(cherry picked from commit a1be17a7

)

Conflicts:
	crypto/pem/pem_err.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Apply a limit to the maximum blob length which can be read in do_d2i_bio()
to avoid excessive allocation.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 66bcba14)

If an oversize BIGNUM is presented to BN_bn2dec() it can cause
BN_div_word() to fail and not reduce the value of 't' resulting
in OOB writes to the bn_data buffer and eventually crashing.

Fix by checking return value of BN_div_word() and checking writes
don't overflow buffer.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

CVE-2016-2182

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07bed46f)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/bn_print.c

Check for error return in BN_div_word().

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b9afbc0)

Thanks to Hanno Böck for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 39a43280)

Conflicts:
	crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c

Fix error path leaks in a2i_ASN1_STRING(), a2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and
a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED().

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting these issues.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e1be1dce)

GH: #1322

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 32baafb2)

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 81f69e5b)

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit af601b83)

Use correct length in old ASN.1 indefinite length sequence decoder
(only used by SSL_SESSION).

This bug was discovered by Hanno Böck using libfuzzer.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 436dead2)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 134ab513)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e9f17097)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56f9953c)

TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.

CVE-2016-2180

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ed26acc)

Ensure things really do get cleared when we intend them to.

Addresses an OCAP Audit issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb5ebf96)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6ad8c482)

While travelling up the certificate chain, the internal
proxy_path_length must be updated with the pCPathLengthConstraint
value, or verification will not work properly.  This corresponds to
RFC 3820, 4.1.4 (a).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30aeb312)

The subject name MUST be the same as the issuer name, with a single CN
entry added.

RT#1852

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 338fb168)

RAND_pseudo_bytes() allows random data to be returned even in low entropy
conditions. Sometimes this is ok. Many times it is not. For the avoidance
of any doubt, replace existing usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes() with
RAND_bytes().

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in
the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation.

CVE-2016-2178

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7d0f283)

Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.

CVE-2016-2178

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 621eaf49)

Fix typos and clarify a few things in the CONTRIBUTING file.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

A common idiom in the codebase is:

if (p + len > limit)
{
    return; /* Too long */
}

Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
limit == p + SIZE

"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
message).

The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
undefined behaviour.

For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2177

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot
continue due to malloc failure.  Similarly for issuer lookup failures
and caller errors (bad parameters or invalid state).

Also, when X509_verify_cert() returns <= 0 make sure that the
verification status does not remain X509_V_OK, as a last resort set
it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, just in case some code path returns
an error without setting an appropriate value of ctx->error.

Add new and some missing error codes to X509 error -> SSL alert switch.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The functions SRP_Calc_client_key() and SRP_Calc_server_key() were
incorrectly returning a valid pointer in the event of error.

Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 308ff286)

In the X509 app check that the obtained public key is valid before we
attempt to use it.

Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c393a5de)

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

RT#3826

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b4825d0)

PR#4449

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit b1f8ba4d)

PR#4466

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 06227924)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 708cf5de)

The default ASN.1 handling can be used for SEED. This also makes
CMS work with SEED.

PR#4504

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c0aa8c27)

Try to set the ASN.1 parameters for CMS encryption even if the IV
length is zero as the underlying cipher should still set the type.

This will correctly result in errors if an attempt is made to use
an unsupported cipher type.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3fd60dc4)

Conflicts:
	crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes
the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will
cause large CRLs to be rejected.

Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will
then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length.

RT#4531

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4e0d184a)

RT#4527

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3340e8bb)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1b3e14f)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>