- Feb 05, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2352) (cherry picked from commit fe4075f2)
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- Feb 04, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixed a memory leak in ASN1_digest and ASN1_item_digest. Reworked error handling in asn1_item_embed_new. Fixed error handling in int_ctx_new and EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup. Fixed a memory leak in CRYPTO_free_ex_data. Reworked error handing in x509_name_ex_d2i, x509_name_encode and x509_name_canon. Check for null pointer in tls_process_cert_verify. Fixes #2103 #2104 #2105 #2109 #2111 #2115 Reviewed-by:
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Todd Short authored
session_ctx and initial_ctx are aliases of each other, and with the opaque data structures, there's no need to keep both around. Since there were more references of session_ctx, replace all instances of initial_ctx with session_ctx. Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 03, 2017
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Dmitry Kostjuchenko authored
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Dmitry Kostjuchenko authored
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Dmitry Kostjuchenko authored
Updated indentations according project rules, renamed file-local define to the shorter version - USE_RWLOCK, fixed declaration after the if statement in CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(). Reviewed-by:
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Dmitry Kostjuchenko authored
Fix compilation on platforms with missing pthread_rwlock_t implementation by replacing it with pthread_mutex_t. An example of such platform can be Android OS 2.0 - 2.1, API level 5 (Eclair), Android NDK platform - android-5 where pthread_rwlock_t is not implemented and is missing in pthread.h. In case of missing pthread_rwlock_t implementation CRYPTO_RWLOCK will work as exclusive lock in write-only mode of pthread_rwlock_t lock. The implementation based on pthread_mutex_t must be using PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE mode to be compatible with recursive behavior of pthread_rwlock_rdlock. Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 01, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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Geoff Thorpe authored
The BIGNUM behaviour is supposed to be "consistent" when going into and out of APIs, where "consistent" means 'top' is set minimally and that 'neg' (negative) is not set if the BIGNUM is zero (which is iff 'top' is zero, due to the previous point). The BN_DEBUG testing (make test) caught the cases that this patch corrects. Note, bn_correct_top() could have been used instead, but that is intended for where 'top' is expected to (sometimes) require adjustment after direct word-array manipulation, and so is heavier-weight. Here, we are just catching the negative-zero case, so we test and correct for that explicitly, in-place. Change-Id: Iddefbd3c28a13d935648932beebcc765d5b85ae7 Signed-off-by:
Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Geoff Thorpe authored
Change-Id: I5ab72ad0aae9069b47d5b7b7b9e25bd1b7afa251 Signed-off-by:
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Geoff Thorpe authored
Couple of updates to make this code work properly again; * use OPENSSL_assert() instead of assert() (and #include <assert.h>) * the circular-dependency-avoidance uses RAND_bytes() (not pseudo) Change-Id: Iefb5a9dd73f71fd81c1268495c54a64378955354 Signed-off-by:
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- Jan 29, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
On error, i2o_SCT_signature() and i2o_SCT() free a pointer that may have wandered off from the start of the allocated block (not currently true for i2o_SCT_signature(), but has that potential as the code may change. To avoid this, save away the start of the allocated block and free that instead. Thanks to Guido Vranken for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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- Jan 28, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2314) (cherry picked from commit 929860d0)
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Richard Levitte authored
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Richard Levitte authored
X509_CRL_digest() didn't check if the precomputed sha1 hash was actually present. This also makes sure there's an appropriate flag to check. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
The pointer that was freed in the SSLv2 section of ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list may have stepped up from its allocated position. Use a pointer that is guaranteed to point at the start of the allocated block instead. Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 27, 2017
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Emilia Kasper authored
See https://github.com/travis-ci/travis-ci/issues/6460 for context on the changes to wine install. Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 26, 2017
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Add a client authentication signature algorithm to simple ssl test and a server signature algorithm. Since we don't do client auth this should have no effect. However if we use client auth signature algorithms by mistake this will abort the handshake with a no shared signature algorithms error. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
CVE-2017-3732 Reviewed-by: -
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
When the client reads DH parameters from the TLS stream, we only checked that they all are non-zero. This change updates the check to use DH_check_params() DH_check_params() is a new function for light weight checking of the p and g parameters: check that p is odd check that 1 < g < p - 1 Reviewed-by: -
Andy Polyakov authored
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened. Thanks to Robert Święcki for report. CVE-2017-3731 Reviewed-by: -
Andy Polyakov authored
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory (or bogus MAC value is produced if x86 MD5 assembly module is involved). Since hash operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS condition. Thanks to Robert Święcki for report. CVE-2017-3731 Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 25, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
This function is used to validate application supplied parameters. An assert should be used to check for an error that is internal to OpenSSL. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Don't use the temp variable donelen in the non-aad fragmented code path. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
When doing in place encryption the overlapping buffer check can fail incorrectly where we have done a partial block "Update" operation. This fixes things to take account of any pending partial blocks. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The previous commit fixed a bug where a partial block had been passed to an "Update" function and it wasn't properly handled. We should catch this type of error in evp_test. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
If we have previously been passed a partial block in an "Update" call then make sure we properly increment the output buffer when we use it. Fixes #2273 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Lots of references to 16 replaced by AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Also a few other style tweaks in that function Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 24, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
Instead of looking for "200" and "established" (and failing all other 2xx responses or "Established"), let's look for a line that's not a header (i.e. doesn't contain a ':') and where the first space is followed by a '2'. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
This is 1.1.0-specific 8f77fab8 redux. Reviewed-by:
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Todd Short authored
Remove duplicate defines from EVP source files. Most of them were in evp.h, which is always included. Add new ones evp_int.h EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK is now always defined in evp.h, so remove conditionals on it Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
Well, not as much, at least. Commit 07afdf3c changed things so that for SSLv2 format ClientHellos we store the cipher list in the TLS format, i.e., with two bytes per cipher, to be consistent with historical behavior. However, the space allocated for the array still performed the computation with three bytes per cipher, a needless over-allocation (though a relatively small one, all things considered). Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2281) (cherry picked from commit f1429b85)
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