

        pitem->buffer = &data_buffer[total_length];

        pitem->retlen = 0;

        total_length += pitems_data->length;

        /* total_length is in longwords */

        total_length += pitems_data->length/4;

        pitems_data++;

        pitem ++;

    }

    pitem->length = pitem->code = 0;



    /*

     * Scan through all the processes in the system and add entropy with

     * results from the processes that were possible to look at.

     * However, view the information as only half trustable.

     */

    pid = -1;                   /* search context */

    while ((status = sys$getjpiw(0, &pid, 0, item, iosb, 0, 0))

           != SS$_NOMOREPROC) {

        if (status == SS$_NORMAL) {

            RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length, total_length / 2);

    /* Fill data_buffer with various info bits from this process */

    /* and twist that data to seed the SSL random number init    */



    if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) == SS$_NORMAL) {

        for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) {

            sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]);

            srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i);



            if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */

                ptr = &data_buffer[i];

                for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {

                    data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j];

                    /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */

                    data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());

                    tmp_length++;

                }

            } else {

                /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */

                data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());

            }

    sys$gettim(iosb);

    RAND_add((PTR_T) iosb, sizeof(iosb), sizeof(iosb) / 2);

    return 1;

        }



        total_length += (tmp_length - 1);



        /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */

        RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length*4, total_length * 2);

    } else {

        return 0;

    }



    return 1;

}

#endif

crypto/rand/randfile.c

+19 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ 
#define BUFSIZE 1024

#define RAND_DATA 1024



#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS

#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64)))

/*

 * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for

 * passing in sharing options being disabled by our /STANDARD=ANSI89
@@ -140,7 +140,24 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) 
    struct stat sb;

#endif

    int i, ret = 0, n;

/*

 * If setvbuf() is to be called, then the FILE pointer

 * to it must be 32 bit.

*/



#if !defined OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER >= 70000000)

    /* For 64-bit-->32 bit API Support*/

#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64

#pragma __required_pointer_size __save

#pragma __required_pointer_size 32

#endif

    FILE *in; /* setvbuf() requires 32-bit pointers */

#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64

#pragma __required_pointer_size __restore

#endif

#else

    FILE *in;

#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */



    if (file == NULL)

        return (0);
@@ -249,7 +266,7 @@ int RAND_write_file(const char *file) 
    }

#endif



#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS

#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64)))

    /*

     * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of

     * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all