Workaround for NetWare CodeWarrior compiler which doesn't properly lookup
includes when in same directory as the C file which includes it.

PR#3569
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 333fad9f)

Minor changes made by Matt Caswell

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 64849586)

Minor changes made by Matt Caswell.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f281b8df)

Minor changes made by Matt Caswell.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34890ac1)

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f6720383)

PR#3608

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8a35dbb6)

PR#3574

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3a076588)

the session's version (server).

See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e189b9d)

once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.

(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)

Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e94a6c0e)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	ssl/s3_srvr.c

The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.

An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de2c7504)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES

The client sends a session ID with the session ticket, and uses
the returned ID to detect resumption, so we do not need to peek
at handshake messages: s->hit tells us explicitly if we're resuming.

An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
407886f589cf2dbaed82db0a44173036c3bc3317.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 980bc1ec)

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_clnt.c
	ssl/s3_clnt.c

The same change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
9eaeef81fa2d4fd6246dc02b6203fa936a5eaf67

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3ba508)

This ensures that it's zeroed even if the SSL object is reused
(as in ssltest.c). It also ensures that it applies to DTLS, too.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a06cd5d0)

When no-ssl3 is set only make SSLv3 disabled by default. Retain -ssl3
options for s_client/s_server/ssltest.

When no-ssl3-method is set SSLv3_*method() is removed and all -ssl3
options.

We should document this somewhere, e.g. wiki, FAQ or manual page.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 3881d810)

Conflicts:
	util/mkdef.pl

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Don't attempt to access msg structure if recvmsg returns an error.

PR#3483
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 012aa9ec)

If the hash or public key algorithm is "undef" the signature type
will receive special handling and shouldn't be included in the
cross reference table.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 55f7fb88)

Out is the buffer which needs to contain at least inl + cipher_block_size - 1 bytes. Outl
is just an int*.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5211e094)

PR#3535

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e04d426b)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This doesn't really fix the datarace but changes it so it can only happens
once. This isn't really a problem since we always just set it to the same
value. We now just stop writing it after the first time.

PR3584, https://bugs.debian.org/534534



Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d45282fc)

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d663df23)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fd28a41e)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssltest.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

listed after TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.

RT: 3575
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>

When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL.  We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things.  This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc2

.  Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.

CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a9)

Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c882abd5)

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55c7a4cf)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 40155f40)

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 87d388c9)

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3568

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3567

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5dc6070a03779cd524f0e67f76c945cb0ac38320)

Related to CVE-2014-3513

This fix was developed by the OpenSSL Team

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>