- Nov 09, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Nothing is using this yet, it just adds the underlying functions necesary for generating the TLS1.3 secrets. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
Normally WPACKETs will use a BUF_MEM which can grow as required. Sometimes though that may be overkill for what is needed - a static buffer may be sufficient. This adds that capability. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
At the moment you can only do an HKDF Extract and Expand in one go. For TLS1.3 we need to be able to do an Extract first, and the subsequently do a number of Expand steps on the same PRK. Reviewed-by: -
FdaSilvaYY authored
Split x509_verify_param_zero code to the right place Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
There were a few places where they could be declared const so this commit does that. Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The name and type of the argument to ssl_check_for_safari() has changed. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The size if fixed by the protocol and won't change even if sizeof(clienthello.random) does. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Don't use a sub-packet, just load it. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
For consistency with the TLSv1.3 spec. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Add a blank line, take one away - due to feedback received during review. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Based on review feedback received. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
We should be freeing up the raw extension data after we've finished with it. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
In the case of an SSLv2 compat ClientHello we weren't setting up the compression methods correctly, which could lead to uninit reads or crashes. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Richard Levitte authored
Having that code in one central object file turned out to cause trouble when building test/modes_internal_test. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
For consistency, it's better to use the perl that was specified to Configure last time it was called. Use case: perl v5.8.8 was first along $PATH, perl v5.22.2 was available and specified as: PERL=/opt/local/bin/perl ./config. When make wanted to reconfigure and called './Configure reconf', configuration broke down, complaining about a perl that's too old. Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 08, 2016
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FdaSilvaYY authored
BN_RECP_CTX_new direclty use bn_init to avoid twice memset calls Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Falko Strenzke for bringing this to our attention. Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1882)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
libssl, not libddl. Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 07, 2016
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FdaSilvaYY authored
and fix documentation. Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Andrea Grandi authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
MD5/SHA1 and MDC-2 have special-case logic beyond the generic DigestInfo wrapping. Test that each of these works, including hash and length mismatches (both input and signature). Also add VerifyRecover tests. It appears 5824cc29 added support for VerifyRecover, but forgot to add the test data. Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
PKCS #1 v2.0 is the name of a document which specifies an algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, often referred to as "PKCS #1 v1.5" after an earlier document which specified it. This gets further confusing because the document PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two signature algorithms, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS. RSA_sign implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. Refer to the document using the RFC number which is easier to find anyway, and refer to the algorithm by its name. Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to ho...
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Matt Caswell authored
This partially reverts commit c636c1c4 . It also tweaks the documentation and comments in this area. On the client side the documented interface for SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() is that setting the flag SSL_VERIFY_PEER causes verfication of the server certificate to take place. Previously what was implemented was that if *any* flag was set then verification would take place. The above commit improved the semantics to be as per the documented interface. However, we have had a report of at least one application where an application was incorrectly using the interface and used *only* SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT on the client side. In OpenSSL prior to the above commit this still caused verification of the server certificate to take place. After this commit the application silently failed to verify the server certificate. Ideally SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() could be modified to indicate if invalid flags were being used. However these are void functions! The simplest short term solution is to revert to the previous behaviour which at least means we "fail closed" rather than "fail open". Thanks to Cory Benfield for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
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Emilia Kasper authored
1) Remove some unnecessary fixtures 2) Add EXECUTE_TEST_NO_TEARDOWN shorthand when a fixture exists but has no teardown. 3) Fix return values in ct_test.c (introduced by an earlier refactoring, oops) Note that for parameterized tests, the index (test vector) usually holds all the customization, and there should be no need for a separate test fixture. The CTS test is an exception: it demonstrates how to combine customization with parameterization. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
Prior to TLS1.3 we check that the received record version number is correct. In TLS1.3 we need to ignore the record version number. This adds a test to make sure we do it correctly. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
The record layer version field must be ignored in TLSv1.3, so we remove the check when using that version. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
We may get failures if we run it in TLS1.3, and it makes no sense anyway so force TLS1.2 Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
We have one TLS1.3 ciphersuite, but there is a typo in the id that should be corrected. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
We read it later in grow_init_buf(). If CCS is the first thing received in a flight, then it will use the init_msg from the last flight we received. If the init_buf has been grown in the meantime then it will point to some arbitrary other memory location. This is likely to result in grow_init_buf() attempting to grow to some excessively large amount which is likely to fail. In practice this should never happen because the only time we receive a CCS as the first thing in a flight is in an abbreviated handshake. None of the preceding messages from the server flight would be large enough to trigger this. Reviewed-by:
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