Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.

A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.

Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.

Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.

PR#3286
(cherry picked from commit 71e95000afb2227fe5cac1c79ae884338bcd8d0b)

PR: 2678
Submitted by: Annie Yousar
(cherry picked from commit d572544a)

PR#3302
(cherry picked from commit 9717f01951f976f76dd40a38d9fc7307057fa4c4)

(cherry picked from commit 3009244d)

Make sure there is an extra 4 bytes for server done message when
NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG is defined.

PR#3361
(cherry picked from commit 673c42b2)

(cherry picked from commit 989d87cb)

PR#3249
(cherry picked from commit 8909bf20269035d295743fca559207ef2eb84eb3)

PR#3278
(cherry picked from commit de56fe797081fc09ebd1add06d6e2df42a324fd5)

Use triple DES for certificate encryption if no-rc2 is
specified.

PR#3357
(cherry picked from commit 03b5b78c)

PR#3357
(cherry picked from commit ca3ffd9670f2b589bf8cc04923f953e06d6fbc58)

Conflicts:

	doc/apps/smime.pod

PR: 3317

If the key type does not match any CMS recipient type return
an error instead of using a random key (MMA mitigation). This
does not leak any useful information to an attacker.

PR#3348
(cherry picked from commit 83a3182e0560f76548f4378325393461f6275493)

This patch resolves RT ticket #2608.

Thanks to Robert Dugal for originally spotting this, and to David
Ramos for noticing that the ball had been dropped.

Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

The lazy-initialisation of BN_MONT_CTX was serialising all threads, as
noted by Daniel Sands and co at Sandia. This was to handle the case that
2 or more threads race to lazy-init the same context, but stunted all
scalability in the case where 2 or more threads are doing unrelated
things! We favour the latter case by punishing the former. The init work
gets done by each thread that finds the context to be uninitialised, and
we then lock the "set" logic after that work is done - the winning
thread's work gets used, the losing threads throw away what they've done.

Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

PR#3289
PR#3345
(cherry picked from commit 3ba1e406)

(cherry picked from commit 9c5d953a)

(cherry picked from commit 351f0a124bffaa94d2a8abdec2e7dde5ae9c457d)

(cherry picked from commit 3143a332)

Keep copy of any host, path and port values allocated by
OCSP_parse_url and free as necessary.
(cherry picked from commit 5219d3dd)

(cherry picked from commit 6cc00684)

Use bufsiz - 1 not BUFSIZ - 1 when prompting for a password in
the openssl utility.

Thanks to Rob Mackinnon, Leviathan Security for reporting this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 7ba08a4d)

A short PEM encoded sequence if passed to the BIO, and the file
had 2 \n following would fail.

PR#3289
(cherry picked from commit 10378fb5)

Use a previously unused value as we will be updating multiple released
branches.
(cherry picked from commit 0737acd2)

Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140

Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.

Thanks for mancha for backporting the fix to OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch.

Fix OpenSSL 0.9.8 alert handling.

PR#3038

(cherry picked from commit 5a7652c3)