Sync with current 1.0.2 CHANGES file.

     whose return value is often ignored. 

     [Steve Henson]

 Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]

 Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]

  *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)

     for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to

     This work was sponsored by Intel Corp.

     [Andy Polyakov]

  *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission

     structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need

     to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display

     compilation flags.

     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]

  *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03

  *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure

     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.

     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]

     Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the

     TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and

     less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it

     is at least 512 bytes long.

  *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.

     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]

     [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]

  *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():

     this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,

     MGF1 digest and OAEP label.

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with

     existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in

     the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap

     algorithms and include tests cases.

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD

     structure.

     certificates.

     [Steve Henson]

 Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]

  *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted

     handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL

     SSL/TLS clients and servers.

     Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and

     researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)

     [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]

  *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an

     OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing

     in a DoS attack.

     Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.

     (CVE-2014-0221)

     [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]

  *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can

     be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS

     client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary

     code on a vulnerable client or server.

     Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)

     [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]

  *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites

     are subject to a denial of service attack.

     Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering

     this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)

     [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]

  *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display

     compilation flags.

     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]

  *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure

     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.

     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]

  *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.

     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]

 Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]

  *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension

     can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or

     server.

     Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to

     Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for

     preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)

     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]

  *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL

     ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"

     by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:

     http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140

     Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this

     flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)

     [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]

  *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03

     Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the

     TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and

     less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it

     is at least 512 bytes long.

     [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]

 Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]

  *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid 

     handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.

     Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.

     (CVE-2013-4353)

  *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission

     structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need

     to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which

     avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be

     Safari on OS X.  Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for

     several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them.  The bug

     is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing

     10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.

     [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]

 Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]

  *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI

     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.

     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so

     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()

     so it returns the certificate actually sent.