An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.

Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.

The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()

i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.

The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.

Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.

It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.

This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.

CVE-2016-2106

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f358213)

Reported by David Benjamin

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 05aef4bb)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

If no serverinfo extension is found in some cases, do not abort the handshake,
but simply omit/skip that extension.

Check for already-registered serverinfo callbacks during serverinfo
registration.

Update SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() documentation to mention the need to reload the
same serverinfo per certificate, for servers with multiple server certificates.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 77076dc9)

Conflicts:
	crypto/x509/x509_err.c
	crypto/x509/x509_obj.c

Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne().

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b33d1141)

This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 295f3a24)

The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function
properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers
(e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption
anyway.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d78df5df)

The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore
we should make sure we check it.

Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 446ba8de)

This causes a compilation failure when using --strict-warnings in 1.0.2
and 1.0.1

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 79356a83)

IBM argues that in certain scenarios capability query is really
expensive. At the same time it's asserted that query results can
be safely cached, because disabling CPACF is incompatible with
reboot-free operation.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 670ad0fb)

Backport of commits:

        79c7f74d
	bdcd660e



from master.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in
chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents
small files allocating excessive amounts of data.

CVE-2016-2109

Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c6298139)

As it turns out branch hints grew as kind of a misconception. In
addition their interpretation by GNU assembler is affected by
assembler flags and can end up with opposite meaning on different
processors. As we have to loose quite a lot on misinterprerations,
especially on newer processors, we just omit them altogether.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20b88bb1)

Free up parsed X509_NAME structure if the CertificateRequest message
contains excess data.

The security impact is considered insignificant. This is a client side
only leak and a large number of connections to malicious servers would
be needed to have a significant impact.

This was found by libFuzzer.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

* Perform ALPN after the SNI callback; the SSL_CTX may change due to
  that processing
* Add flags to indicate that we actually sent ALPN, to properly error
  out if unexpectedly received.
* document ALPN functions
* unit tests

Backport of commit 817cd0d5



Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

no-comp on Windows was not actually suppressing compilation of the code,
although it was suppressing its use.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Ensure we check for a NULL return from OPENSSL_malloc

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur.
Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed
to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it
anyway.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ffe9150b)

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

MR: #2341

If there is cause to think LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32 and LD_PRELOAD_32 are
appropriate variables to touch, do so.  Otherwise, touch the usual
LD_LIBRARY_PATH and LD_PRELOAD.  This covers for older installations
that don't have a mix of 32-bit and 64-bit libs.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a772e9d0)

Submitted by Erik Forsberg <erik@efca.com>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86e75432)

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

This improves ABI compatibility when symbol resolution is not lazy.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit adc4f1fc)

Not all assemblers of "gas" flavour handle binary constants, e.g.
seasoned MacOS Xcode doesn't, so give them a hand.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e42e3ff)

PVK files with abnormally large length or salt fields can cause an
integer overflow which can result in an OOB read and heap corruption.
However this is an rarely used format and private key files do not
normally come from untrusted sources the security implications not
significant.

Fix by limiting PVK length field to 100K and salt to 10K: these should be
more than enough to cover any files encountered in practice.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5f57abe2)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Update mk1mf.pl to properly handle no-weak-ssl-ciphers

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

and reorganize/harmonize post-conditions.

Additional hardening following on from CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)