- Sep 28, 2015
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Michal Bozon authored
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
RFC 5077 section 3.3 says: If the server determines that it does not want to include a ticket after it has included the SessionTicket extension in the ServerHello, then it sends a zero-length ticket in the NewSessionTicket handshake message. Previously the client would fail upon attempting to allocate a zero-length buffer. Now, we have the client ignore the empty ticket and keep the existing session. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Jack Danger Canty authored
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- Sep 26, 2015
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Alessandro Ghedini authored
Some builds break, as documented in: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/408#issuecomment-142971427 This fixes it. Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Sep 25, 2015
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The ossltest engine wraps the built-in implementation of aes128-cbc. Normally in an engine the cipher_data structure is automatically allocated by the EVP layer. However this relies on the engine specifying up front the size of that cipher_data structure. In the case of ossltest this value isn't available at compile time. This change makes the ossltest engine allocate its own cipher_data structure instead of leaving it to the EVP layer. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Alessandro Ghedini authored
Otherwise the ./config script fails with errors like: > Operating system: x86_64-whatever-linux2 > This system (linux-x86_64) is not supported. See file INSTALL for details. The failure was introduced by a93d3e06 . RT#4062 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The windows test uses the pseudo file "nul" to indicate no file for the -CApath option. This does not work on all versions of Windows. Instead use the new -no-CApath option. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Add documentation to all the appropriate apps for the new -no-CApath and -no-CAfile options. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
For those command line options that take the verification options -CApath and -CAfile, if those options are absent then the default path or file is used instead. It is not currently possible to specify *no* path or file at all. This change adds the options -no-CApath and -no-CAfile to specify that the default locations should not be used to all relevant applications. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Previously you could only set both the default path and file locations together. This adds the ability to set one without the other. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
As some of ARM processors, more specifically Cortex-Mx series, are Thumb2-only, we need to support Thumb2-only builds even in assembly. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Sep 24, 2015
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Vladimir Kotal authored
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Sep 23, 2015
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Matt Caswell authored
Add a sanity check that the cookie_len returned by app_gen_cookie_cb is valid. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Clarify that user code is required to allocate sufficient space for the addressing scheme in use in the call to DTLSv1_listen. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Use sockaddr_storage not sockaddr for the client IP address to allow for IPv6. Also fixed a section of code which was conditional on OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 which should not have been. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Adds a new man page to cover the DTLSv1_listen() function. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
This commit adds documentation for the new -listen option to s_server. Along the way it also adds documentation for -dtls, -dtls1 and -dtls1_2 which was missing. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
DTLSv1_listen is a commonly used function within DTLS solutions for listening for new incoming connections. This commit adds support to s_server for using it. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The old implementation of DTLSv1_listen which has now been replaced still had a few vestiges scattered throughout the code. This commit removes them. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The existing implementation of DTLSv1_listen() is fundamentally flawed. This function is used in DTLS solutions to listen for new incoming connections from DTLS clients. A client will send an initial ClientHello. The server will respond with a HelloVerifyRequest containing a unique cookie. The client the responds with a second ClientHello - which this time contains the cookie. Once the cookie has been verified then DTLSv1_listen() returns to user code, which is typically expected to continue the handshake with a call to (for example) SSL_accept(). Whilst listening for incoming ClientHellos, the underlying BIO is usually in an unconnected state. Therefore ClientHellos can come in from *any* peer. The arrival of the first ClientHello without the cookie, and the second one with it, could be interspersed with other intervening messages from different clients. The whole purpose of this mechanism is as a defence against DoS attacks. The idea is to avoid allocating state on the server until the client has verified that it is capable of receiving messages at the address it claims to come from. However the existing DTLSv1_listen() implementation completely fails to do this. It attempts to super-impose itself on the standard state machine and reuses all of this code. However the standard state machine expects to operate in a stateful manner with a single client, and this can cause various problems. A second more minor issue is that the return codes from this function are quite confused, with no distinction made between fatal and non-fatal errors. Most user code treats all errors as non-fatal, and simply retries the call to DTLSv1_listen(). This commit completely rewrites the implementation of DTLSv1_listen() and provides a stand alone implementation that does not rely on the existing state machine. It also provides more consistent return codes. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Add the ability to peek at a message from the DTLS read BIO. This is needed for the DTLSv1_listen rewrite. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- Sep 22, 2015
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Matt Caswell authored
The openssl rehash command is not available on some platforms including Windows. This change skips the associated tests if rehash is not available. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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