- Nov 09, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Fixes #3302 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7606)
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- Nov 02, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Since 3884b47b we may attempt to buffer a record from the next epoch that has already been buffered. Prior to that this never occurred. We simply ignore a failure to buffer a duplicated record. Fixes #6902 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7415)
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- Nov 01, 2018
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7549) (cherry picked from commit 00496b64)
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- Oct 29, 2018
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Pauli authored
There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm. This change takes advantage of the primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse without leaking information. Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7512)
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- Oct 28, 2018
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7513)
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- Oct 18, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Previously, the RNG sets `initialized=1` after the first call to RAND_poll(), although its criterion for being initialized actually is whether condition `entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED` is true. This commit now assigns `initialized=(entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED)`, which has the effect that on the next call, RAND_poll() will be called again, if it previously failed to obtain enough entropy. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7439)
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Also, some readers of the code find starting the count at 1 for EE cert confusing (since RFC5280 counts only non-self-issued intermediate CAs, but we also counted the leaf). Therefore, never count the EE cert, and adjust the path length comparison accordinly. This may be more clear to the reader. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit dc5831da)
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
At the bottom of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-12 and top of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-13 (last paragraph of above https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-3.3), we see: This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA certificates and end entity certificates. CA certificates may be further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued certificates, and self-signed certificates. Cross-certificates are CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different entities. Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between the two CAs. Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are the same entity. Self-issued certificates are generated to support changes in policy or operations. Self- signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital signature may be verified by the public key bound into the certificate. Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public key for use to begin certification paths. End entity certificates are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates. that the term "self-issued" is only applicable to CAs, not end-entity certificates. In https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.9 the description of path length constraints says: The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the keyCertSign bit (Section 4.2.1.3). In this case, it gives the maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may follow this certificate in a valid certification path. (Note: The last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate certificate, and is not included in this limit. Usually, the last certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA certificate.) This makes it clear that exclusion of self-issued certificates from the path length count applies only to some *intermediate* CA certificates. A leaf certificate whether it has identical issuer and subject or whether it is a CA or not is never part of the intermediate certificate count. The handling of all leaf certificates must be the same, in the case of our code to post-increment the path count by 1, so that we ultimately reach a non-self-issued intermediate it will be the first one (not zeroth) in the chain of intermediates. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ed422a2d)
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- Oct 12, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7123) (cherry picked from commit d1c008f6)
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Andy Polyakov authored
While reviewing last modification in GH#6261 Richard actually spotted the inconsistency, but withdrew the remark, correct one in aftermath... Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7298)
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- Oct 02, 2018
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Nicola Tuveri authored
It appears that, in FIPS mode, `ec_precompute_mont_data()` always failed but the error was ignored until commit e3ab8cc4 from #6810. The actual problem lies in the fact that access to the `mont_data` field of an `EC_GROUP` struct should always be guarded by an `EC_GROUP_VERSION(group)` check to avoid OOB accesses, because `group` might come from the FIPS module, which does not define the `mont_data` field inside the EC_GROUP structure. This commit adds the required check before any access to `group->mont_data` in `EC_GROUP_set_generator()`. Fixes #7127 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7135)
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- Sep 26, 2018
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Pauli authored
Manual merge of #7047 to 1.0.2-stable. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7300)
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Manikantan Subramanian authored
Fixes #7228 The function BIO_get_host_ip uses gethostbyname, which is not thread safe and hence we grab a lock. In multi-threaded applications, this lock sometimes causes performance bottlenecks. This patch uses the function gethostbyname_r (thread safe version), when available. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7250)
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- Sep 24, 2018
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Daniel Bevenius authored
This commit documents the OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT which is currently missing in the man page. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7301) (cherry picked from commit 7c694957)
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- Sep 21, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
This module includes bn.h via other headers, so it picks up the definition from there and doesn't need to define them locally (any more?). Worst case scenario, the redefinition may be different and cause all sorts of compile errors. Fixes #7227 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7287) (cherry picked from commit dda5396a)
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- Sep 20, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Fixes #7240 In FIPS mode, the default FIPS DRBG uses the drbg_get_entropy() callback to reseed itself, which is provided by the wrapping libcrypto library. This callback in turn uses ssleay_rand_bytes() to generate random bytes. Now ssleay_rand_bytes() calls RAND_poll() once on first call to seed itself, but RAND_poll() is never called again (unless the application calls RAND_poll() explicitely). This implies that whenever the DRBG reseeds itself (which happens every 2^14 generate requests) this happens without obtaining fresh random data from the operating system's entropy sources. This patch forces a reseed from system entropy sources on every call to drbg_get_entropy(). In contrary to the automatic reseeding of the DRBG in master, this reseeding does not break applications running in a chroot() environment (see c7504aeb ), because the SSLEAY PRNG does not maintain an error state. (It does not even check the return value of RAND_poll() on its instantiation.) In the worst case, if no random device is available for reseeding, no fresh entropy will be added to the SSLEAY PRNG but it will happily continue to generate random bytes as 'entropy' input for the DRBG's reseeding, which is just as good (or bad) as before this patch. To prevent ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system() (and hence RAND_poll()) from being called twice during instantiation, a separate drbg_get_nonce() callback has been introduced, which is identical with the previous implementation of drbg_get_entropy(). Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7259)
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Richard Levitte authored
These both indicate that the file descriptor we're trying to use as a terminal isn't, in fact, a terminal. Fixes #7271 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7272) (cherry picked from commit 276bf862) (cherry picked from commit ad173035)
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- Sep 11, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7166) (cherry picked from commit e13dc23c)
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Richard Levitte authored
Since the SSL code started using RSA_NO_PADDING, the CAPI engine became unusable. This change fixes that. Fixes #7131 Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7132)
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- Sep 10, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Found by Coverity Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7169) (cherry picked from commit 512d8117)
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- Sep 04, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
With the introduction of -pkeyopt, the number of bits may change without |newkey| being updated. Unfortunately, there is no API to retrieve the information from a EVP_PKEY_CTX either, so chances are that we report incorrect information. For the moment, it's better not to try to report the number of bits at all. Fixes #7086 Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7096) (cherry picked from commit 17147181)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7112)
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Matt Caswell authored
They did not make it clear how the memory management works for the |pctx| parameter. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7043)
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Jakub Wilk authored
The default input format is PEM, so explicit "-inform DER" is needed to read DER-encoded CRL. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7094) (cherry picked from commit 785e614a) (cherry picked from commit e25fc6b5)
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Matt Caswell authored
Just remove that statement. It's not been true since 2005. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6906)
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- Sep 03, 2018
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7088) (cherry picked from commit 6bcfcf16)
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- Sep 02, 2018
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Eric Brown authored
This trivial patch removes a duplicated call to ASN1_INTEGER_set. Fixes Issue #6977 Signed-off-by: Eric Brown <browne@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6984) (cherry picked from commit 59701e63)
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- Aug 28, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
(cherry picked from commit 324b9560 ) Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
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Andy Polyakov authored
(cherry picked from commit e02c519c ) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_blind.c Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
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Andy Polyakov authored
In [most common] case of p and q being of same width, it's possible to replace CRT modulo operations with Montgomery reductions. And those are even fixed-length Montgomery reductions... (cherry picked from commit 41bfd5e7 ) Resolved conflicts: crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Add bn_mul_fixed_top, bn_from_mont_fixed_top, bn_mod_sub_fixed_top. Switch to bn_{mul|sqr}_fixed_top in bn_mul_mont_fixed_top and remove memset in bn_from_montgomery_word. (cherry picked from commit fcc4ee09 ) Resolved conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_mod.c crypto/bn_int.h Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
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- Aug 27, 2018
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Hubert Kario authored
the option is provided in the -help message of the s_server utility but it is not documented in the man page, this fixes it Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7046)
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- Aug 17, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6916) (cherry picked from commit 0da7358b) Resolved conflicts: crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
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- Aug 14, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6957)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6955)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6951)
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Richard Levitte authored
Just as was done recently for i2d_ASN1_OBJECT, we also make i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN comply with the documentation. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6943)
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