- Jan 08, 2015
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Matt Caswell authored
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane. Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the handshake record. CVE-2014-3571 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 56df92efb6893abe323307939425957ce878c8f0)
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- Jan 07, 2015
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4a4d4158)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e464403d)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Jan 06, 2015
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4138e388)
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Emilia Kasper authored
context was also inherited (matches that of the existing SSL_CTX). Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ac8e9cbe)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit cb62ab4b)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Change by SteveH from original by John Denker (in the RT) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 77ff1f3b)
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Martin Brejcha authored
Fix memory leak by freeing up saved_message.data if it is not NULL. PR#3489 Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 41cd41c4)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b691154e)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a protocol violation. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
This is re-commit without unrelated modification. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 0548505f)
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Andy Polyakov authored
This reverts commit caeed719 . Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4fec9150)
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Andy Polyakov authored
This facilitates "universal" builds, ones that target multiple architectures, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv7. See commentary in Configure for details. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c1669e1c)
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- Jan 05, 2015
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. CVE-2014-3572 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b15f8769)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 31c65a7b)
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Adam Langley authored
when its SSL_CTX is updated. From BoringSSL commit https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/a5dc545bbcffd9c24cebe65e9ab5ce72d4535e3a Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 61aa44ca)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4c52816d)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). CVE-2014-8275 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 684400ce)
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Matt Caswell authored
RT3638 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Piotr Sikora authored
RT3638 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Conflicts: ssl/t1_lib.c
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Emilia Kasper authored
This change documents the world as-is, by turning all warnings on, and then turning warnings that trigger off again. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Jan 04, 2015
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Andy Polyakov authored
RT: 3607 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 9e557ab2)
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Rich Salz authored
Check for NULL return from X509_NAME_ENTRY_new() Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2c60925d)
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- Jan 02, 2015
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Since SGC has been removed from OpenSSL 1.0.2 the SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is no longer used. However the #define is retained for compatibility. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of MSIE. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 63eab8a6)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from SRP login and SRTP profile. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4f605ccb) Conflicts: ssl/t1_lib.c
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- Dec 31, 2014
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Dominik Neubauer authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
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- Dec 30, 2014
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Kurt Roeckx authored
RT#3629 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Thorsten Glaser authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
We need this for the freebsd kernel with glibc as used in the Debian kfreebsd ports. There shouldn't be a problem defining this on systems not using glibc. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
The BIO_free() allocated ex_data again that we already freed. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Dec 22, 2014
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Alok Menghrajani authored
* adds links to various related documents. * fixes a few typos. * rewords a few sentences. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 67472bd8)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 7cfab40f)
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- Dec 20, 2014
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Michael Tuexen authored
Return an error code for I/O errors instead of an assertion failure. PR#3470 Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2521fcd8)
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- Dec 19, 2014
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Matt Caswell authored
is run with --strict-warnings. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 488f16e3)
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- Dec 18, 2014
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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