- Aug 13, 2014
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Bodo Moeller authored
group_order_tests (ectest.c). Also fix the EC_POINTs_mul documentation (ec.h). Reviewed-by: <emilia@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
In Makefile, when build manpages, put the current directory at the start of the podpath so that cross-refs find the local directory first. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@cryptosoft.com>
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- Aug 12, 2014
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Ingo Schwarze authored
In two OpenSSL manual pages, in the NAME section, the last word of the name list is followed by a stray trailing comma. While this may seem minor, it is worth fixing because it may confuse some makewhatis(8) implementations. While here, also add the missing word "size" to the one line description in SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(3). Reviewed by: Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk>
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Rich Salz authored
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nnposter@users.sourceforge.net authored
If subcommand fails, just die. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
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nnposter@users.sourceforge.net authored
If subcommand fails, just die. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
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Nick Lewis authored
Update the dgst.pod page to include SHA224...512 algorithms. Update apps/progs.pl to add them to the digest command table. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@cryptosoft.com>
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Nick Urbanik authored
The x509_extensions should be req_extensions in the config example in req.pod Reviewed-by: <tjh@cryptsoft.com>
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- Aug 11, 2014
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Dr Stephen Henson authored
Fully remove old error, per drH Reviewed-by: rsalz
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Jim Reid authored
Add darwin-*-cc as one of the systems for case-insensitive filenames. Fixes the manpage install so it doesn't create looping symlinks.
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Rich Salz authored
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Rich Salz authored
Not approved; mistakenly pushed commit that added README.md
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Scott Schaefer authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper Many of these were already fixed, this catches the last few that were missed.
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Scott Schaefer authored
Many of these were already fixed, this catches the last few that were missed.
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Rich Salz authored
A small markdown README for GitHub users; points them to the right README and the website and RT tracker.
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- Aug 09, 2014
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places to work properly. Specifically: A certificate is not sent. A certificate request must not be sent. Server key exchange message must not contain a signature. If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Undo unapproved commit that removed DJGPP and WATT32
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Viktor Szakats authored
The "unsigned char *d" should be const. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
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Matthieu Crapet authored
Use SSL3_AL_FATAL instead of the literal constant "2" Every bit of cleanup helps. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- Aug 08, 2014
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Rich Salz authored
DJGPP is no longer a supported platform. Remove all #ifdef, etc., cases that refer to it. DJGPP also #define'd WATT32, so that is now removed as well.
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- Aug 06, 2014
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Check SRP parameters when they are received so we can send back an appropriate alert. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code. Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC Group for reporting this issue.
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious server could exploit this in a DoS attack. Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon for reporting this issue. CVE-2014-2970 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Gabor Tyukasz authored
CVE-2014-3509 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding. - Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function. CVE-2014-3508 Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Emilia Käsper authored
CVE-2014-3510 Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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David Benjamin authored
CVE-2014-3511 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
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Adam Langley authored
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice. Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that |frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read. Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam Langley. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Adam Langley authored
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that *ok was zero. I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses |s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can see. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Adam Langley authored
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call |dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the return value, leaking the fragment. This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer. Fixes CVE-2014-3507 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of |msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB (for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS connection. In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no check was applied. Fixes CVE-2014-3506 Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Adam Langley authored
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a |pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double freed. Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct). Fixes CVE-2014-3505 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- Aug 01, 2014
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Bodo Moeller authored
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Bodo Moeller authored
(If a change is already present in 1.0.1f or 1.0.1h, don't list it again under changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.2.)
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Bodo Moeller authored
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Bodo Moeller authored
(which didn't always handle value 0 correctly). Reviewed-by: <emilia@openssl.org>
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