- Jul 20, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6745)
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Matt Caswell authored
The spec says that a client MUST set legacy_version to TLSv1.2, and requires servers to verify that it isn't SSLv3. Fixes #6600 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Use the latest version of the test vectors available in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-06 Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 19, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
It is not valid to send early_data after an HRR has been received. Fixes #6734 Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 18, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
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David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6664)
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
Originally suggested solution for "Return Of the Hidden Number Problem" is arguably too expensive. While it has marginal impact on slower curves, none to ~6%, optimized implementations suffer real penalties. Most notably sign with P-256 went more than 2 times[!] slower. Instead, just implement constant-time BN_mod_add_quick. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
It was false positive, but one can as well view it as readability issue. Switch even to unsigned indices because % BN_BYTES takes 4-6 instructions with signed dividend vs. 1 (one) with unsigned. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Using the rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 sig alg should imply that the key OID is rsaEncryption. Similarly rsa_pss_pss_sha256 implies the key OID is rsassaPss. However we did not check this and incorrectly tolerated a key OID that did not match the sig alg sent by the peer. Fixes #6611 Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 17, 2018
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Mat authored
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Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
The GOST ciphers are dynamically loaded via the GOST engine, so we must be able to support that. The engine also uses DSA and CMS symbols, so we skip the test on no-dsa or no-cms. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Also fixes a function name typo. Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6729)
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Previously we were failing to issue new tickets if a resumption attempt failed. Fixes #6654 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
If we issue new tickets due to post-handshake authentication there is no reason to remove previous tickets from the cache. The code that did that only removed the last session anyway - so if more than one ticket got issued then those other tickets are still valid. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 16, 2018
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by:Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> GH: #6240
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Kurt Roeckx authored
The config file can override it. In case of the server, it needs to be set on the ctx or some of the other functions on the ctx might file. Reviewed-by: -
Nicola Tuveri authored
By default `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (which uses the Lopez-Dahab ladder implementation) is used only for (k * Generator) or (k * VariablePoint). ECDSA verification uses (a * Generator + b * VariablePoint): this commit forces the use of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` also for the ECDSA verification path, while using the default wNAF implementation for any other case. With this commit `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` loses the static attribute, and is added to ec_lcl.h so EC_METHODs can directly use it. While working on a new custom EC_POINTs_mul implementation, I realized that many checks (e.g. all the points being compatible with the given EC_GROUP, creating a temporary BN_CTX if `ctx == NULL`, check for the corner case `scalar == NULL && num == 0`) were duplicated again and again in every single implementation (and actually some implementations lacked some of the tests). I thought that it makes way more sense for those checks that are independent from the actual implementation and should always be done, to be moved in the EC_POINTs_mul wrapper: so this commit also includes these changes. Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the operands. The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is auto generated with tooling: - see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the `ladder_pre` implementation; - see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3 for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in `ladder_step`; - see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m) without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in affine coordinates. Co-authored-by:
Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Co-authored-by:
Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
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Billy Brumley authored
and catch corner cases better and earlier Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret scalar is feed to the point multiplication). The newly introduced default implementation directly used EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop. The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling and different coordinate systems. - `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R. Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling; - `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could, e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential addition-and-doubling; - `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of the result point. This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`, as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily constant-time themselves. What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar. Co-authored-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Run `make update ERROR_REBUILD=-rebuild` to remove some stale error codes for SM2 (which is now using its own submodule for error codes, i.e., `SM2_*`). Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 15, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Move base 2^64 code to own #if section. It was nested in base 2^51 section, which arguably might have been tricky to follow. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
Base 2^64 addition/subtraction and final reduction failed to treat partially reduced values correctly. Thanks to Wycheproof Project for vectors and Paul Kehrer for report. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 14, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
"Computationally constant-time" means that it might still leak information about input's length, but only in cases when input is missing complete BN_ULONG limbs. But even then leak is possible only if attacker can observe memory access pattern with limb granularity. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 13, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Test that we never negotiate TLSv1.3 using GOST Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Check that we are either configured for PSK, or that we have a TLSv1.3 capable certificate type. DSA certs can't be used in TLSv1.3 and we don't (currently) allow GOST ones either (owing to the lack of standard sig algs). Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #6513 Reviewed-by:
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Alexandre Perrin authored
Change the description for BN_hex2bn() so that it uses the same BIGNUM argument name as its prototype. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6712)
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